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ABSTRACT 
 
 The National Guard has been an integral piece of the American military structure 
since its creation in 1903, and the Guard can trace its lineage to the colonial era.  While 
the Guard had its origins in the old militia system, by the onset of the Spanish-American 
War, the militia proved to be unable to meet the twentieth century’s military challenges.  
Due to outdated laws and a poor public perception, the federal government instituted a 
series of legal actions designed to replace the militia with a more effective equivalent, 
beginning with the Militia Act of 1903 and ending with the National Defense Acts of 
1916 and 1920.  This dissertation argues that Progressive Era politicians created the 
National Guard within the context of Progressive reform efforts geared toward efficiency 
and centralization.  The new National Guard’s first test as a unified military entity took 
place along the Mexican border in 1916, and the Guard had its chance to prove its mettle 
in the trenches of the First World War.  Furthermore, the National Guard serves as a 
laboratory through which to better understand American society during the Gilded Age 
and Progressive Era, and military attitudes closely mirrored civilian attitudes, and 
illustrated the emerging class consciousness among the new middle class.  This middle-
class mindset drove Progressive reform efforts and culminated in the National Guard’s 
coalescence into a functional and effective military force.
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
 The modern National Guard describes itself as “a unique and essential element of 
the U.S. military.  Founded in 1636 as a citizen force organized to protect families and 
towns from hostile attacks, today’s National Guard Soldiers hold civilian jobs or attend 
college while maintaining their military training part time, always ready to defend the 
American way of life in the event of an emergency.”1  The National Guard’s self-
assessment includes many important elements of modern and historical Guard service, 
but also offers a vague description of the Guard’s often chaotic past.  Although the 
modern National Guard traces its heritage to the colonial militia system, the Guard is 
actually a modern creation, drawn from Progressive Era political and social trends.  
Congressional, military, and civil leaders lobbied for a modernized military force at the 
end of the nineteenth century due to extreme inefficiencies in the militia system.  When 
the United States Congress established the official National Guard in 1903, they 
established the basis of the modern American military structure.2 
 The National Guard’s creation ushered in a new phase of American military 
culture, where the US peacetime and wartime military structure permanently incorporated 
citizen-soldiers.  However, an equally important aspect of the Guard’s history lies in its 
ability to illuminate social issues at specific time periods and bridge the gap between civil 
and military elements.  Prior to 1903, the United States military included elements of the 
Regular Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, with each state maintaining a militia 
                                                          
1 “The National Guard’s Legacy,” accessed April 14, 2016 http://www.nationalguard.com/legacy. 
2 Though the terms “militia” and “National Guard” were used interchangeably near the end of the 
nineteenth-century, this work will refer to the militia as a pre-1903 organization and the National Guard 
as a twentieth-century military force.  This is due to the official nature of federal law, which did not 
officially create the National Guard until 1903.  But because many states adopted the term prior to 1900 
(as did the National Guard Association), the term “National Guard” may appear in a pre-1903 sense when 
specific units are mentioned. 
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component.  After 1903, the federal government established the National Guard as a 
replacement to the antiquated militia system, and over the course of the next two decades, 
the National Guard became a key piece of the US Army’s force structure.  Extreme levels 
of inefficiency during mobilization for the Spanish-American War, combined with 
increased levels of social strife—particularly regarding the militia’s role in labor 
disputes—demonstrated the failures of the nineteenth century military structure.3   
 Oftentimes, class struggles and worker strikes created a need for social order that 
local police and constabularies could rarely enforce.  The fact that business and political 
leaders often flung the militia into the middle of cultural and social antagonisms during 
the final three decades of the nineteenth century influenced the militia’s changing role in 
popular imagination.  These perceptions limited the militia’s ability to perform its 
mission adequately, and the federal government took steps to centralize the new National 
Guard during the Progressive Era.  Between 1903 and 1916, the National Guard evolved 
into an efficient military organization with high levels of federal oversight.  This 
transition coincided with general trends in American society, where civic leaders sought 
reform oriented toward efficiency, cohesion, and proficiency.  Ultimately, by the end of 
the First World War, the National Guard was only a shadow of the old militia, and its 
identity had shifted from a prominently state-oriented organization to a national one. 
Additionally, unlike soldiers in the Regular Army, who often represented a lower 
strata of society, National Guard troops came from a large cross-section of society and 
served in a dual capacity as civilians and soldiers, and they spent the majority of their 
time in civilian professions.  Therefore, guardsmen transcended America’s class system 
                                                          
3 John K. Mahon, History of the Militia and National Guard (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 
1983) 138-40. 
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and embodied changing notions of civic duty, virtue, masculinity, and class relationships.  
This dissertation will closely examine the militia and National Guard in the American 
Midwest between 1877 and 1924 because this region embodied national trends.  While 
regional differences pertaining to militia and National Guard service and attitudes existed 
during the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, the American Midwest encapsulated national 
trends.  As a region, the Midwest has been simultaneously rural and urban, and densely 
populated cities such as Chicago existed in the same region as Pacific Junction, Iowa.   
Contrary to popular perceptions, the Midwest’s racial, ethnic, and cultural 
diversity makes it a truly distinct region with a comprehensive cultural identity.  While 
many Americans identify the Midwest as a “normative” site, the region was in fact truly 
transformative and was not divorced from social conflicts usually associated with the 
South, West, and Northeast.  In the decades following Reconstruction, militia and 
National Guard units in the Midwest reorganized and coalesced into centralized and 
efficient military entities.  Between 1877 and the First World War’s onset, Midwestern 
militia and Guard companies and regiments became embroiled in the same social tensions 
associated with labor disputes in the Northeast and racial strife in the South.  
Furthermore, the Guard’s development and formation in the American Midwest reflected 
national trends, and the Midwestern National Guard serves as a laboratory to better 
understand American society during the Gilded Age and Progressive Era.  Military 
attitudes closely mirrored civilian attitudes, and illustrated the class consciousness among 
the emerging middle-class.   
 Regarding larger trends in military history, historians can gain a better 
understanding of socio-military issues during wartime and peacetime from National 
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Guard troops.  Eric Dean noted in his influential work, Shook Over Hell, that when 
examining small units, “the greater purpose and flow of the war is rarely evident; to the 
common soldier in all eras, war has seemed a chaotic and terrifying business.”4  In some 
ways, new military history’s emphases on individual troops and small units led to an 
oversight regarding the “big picture” of American wars.  However, letters and diaries of 
Guard troops often contain detailed accounts of the political, social, and cultural issues of 
the day, and thus can offer insights regarding the common soldier’s experience as well as 
the “greater purpose and flow” of the war.  Therefore, the National Guard’s identity went 
beyond traditional social spheres and boundaries.  Increased historical analysis regarding 
the National Guard will illuminate another layer of the Progressive Era’s social and 
cultural trends.  The National Guard serves as a prism through which historians can 
examine American social developments related to civic virtue and class identity within a 
larger political and social context. 
*** 
Historiography 
 Generally, with the exception of specific Guard scholarship, historians have 
placed the National Guard either outside of major historical movements, or on the fringes 
of such movements.  Regarding the military, Guard scholarship, such as Jim Dan Hill’s, 
Jerry Cooper’s, and John Mahon’s, comprehensively cover the Guard as an entity, but the 
militia and Guard seem to fit outside of the military system—almost separate from it.5  In 
                                                          
4 Eric T. Dean Jr., Shook Over Hell: Post-Traumatic Stress, Vietnam, and the Civil War (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1997) 188. 
5 Jerry M. Cooper, The Rise of the National Guard: The Evolution of the American Militia, 1865-1920 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997; and Jim Dan Hill, The Minute Man in Peace and War: A 
History of the National Guard (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Co., 1964).  These works provide adequate 
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other cases, historians have included the Guard within military history narratives, but 
only as a minor piece of a larger puzzle.  In most of these works, the narrative centers on 
the Regular Army, and this approach obscures the key role the militia and Guard played 
in wartime and peacetime.  For instance, Edward Coffman and Robert Zieger offer 
compelling accounts of the American experience during the First World War, and both 
mention the Guard as part of that story.  However, the Guard’s role comes secondary to 
that of the Regular Army throughout these works.6  On the other hand, works such as 
James Cooke’s The Rainbow Division in the Great War, 1917-1919, focus squarely on 
the Guard during wartime, but even these studies fail to establish the Guard’s importance 
within the modern American military structure.7  While some studies (as noted in the case 
of Eleanor Hannah) connect the Guard to the larger military historiography, there is 
ample room for further examination and elaboration. 
 Ultimately then, the National Guard’s role in the United States military system 
bridges the gap that Samuel Huntington points to in his seminal work, The Soldier and 
the State, which offers a theoretical framework regarding civil-military relations, and 
argues that, “Civil-military relations is the principle institutional component of military 
security policy.”8  Furthermore, Huntington’s work set the military and civilian-
controlled government agencies on opposite ends of a spectrum that professional officers 
and politicians needed to cross in order to effectively manage military affairs.  According 
                                                                                                                                                                             
coverage of the Guard’s history, but do little to include the Guard within the military structure.  Instead, 
they provide a historical account of a seemingly stand-alone entity. 
6 Edward M. Coffman, The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 61-3; and Robert H. Zieger, America’s Great War: World War I and 
the American Experience (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers INC., 2000).  These studies discuss 
the Guard and include instances of the Guard’s combat experience, but the major focus of these works is 
the Regular Army. 
7 James J. Cooke, The Rainbow Division in the Great War, 1917-1919 (Westport: Praeger, 1994). 
8 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil Military Relations 
(Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 1. 
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to Huntington, the “principal focus of civil-military relations is the relation of the officer 
corps to the state,” and these two elements represent the relationship between the military 
and the state.9  Therefore, an ongoing struggle between civilian entities and professional 
officers dominated American civil-military relations, and ultimately created two 
competing elements who shaped political and military policy.  However, the National 
Guard existed in both realms, and Guard officers moved seamlessly between the two 
spheres.  Indeed, Congressman Charles Dick (who outlined many of the elements of the 
modern National Guard) served as both an Ohio politician and Ohio National Guard 
officer.   
 By including the National Guard into the general historiography of not only 
military history, but also within the Gilded Age and Progressive Era narrative, one will 
gain a more nuanced understanding of American society at a contentious period.  The 
National Guard’s origin story illuminates many of the social trends and discourses that 
dominated American social and political developments in the five decades following the 
Civil War.  And because the National Guard was (and is) both a civilian and military 
institution, soldiers who served in the ranks epitomized various concepts and ideals of 
civic virtue and citizenship.  As noted, historians such as Jerry Cooper and Eleanor 
Hannah have examined the Guard’s appeals to identity; however, the Guard’s 
connections to Progressive Era dynamics centered on efficiency and modernity 
demonstrate the ways in which the National Guard tied the political and military spheres 
together.  Finally, the transition from the militia to the National Guard was crucial in the 
development of the modern American military system, and by establishing the Guard as a 
new organization (not simply the next stage in the militia’s evolution), this work will 
                                                          
9 Huntington, Soldier and the State, 3. 
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illuminate the progressive nature of the Guard and military system.  And finally, because 
the long-term survival of the Guard was not a foregone conclusion—as many leaders 
opposed the creation of the Guard—this transitory period became even more important 
for the establishment of a military system capable of meeting twentieth-century 
challenges.  Ultimately, the National Guard’s story between 1877 and 1920 was 
America’s story.  
 Historians rarely focus on the militia or National Guard during this contentious 
period (or any other period).  This lack of attention has led to a gap in the literature.  
Beginning in the 1960s and 70s, historians began focusing on previously overlooked 
aspects of American history, and this social historical trend has created a deeper 
understanding of American history from the bottom up.  While scholars have examined 
the social elements of numerous historical periods and movements, few have focused on 
the social elements of the National Guard or militia.  And indeed, the militia and National 
Guard as an organization contain elements of all three social history categories—race, 
class, and gender, and include inherent tensions related to general trends.  For these 
reasons, historians can benefit by focusing on the Guard as an institution through which 
to view American society.  While a few historians, including Eleanor Hannah, have 
looked into this aspect of Guard service, it remains overlooked in the general narrative of 
American history.10  
                                                          
10 Eleanor Hannah, Manhood, Citizenship, and the National Guard: Illinois 1870-1917 (Columbus: The Ohio 
State University Press, 2007); Hannah, “From the Dance Floor to the Rifle Range,” The Journal of the 
Gilded Age and Progressive Era 6.2, (2007); and Hannah, “Soldiers under the Skin: Diversity of Race, 
Ethnicity, and Class in the Illinois National Guard, 1870–1916,” American Nineteenth Century History 8:3 
(2007).  Each of these works focus on an aspect of race, class, and gender within the Illinois National 
Guard at the turn of the twentieth-century. 
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 A few pieces of important literature demonstrate the lack of Guard inclusion into 
the Gilded Age and Progressive Era historiography.  Alan Trachtenberg’s comprehensive 
work, The Incorporation of America: Culture and Society in the Gilded Age, details 
numerous American social shifts and describes the emergence of industrial capitalism in 
the country, but barely mentions the militia or the National Guard.11  For Trachtenberg—
who focused on the coalescence of big business and social structures—the militia only 
played a role occasionally as strike breakers.  Though the militia’s role in worker strikes 
(and race riots) partially defined its identity during the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, 
the organization’s overall importance tied to other facets of American culture as well.  
While this limited definition works in a discussion of class tensions during 
industrialization and “incorporation,” it places the militia on the outskirts of society.  
Similarly, Heather Cox Richardson’s recent work, West from Appomattox details the 
realignment of American society between 1865 and 1901, arguing that “a new definition 
of what it meant to be and American developed from a heated debate over the proper 
relationship of the government to its citizens.”12  Richardson extensively details how 
politicians utilized the militia in the American south during Reconstruction, but barely 
mentions the militia after 1877.   
 Both Trachtenberg and Richardson offer compelling explanations of American 
social and cultural shifts during the Gilded Age, but only include the militia as tools of 
big business and politicians.  While neither The Incorporation of America nor West from 
Appomattox are military histories, but rather focus on industrial and business 
                                                          
11 Alan Trachtenberg, The Incorporation of America: Culture and Society in the gilded Age (New York: Hill 
and Wang, 1982).  Numerous pages discuss labor disputes and corporate responses, but mostly deal with 
this issue from a worker perspective.  A good example is found on pages 233-4. 
12 Heather Cox Richardson, West from Appomattox: The Reconstruction of America after the Civil War 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 1. 
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transformations in American culture, their limited explanation of the militia’s societal 
role ignores the fact that the militia was a traditional American institution made up of 
living volunteers.  Militia troops came from varying political and social backgrounds, and 
militiamen carried personal feelings and sentiments related to their own lives into militia 
service.  Additionally, by only including the militia as the military arm of big business, 
many histories gloss over tensions within the militia and do not assess why men 
continued to serve in the institution despite internal strife.   
 While Gilded Age and Progressive Era scholarship generally glosses over the 
National Guard’s deeper contributions to societal development, military and National 
Guard historians have focused directly on this transformation in various ways.  Jim Dan 
Hill’s comprehensive work, The Minute Man in Peace and War, serves as a general 
historical overview of the militia and National Guard, as does John Mahon’s History of 
the Militia and National Guard.  However, because of the scope of these works, the 
period between the end of Reconstruction and the end of the First World War garner the 
same attention as other periods in the militia’s and Guard’s histories.  While Hill 
acknowledges the struggle of the militia during the Gilded Age, he establishes the 
transition from the militia into the National Guard as one step in a larger process of 
evolution, and Mahon offers a similar analysis.  This interpretation of the Guard’s 
development as one step in a larger evolutionary process minimizes the ideological shift 
from the old militia to the twentieth century National Guard, and creates a false sense that 
the Guard’s history occurred in a bubble, somewhere outside the course of American 
social history.13  These works support William H. Riker’s assertion in Soldiers of the 
                                                          
13 Hill, The Minute Man; and Mahon, History. 
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States that the militia garnered federal aid during this transitional period due to its role as 
a strike breaking force, and that this was a major role of the militia and early Guard.14    
These works offer compelling narratives regarding the Guard’s overall historical 
development, but fail to tie the Guard’s federalization to deeper societal transformations.  
One of the most influential Guard historians, Jerry Cooper, outlined the extensive shift in 
the National Guard’s identity in his 1997 work, The Rise of the National Guard.  
Cooper’s manuscript built on his earlier works regarding the Wisconsin National Guard 
during labor strikes and his detailed examination of the North Dakota National Guards 
service between the Spanish-American War and the Cold War.15  Cooper’s earlier works 
establish the concept of the Guard’s changing role related to increased federal oversight, 
which sets the basis for The Rise of the National Guard.  While Cooper contends that the 
period between 1865 and 1920 was instrumental in the modern National Guard’s 
formation, he alludes to a general evolutionary process, and places funding and 
practicality at the center of his story.16  While historians must not overlook or downplay 
these elements, this Guard transition occurred during a general transformative period in 
American history.  These general shifts were truly instrumental in altering the National 
Guard’s nature as a state military force.  Congressional progressives and military 
reformers debated numerous alternatives to the existing militia system as the nineteenth 
century drew to a close, and ultimately created a unique dual system under state and 
federal authority, which reshaped the American military system.  Ultimately then, while 
                                                          
14 William H. Riker, Soldiers of the States: The Role of the National Guard in American Democracy 
(Washington D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1957), 46-54. 
15 Jerry M. Cooper, “The Wisconsin Militia, 1832-1900” (master’s thesis, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 
1968); and Jerry M. Cooper, Citizens as Soldiers: A History of the North Dakota National Guard (Fargo: The 
North Dakota Institute for Regional Studies, North Dakota State University, 1986).   
16 Cooper, Rise, xiii-xvi. 
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the National Guard did evolve into a federally-centered force between 1903 and 1920, the 
Guard system represented a clear break from the old militia system and was an outgrowth 
of Progressive Era reform movements.   
 Regarding other social issues such as race and gender, some key works have 
broached the subject.  Eleanor Hannah’s article, “From the Dance Floor to the Rifle 
Range: The Evolution of Manliness in the National Guards, 1870-1917,” and monograph, 
Manhood, Citizenship, and the National Guard: Illinois, 1870-1917, establish the 
National Guard as an inherently masculine institution during the turn of the twentieth 
century, which allowed native-born whites, immigrants, and blacks an opportunity to 
demonstrate their masculine and American identity.  She argues that Guard service 
allowed men from a variety of backgrounds to both establish and maintain a “manly” 
identity while exemplifying existing notions of citizenship.17  When combined with 
supplemental articles, Hannah’s works confirm that the Guard was a complex 
organization comprised of men from a variety of races and social classes.18  And Hannah 
points out that, contrary to general perceptions, the National Guard was not a 
homogenous group of anti-labor native-born Americans.  Furthermore, Hannah 
effectively argues that this complex group used Guard service as a means of both 
assimilation and citizenship fulfillment.  This dissertation builds off the confirmation that 
the Guard reflected a wide array of personal backgrounds, but carries that into other 
elements of society.  Indeed, trends within the National Guard grew out of larger social 
developments because the National Guard remained a military institution comprised of 
civilian soldiers.  Ultimately then, the militia’s collapse corresponded to a general 
                                                          
17 Hannah, Manhood, 1-3. 
18 Hannah, Manhood, 10-14. 
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breakdown of existing social institutions during the Gilded Age, and the National 
Guard’s rise stemmed from Progressive Era goals. 
 Hannah’s works fit well into larger historiographical trends, and complement 
works such as Kristin Hoganson’s Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender 
Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars, which discuss 
how a perceived crisis of masculinity and manhood—brought about by industrialization 
and the decline of skilled labor—encouraged American political leaders to seek war as a 
means of reestablishing a sense of “manhood.”19  Hoganson’s work focused more broadly 
on American political and military developments at the turn of the twentieth century, and 
argues that American political leaders used gendered language to support or oppose 
imperialistic and military endeavors.  Generally, political war hawks often referred to 
their opponents as “feminine” or “womanly” in their wartime opposition or pacifism, and 
thus established American expansion and military domination as synonymous with 
masculinity.20  As Hannah points out, Guard service offered men a way of maintaining 
their masculine identity and a means of performing their civic duty without having to join 
the Regular Army.21  These works provide a solid foundation for further study, and there 
is much room for deeper investigation into the social aspects of Guard and militia service. 
 Similarly, some important scholarship examines the racial components of the 
National Guard’s historical development.  Charles Johnson’s African American Soldiers 
in the National Guard, offers a comprehensive narrative of black troops in the old militia 
and in segregated Guard units through the Guard’s eventual integration in 1950.  Like 
                                                          
19 Kristin Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American 
and Philippine-American Wars (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 2-5. 
20 Hoganson, Fighting for Manhood, 1-14. 
21 Hannah, Manhood, 2-3. 
13 
 
 
many comprehensive Guard works, Johnson provides a general narrative and 
demonstrates change over time regarding racial inclusion and African American identity.  
Johnson’s work also examines the ways in which the militia and National Guard appealed 
to black Americans’ conceptions of virtue and civil service.22  More recently, Chad 
Williams examined the role black soldiers played during the First World War in 
Torchbearers of Democracy.  While Williams focused on African American soldiers 
broadly, guardsmen comprised the majority of black soldiers who fought in the Great 
War and nearly the entire 93rd Provisional Division.  Williams’s work stressed elements 
of racial prejudice and military prowess among black soldiers during and after the war.23  
These works establish a basis for study regarding the National Guard’s racial components 
during its transformative period, and when combined with gender studies, offer a 
compelling argument regarding the Guard’s recruitment and appeals to duty and identity.  
However, larger concepts related to Progressive Era reforms and transitions expose 
another element to the Guard’s racial and gendered dynamic, as the Guard served at an 
intersection between American society and military and political reforms.  Indeed, issues 
of race, class, and gender are inherently connected in the Guard’s history, and manifested 
themselves in Guard activities. 
 Additionally, recent historical works related to the National Guard have emerged 
during the First World War’s centennial commemoration.  Charles Harris and Louis 
Sadler’s 2015 work, The Great Call Up, examines the National Guard’s role and mission 
along the Mexican border in 1916.  Harris and Sadler provide a detailed analysis of every 
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National Guard sector along the border and the various missions the National Guard 
carried out during their year-long mobilization in Texas, Arizona, California, and New 
Mexico.  While Harris and Sadler generally argue that the Guard’s training at the border 
prepared them for combat during World War I, their work focused on the Guard’s 
mission in a broad sense.  Furthermore, The Great Call Up places the Guard’s 
mobilization within the Mexican Revolution’s context and the American response to 
international relations with Mexico.24  Ultimately then, their work serves as a prelude to 
the Guard’s eventual actions during the First World War, but does not delve into ideas of  
Guard identity or wider Progressive Era societal movements.  
 This dissertation will build upon existing literature regarding social elements 
within the emerging National Guard, but will establish that the Guard was not simply 
another step in a general militia evolutionary trend.  Instead, Progressive Era ideology 
drove political leaders and military reformers to establish the National Guard as a 
replacement to the old militia against the backdrop of a growing professionalization and 
centralization movement.  By examining adjutant general’s reports, soldier 
correspondence, military records, Congressional records and debates, and newspaper 
articles, this dissertation will demonstrate that the National Guard was the result of 
middle-class drives for reform during the Progressive Era.  From a macro perspective, the 
National Guard’s development even reflected international trends.  During the final 
decades of the nineteenth century, as European nations colonized Africa and Asia, 
governments utilized “experts” to oversee and exert political, economic, and military 
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control over colonized peoples.  These experts attempted to calculate unforeseen 
variables and alter social dynamics.25   
While scholars often look to Europe in terms of colonization, the United States’ 
Progressive movement contained many similarities.  Reforms in the militia and National 
Guard generally came from political and military experts who believed the organization 
could achieve greater efficiency if professionals could calculate and reduce unexpected 
variables related to military proficiency and mobilization.  In a similar fashion, so-called 
high modernism had its zenith in Germany’s statehood development between 1870 and 
1914, and relied on an ordered set of social planning that viewed the world through a 
state lens.26  These governmental planners sought to improve and alter the human 
condition through increased centralization and governmental oversight.  Again, American 
Progressives took on similar characteristics and structured the National Guard from the 
same perspective.  Ultimately then, the official creation of the National Guard and its 
subsequent development between 1903 and 1920 grew out of Progressive Era reform 
movements and reflected broader national and international trends.    
 This dissertation will focus on three key elements in the militia’s decline and the 
National Guard’s emergence in the early twentieth century.  First, the National Guard’s 
embodied a Progressive identity as it developed between 1903 and 1920.  Second, the 
Guard’s institutional development reflected larger Progressive reform movements.  
Finally, the National Guard’s lived experience during military operations ultimately 
determined its long-term organizational survival.  Chapter 2 will examine the social, 
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political, military, and ideological pressures that led to the militia’s decline in public 
perception.  Chapter 3 will focus on the National Guard’s institutional formation and how 
political and military leaders structured the organization to meet expectations related to 
professionalization and centralized efficiency amidst pressure from organized labor and 
militia detractors.  The next two chapters will focus on the intersections of the National 
Guard’s identity and soldiers’ lived experiences along the Mexican border and during the 
First World War.  Chapter 6 will readdress the Guard’s institutional development as a 
response to the organization’s service record during World War I, and will ultimately 
show how the federal government solidified the National Guard as a key piece of the 
United States’ force structure.   
 
The National Guard and progressive identity 
 A major facet of onset of the Progressive Era and the National Guard’s growth 
related to an emerging middle-class which sought to reshape social relationships and alter 
existing power dynamics.  Importantly, this transition occurred during a tense period in 
American history, where social realignment was a dominant trend.  Robert Wiebe and 
Nell Irvin Painter offered two distinct views of this era.  Wiebe described America as a 
series of island communities connected to urban centers in the mid-1870s, but by the late 
nineteenth century, “America was a society without a core.”27  He outlined the idea that 
the aforementioned middle-class hoped to restore order when the system seemed to 
collapse by reconnecting to American traditions.  Middle-class Americans hoped to tie an 
old value system to a new cultural identity.28  In many ways, the National Guard offered 
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these individuals one avenue for establishing a new institution with traditional 
undertones.  Painter posed a bleaker view of this divisive time, as she places working 
class tensions at the center of shifting social norms.  For Painter, industrialization and the 
emergence of modern capitalism pitted class against class, replacing sectional conflict in 
the United States.  Working-class antagonisms created a sense of fear among the upper 
classes, and they responded with force.  According to this interpretation, American 
society was on the brink of collapse during the final decades of the nineteenth century, 
and eventually this crisis created the demand for a new American identity.29  Ultimately, 
Painter’s arguments outline some root causes of working-class strife, the new middle-
class ultimately drove the National Guard’s reform movement and served as the 
foundation of the Guard’s growth as part of the United States’ force structure. 
Industrialization and urbanization brought about a series of structural shifts and 
created a sense of fear in a large section of the population who believed America was on 
a path to disaster, and they worked to realign society.  As corporate managers came to 
allocate market resources and oligopolistic markets replaced competitive ones, 
Americans questioned how the future economy would shape American society.30  Many 
reformers ultimately came from a social class between the industrial elite and the 
working poor.  This new middle-class comprised two major groups.  The first group 
consisted of lawyers, doctors, and teachers with strong professional inclinations, while 
the second group included business specialists and managers.  Both groups took pride in 
their professions and began to identify themselves by their skills, and formed national 
                                                          
29 Nell Irvin Painter, Standing at Armageddon: The United States, 1877-1919 (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1987) 10-15 and 383-90. 
30 Alfred D. Chandler Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge: 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1977). 
18 
 
 
organizations in the 1870s centered on specific professions, ranging from the American 
Medical Association to the American Bar Association.31   In a similar vein, militia 
officers—who often came from this emerging middle-class—carried these civilian 
experiences into their military sub-profession, and eventually formed the National Guard 
Association (NGA) in 1879 in hopes of establishing a national militia community.32    
Class identity was apparent within the militia, and ultimately reflected American 
society.  While militia officers generally came from the middle- and upper-classes, many 
enlisted men had working-class backgrounds.  However, middle-class professionals also 
served in the militia and National Guard within the enlisted ranks and as non-
commissioned officers.33  This militia class dynamic remained much more ambiguous 
than the Regular Army’s social structure, and became an important element in the 
National Guard’s identity.  Regarding the Guard’s development, middle-class officers 
drew upon workplace drives for professionalism, and carried them over to the militia and 
National Guard.  And just as professionals focused on increasing business efficiency, 
middle-class militia officers in the NGA focused on militia effectiveness and 
standardization, while lobbying for increased federal funding to promote those new 
standards.34  Amidst these professionalization efforts, middle-class Americans hoped to 
reestablish a “traditional America,” which would reinforce virtuous values among the 
population and restore a semblance of order and balance.35  The militia’s ties to early 
America fulfilled these desires, because militia traditions dated to the colonial period 
prior to the American Revolution.  While the militia’s role changed during the nineteenth 
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century, it remained a symbol of America’s noble past.  Militia service alluded to popular 
images of the minuteman, and ideas related to civic virtue appealed to Americans of all 
walks of life, especially the tradition-oriented new middle-class.36  Americans who 
sought direct connections to the nation’s founding found that connection in state military 
service. 
Men such as Irving Goff McCann and Moses Thisted epitomized the National 
Guard’s middle class appeal in the twentieth century.  McCann served as a minister in 
various capacities prior to 1916 and served as chaplain with the First Illinois Infantry 
Regiment at the Mexican border and in France during the First World War.  Eventually 
McCann earned a law degree and became a practicing lawyer in St. Louis, Missouri.  
Moses Thisted also served along the Mexican border and in France.  Like McCann, 
Thisted’s career as a teacher (and eventually professor) embodied the Progressive Era’s 
professionalization trends.  Along similar lines, Mathew Tinley, Lloyd Ross, and Frank 
O. Lowden grew from obscurity to prominence during the Progressive Era, and all had 
militia and National Guard backgrounds.  Tinley and Ross served in the Iowa militia 
during the Spanish-American War, commanded troops in the First World War, and 
continued serving in high ranking military and civilian capacities in their professional 
lives.  Frank Lowden briefly served in the Illinois militia during the 1890s, and 
eventually became governor of Illinois.  These examples reflect how National Guard 
service appealed to middle-class progressives, and how the Guard existed at an 
intersection between the nation’s military and civilian spheres.37 
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Congress’s creation of the National Guard in the early twentieth century not only 
combined modernity with tradition, but reflected Progressive Era politics.  The Guard 
was a direct response to a lack of military efficiency and functionality throughout the 
Gilded Age.  In civilian spheres, social reformers sought efficiency in the workplace by 
the twentieth century’s onset.  In The Principles of Scientific Management, Frederick 
Winslow Taylor outlined a plan to increase manufacturing output by maximizing worker 
efficiency.  Taylor believed that by focusing on individual efficiency, a business could 
increase profits, which would translate into higher pay for workers and safer work 
conditions.38  Though Taylor focused on the business world, the values translated into 
militia service.  Middle-class officers drew upon workplace drives for professionalism, 
and carried it over to their military sub-profession.  By the late nineteenth century, the 
officer class required intellectual and managerial skills in order to maximize soldier 
efficiency, just as business managers needed to maximize worker efficiency.39  Militia 
officers (as well as army officers) often attended lectures on tactics, law, and discipline in 
efforts to establish competent and professional state forces.40  Ultimately, the transition to 
the National Guard coincided with and reflected larger trends in American society related 
to professionalization and Progressive Era reform movements.  By the United States’ 
entry into the First World War, the National Guard epitomized Progressive ideals and 
concepts of centralized authority and efficiency. 
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The militia’s transformation and the Guard’s rise 
 The Guard’s overall story during this period is also reflective of the ebbs and 
flows of a changing nation.  Following Reconstruction, the militia came to reflect a social 
institution rather than a military organization.  The lack of a solid financial structure, poor 
training standards, and few military challenges created a sense of complacency within the 
militia.  Militia service became more associated with drunkenness and social gatherings 
than with any real military function.41  Due to the militia’s poor reputation, by the late 
1870s, many states went so far as to officially replace the term “militia” with “National 
Guard,” despite no changes in federal law or legal definitions.42  Over the course of the 
final three decades of the nineteenth-century, the National Guard Association lobbied 
Congress for increased federal funding, and state governments worked with militia 
officers to increase standards and establish training and efficiency standards.  However, 
tensions with organized labor and non-uniform standards across state lines hastened the 
decline of the militia in common imagination and practice.  The final blow to the old 
militia came during the Spanish-American War, when mobilizing the organization for a 
foreign war became a quagmire due to outdated laws and hostility from state 
governments.43  
 Throughout the Gilded Age, though, increased social tensions and worker strikes 
hastened governors and local authorities to use force to restore order.  In large strikes, 
such as the Great Railroad Strike of 1877, civilian authorities proved unable to restore 
order, and turned to state militia forces.  However, the militia also failed to ease the 
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tension, and sometimes clashed with striking workers.  Eventually, the federal 
government sent the Regular Army into various American cities, and managed to restore 
order.44  Ultimately though, the optics of using the US Army against working-class 
citizens elicited images of a social breakdown, and civil authorities increasingly turned to 
the militia to maintain order when police forces and constabularies became unable or 
unwilling to do so.  This meant that authorities often pitted an undertrained force against 
antagonistic strikers.  The working-class increasingly viewed the militia as an enemy, 
despite the fact that many militiamen came from the same social class as those across the 
line, and strike duty was not part of the militia’s or National Guard’s mission.  By the 
start of the First World War, guardsmen from only twenty six states ever performed such 
duty.45   
 Even though these various engagements between the militia and strikers were 
limited and usually ended peacefully, the militia’s public image continued to deteriorate.  
The militia’s and Guard’s negative image as strikebreakers eventually led to a general 
decline in both efficiency and recruitment due to continued resentment from labor unions 
and the working-class.  In some cases, this image was justified.  For instance, during a 
mining strike in Colorado in 1914, nearly ninety percent of laborers went on strike.  The 
mining company (with support from the Rockefeller family) hired members of the 
Baldwin-Felts Detective Agency to serve as strikebreakers, and the detectives and mine 
operators began attacking and harassing the labor camps.  Most notably, the detectives 
used an improvised armored car—nicknamed the “death special”—to periodically spray 
machine gun fire into labor “colonies.”  Colorado’s governor responded by calling in the 
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National Guard to restore order, and allowed the Guard commander to enlist mine guards 
as a way to bolster numbers.  As the strike drew on, the governor allowed the Rockefeller 
family to dress their strikebreakers in Guard uniforms in order to prevent his actual 
guardsmen from needing to remain in the field for an extended period of time.  After six 
months, the remaining guardsmen were mostly former mine guards and company 
strikebreakers, and on 20 April 1914, these “guardsmen” attacked the strikers and killed 
20 men, women, and children, and wounded dozens of others.  Eventually, Colorado’s 
governor called in the actual National Guard to restore order.  Indeed, these pseudo-
guardsmen signed up specifically to break a strike, but were never part of the state’s 
official National Guard and never received any federal recognition, and instances such as 
this were certainly the exception not the rule.46  Regardless of the reality though, these 
types of incidents exasperated the militia and Guard’s negative image, especially when 
the media and labor organizers focused on instances of militia ineptitude. 
 Despite the overall rare occurrences of clashes between state soldiers and 
workers, the presumed war between the militia and the working-class created strife 
within the militia itself.  In response, militia leaders, state and federal politicians, and 
military officials took steps to reorganize and reform the militia.  Many of these reform 
efforts tied to militia funding and federal allocations.  State governments, federal 
authorities, and militia officers believed increased funding would allow the militia to 
increase training protocols and improve equipment and provisions.  These efforts would 
then translate to increased recruitment and better proficiency, which would theoretically 
improve the militia’s public perception.  States began stressing the importance of military 
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training and proficiency in an effort to break the connection between the militia and 
images of drunkenness and military ineptitude.  American political leaders specifically 
set out to reshape the American military system in the shadow of European models based 
on compulsory service and national mobilizations.  The United States opted to remain 
volunteer-based, but with an option for conscription, while maintaining a large peacetime 
force of part-time volunteers.  The resulting creation of the National Guard set up a 
massive supplementary force to the Regular Army, while maintaining state control over 
local forces, harkening back to the earliest American republican traditions.47 
Between roughly 1880 and 1900, Regular Army officers and high ranking 
military officials held differing views related to the militia and eventually the National 
Guard.  In the decades following the Civil War, William T. Sherman, General Emory 
Upton, and Stephen Luce ushered in an era of general military professionalization.  As 
Commanding General of the Army, Sherman stressed the importance of military 
education and reestablished the artillery school at Fort Monroe in 1868, helped establish 
infantry and cavalry schools at Fort Leavenworth, as well as advanced tactical and 
strategic officer schools across the country.  Emory Upton became perhaps the most 
influential young officer in the Army regarding military reform efforts.  Upton prepared a 
new set of tactics for the Army, served as Commandant of Cadets at West Point from 
1870 to 1875, travelled across Europe and Asia in 1876 and 1877 to inspect foreign 
military institutions, and became superintendent of theoretical instruction at Fort Monroe.  
Upton’s influential works, The Armies of Europe and Asia, and The Military Policy of the 
United States expressed the fundamental elements of a professional military class and 
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presented a series of wide ranging reforms.48  Regarding the militia, Upton supported 
maintaining a ready-reserve as a supplement to a strong and centralized Regular Army, 
but believed citizen-soldiers could never adequately support the Army.  Though Upton 
committed suicide in 1881, his influence remained prevalent for decades, and 
“Uptonians” in the Army’s ranks regularly called for strengthening the Regular Army 
either through universal military training or conscription—often at the expense of the 
militia and National Guard.49  
Conversely, other military officers—including Sherman—supported 
strengthening the militia, and the militia and National Guard found strong advocates in 
Congress and other circles.  Throughout the 1880s, the NGA convinced some 
Congressional leaders to increase militia funding and levels of federal oversight—
particularly regarding training protocols.  Despite some reform efforts though, when the 
United States went to war with Spain in 1898, the militia comprised a large element of 
the nation’s manpower potential.  However, the nation still relied on an antiquated militia 
law and an outdated wartime volunteer structure.  From the war’s onset, states struggled 
to mobilize their militias as “volunteers,” and barriers between the federal and state 
governments hindered the mobilization, and exposed serious shortcomings in the existing 
system.  Overall, the militia performed well in both the Caribbean and the Philippines, 
due to increased training during the Gilded Age, but these successes did little to sway 
public opinion.  Ultimately, by 1900, general perceptions led many governmental 
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officials and military leaders to believe that the militia was inept and outdated.  Federal 
officials worried that the nation would not be able to meet military challenges in the 
twentieth century under the existing format, and took to the task of reforming the United 
States’ military structure. 
In the aftermath of the Spanish-American War, military reformers again 
reexamined the relationship between the Regular Army and the militia.  Mobilization 
inefficiencies prompted Congressional officials and military officers to question whether 
or not the militia could adequately supplement the Army under the existing structure.  
Elihu Root (who became Secretary of War in 1899), turned to reform-oriented regular 
officers for advice on how to alter the Army and initiate basic reforms in national policy.  
By 1903, the Army established a general staff system and established war preparation as 
the Army’s chief peacetime activity.  Root also understood the need for a trained reserve 
force, and supported the idea of making the militia and National Guard (after 1903) a 
nominal reserve.  Root stressed the need for increased funding and federal control, and 
redefining the relationship between the federal government and state soldiers became a 
major element in Secretary Root’s reforms.50 
 In 1903, Congress enacted legislation that officially replaced the militia with the 
National Guard, established training standards and increased federal oversight into the 
Guard.  The Militia Act of 1903, or the Dick Act, established the National Guard as a 
piece of the Army’s force structure, but still maintained state control over the Guard.  The 
Dick Act allowed the federal government—particularly the executive branch—to 
mobilize the National Guard for national emergencies, but still restricted the Guard to 
activities within the United States.  Amendments to the Dick Act in 1908 and 1909 built 
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upon the initial legislation and expanded federal oversight.  By 1910, the federal 
government could mobilize the National Guard in the event of any invasion or 
insurrection without state sanction, and the federal government could deny funding to any 
state unit who did not meet federal standards and guidelines.  Furthermore, Regular Army 
officers and noncommissioned officers regularly instructed Guard troops and oversaw 
training programs.  However, even with the new laws, numerous politicians and business 
leaders supported replacing the National Guard with some other military organization 
based on compulsory service.51  This sentiment stemmed from perceived tensions 
between the federal government and state governments, as well as continued hostility 
from organized labor (the National Guard performed the same strike duty as the militia 
earlier).  But, the National Guard remained steadfast, and in 1916, Congress once again 
altered the American military structure.   
 The National Defense Act of 1916 not only strengthened the Guard and gave the 
President the authority to mobilize the Guard for wartime service without state approval, 
but also completely reshaped the size and function of the American military.52  So, by 
1916, the National Guard became a key element in the US Army’s force structure.  The 
survival of the Guard under the National Defense Act was tested twice—at the Mexican 
border and in France during World War I.  Although many congressmen and some 
National Guard officers opposed sending the Guard to the border for political purposes, 
the training the Guard received at the border proved valuable for the Guard’s war efforts 
                                                          
51 “Defense Sentiment Shown by Poll of Businessmen,” The Chicago Daily Tribune, May 26, 1916.  This 
article detailed how a majority of members in the U.S. Chamber of Commerce still supported replacing 
the National Guard with another military entity even as late as 1916.   
52 U.S. Congress, The National Defense Act, Approved June 3, 1916 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1916); and John S. Eisenhower with Joanne Thompson Eisenhower, Yanks: The Epic Story 
of the American Army in World War I (New York: The Free Press, 2001), 23-4.   
28 
 
 
in France.  And because the Guard performed better than anticipated in Europe, Congress 
further solidified the Guard’s position in the military system in the form of amendments 
to the National Defense Act in 1919, and again in 1920.  Indeed, the Guard proved its 
worth in France during the war, but this success was the result of decades of tension, 
changes in the Guard’s social structure, successful lobbying efforts, and Progressive Era 
Congressional action.
29 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 – THE MILITIA’S DECLINE 
On a cold February day in 1875, Chicago’s militia armories were hot with action.  
Rumors had spread around the city, pronouncing that angry, socialist, immigrants and 
Bohemians threatened to march on the Chicago Relief and Aid Society with little regard 
for private or public property.  In the weeks prior, the socialists held three meetings 
throughout Chicago and demanded that the Relief and Aid Society change its policies in 
order to do more to support downtrodden individuals who applied for help.  Chicagoans 
feared that potential chaos loomed over their city and that these socialists could institute 
an era of fear similar to the lawlessness of the Paris Commune earlier in the decade.  
Against this backdrop, the militia stood ready to preserve order and rise to the occasion 
just as the famed minutemen had done at Lexington and Concord.  Men from the First 
Regiment of the Illinois Militia voluntarily assembled at its armory and within a few 
days, other militia companies from Chicago, including the Clan-na-Gael Guards, the 
Alpine Hunters, the Irish Rifles, the Montgomery Light Guards, the Mulligan Zuaves, 
and the Hannibal Zuaves, prepared themselves for battle, even though observers 
commented that “any attempts at forcible demonstration” were “extremely unlikely.”1  
Indeed, either due to military preparations or the socialists’ lack of organization, events in 
Chicago remained relatively quiet, but this potential riot exposed some problems related 
to militia mobilizations in the post-Civil War years.   
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The first problem with these types of deployments was the fact that they occurred 
without official state sanction, and displayed a lack of authority, evident in the archaic 
and non-centralized names of the Chicago regiments.  Secondly, most of these self-
mobilized units maintained no formal ties to the official Illinois militia, but were instead 
privately funded and consisted of local volunteers.2  While most militia activations came 
from state authorities, vague laws and mission statements, combined with a sense of 
disillusionment within the militia displayed massive militia inefficiencies in the final 
decades of the nineteenth century.  The post-Civil War militia devolved into an 
undisciplined, under-funded force more closely associated with pageantry and 
drunkenness than with military prowess.  This reality greatly undercut the militia’s 
military effectiveness.  Finally, the militia’s popular decline occurred at a pivotal junction 
in American history.  During the Gilded Age, changing geopolitical and socio-economic 
structures, related to urbanization, industrialization, and social class disparities placed 
great stresses on American society, gradually realigning American culture.  The need for 
social and political reform eventually led to American Progressivism in the early 
twentieth century; the restructuring of the militia was part of this trend.  Indeed, Gilded 
Age tensions shattered the old militia system, and Progressive Era reform movements 
created its replacement, the National Guard.    
During the latter half of the nineteenth-century, business and political leaders 
often flung the militia into the middle of cultural and social antagonisms which led to a 
shift in popular militia perceptions.  Unfortunately for the militia, these activations came 
during a period when state forces were in a transitory period.  In the immediate years 
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after the Civil War, the antebellum militia structure completely dissolved due to funding 
gaps and general military malaise, and the Midwestern militia reflected national trends.  
Midwestern states contained both urban and rural militia units, and national trends related 
to labor and racial strife played out in Midwestern communities.  Midwestern militia 
units also reorganized and grew in the decades following Reconstruction, and came to 
represent the organization’s general state by the end of the century.  For instance, by 
1870, Illinois’ governor reported to the secretary of war that his state had no active militia 
at all along with fifteen other states.  In 1872, a volunteer militia reemerged in Illinois, 
but it had no centralized structure and each regiment carried its own antiquated name 
dating to the antebellum period, as evidenced by the 1875 Chicago mobilization during 
the Aid and Relief Society marches.3  Likewise, legislatures in Iowa, Minnesota, and 
Wisconsin attempted to recreate an antebellum-style militia in the decade after the Civil 
War.  These efforts collapsed.4  After the disruptive railroad disputes of 1877, though, 
these states increased their militia appropriations and took steps to establish better trained 
state forces.  States such as Iowa and Illinois adopted the term “national guard,” and by 
the 1880s each regiment carried a numerical designator and fell under a state-mandated 
(and federally outlined structure).5  Ultimately, social developments related to organized 
labor, combined with the nation’s desire to modernize its military forces led the federal 
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government to reassess the militia’s situation throughout the Gilded Age.  Little changed, 
however, until a militia mobilization debacle during the Spanish American War.   
Throughout the Gilded Age, class struggles and worker strikes created a need for 
social order that local police and constabularies had difficulty enforcing.  In many cases, 
the militia was the closest military force at a governor’s or local official’s disposal to 
restore order.  And although many militiamen came from the same social class as those 
across the line, many workers viewed the militia as a tool of large corporations, and while 
these engagements between the militia and the working class were limited and usually 
ended peacefully, many workers saw the militia as the enemy.  Meanwhile, class identity 
remained apparent within the militia (as every social class was represented within the 
organization).  Therefore, the militia served as a reflection of American society.  
Sometimes, these social divisions were quite obvious and bordered on racism, as was the 
case when Captain Thomas Quincey recapped an incident that occurred in Virden, 
Illinois in 1898 when a riot broke out between white mine strikers and black replacement 
workers.  Captain Quincey declared that:  
I believe that the vast amount of harm was done by men who came from outside the 
town.  We have heard of the English, Irish, Scotch, Welsh, and German.  No doubt they 
are the better class, but there is a class of men who come to this country from Slovania 
[sic] whom they tell me it is impossible to educate or elevate.  Those are the men who 
came from Mt. Olive and a hundred places one hundred fifty strong and lined up along 
the railroad in broad daylight and fought that battle and those are the men who lost their 
lives.6  
                                                          
6 Sunset Club 92nd Annual Meeting Minutes, November 22, 1898; Papers of John H. Walker, Miscellaneous 
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While Captain Quincey certainly did not speak for all militia officers, he demonstrated an 
existing prejudice in the United States among social elites, which sometimes manifested 
itself in militia activities.  Indeed, during periods of societal unrest, the militia found 
itself caught between two ideologically opposed social classes with little federal 
guidance. 
This period in the militia’s history occurred during a tense period in American 
history, and larger social transitions in the United States directly influenced the militia’s 
decline.  Robert Wiebe and Nell Irvin Painter offered two distinct views of the Gilded 
Age and ensuing Progressive Era.  Wiebe describes America as a series of island 
communities connected to urban centers in the mid-1870s, but by the late nineteenth 
century these communal connections had broken down.7  He maintains that an emerging 
middle-class desired to restore order when the system seemed to collapse by reconnecting 
to American traditions.  Middle-class Americans hoped to tie an old value system to a 
new cultural identity in a rapidly changing society.8  Painter presents a bleaker view of 
this divisive time, as she places working class tensions at the center of shifting social 
norms.  For Painter, industrialization and the emergence of modern capitalism pitted class 
against class, which essentially replaced the sectional conflicts that plagued the United 
States throughout the first half of the nineteenth-century.  Working class unrest created a 
sense of fear among the upper classes, and they often responded with force.  According to 
Painter’s interpretation, working-class unrest drove American social strife, which created 
the demand for a new American cultural identity.9  These contesting views provide the 
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setting for the militia’s role in Gilded Age society, as social discord directly led to 
increased militia activity.  Amidst this turmoil, militia service appealed to the new 
middle-class’s desire for order.  
In the decades following the Civil War, an emerging middle-class began to 
reshape social relationships and altered existing power dynamics it they sought to realign 
society, while priding itself on professional endeavors.  This middle-class created 
professional organizations during the Gilded Age such as from the American Medical 
Association and the American Bar Association as a way of establishing a professional 
identity.10  Within the militia, middle-class reformers (often within the militia officer 
corps) established similar associations to increase military efficiency and 
professionalization in the state militias.  For example, New York militia officers 
promoted the formation of the National Rifle Association in 1871 in order to increase 
rifle proficiency within their organization, and other states followed suit.11  Nearly two 
decades later, delegates from various Midwestern militia regiments met in Chicago and 
formed the Military Rifle Association of the National Guard of the Northwest, which 
included members from Illinois, Iowa, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Indiana, and Michigan.12  
However, the most influential militia professional organization was formed in in 1879 
when middle-class militia officers formed the National Guard Association (NGA) with 
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the hope of establishing a national militia community with a professional base, and 
individual states created their own guard associations.13      
Furthermore, the militia’s ties to early American society reflected the middle-
class’s desires to reestablish “traditional America.”  Although the militia’s role changed 
during the nineteenth century, it remained a symbol of America’s noble past.  However, 
by the time the United States went to war with Spain in 1898, the militia’s legal structure 
remained almost unchanged since the nation’s founding, and the federal government 
struggled to mobilize the militia to meet the challenges associated with overseas 
endeavors.  At the turn of the twentieth century, the militia still relied on an antiquated 
legal structure based on the Militia Act of 1792 which established that “each and every 
free able-bodied white male citizen of the respective States, resident therein, who is or 
shall be of age of eighteen years, and under the age of forty-five years…shall severally 
and respectively be enrolled in the militia.”14  While this act provided the framework for 
a force structure, it remained, with the exception of the word “white,” unchanged until 
the twentieth century.  Due to the limitations of the old law, one commentator pointed out 
that over the course of the nineteenth-century, “the country rapidly advanced in 
population and prosperity, and in the same proportion that it progressed, the militia law 
was disregarded.”15   
Eventually, Progressive politicians responded by replacing the old law with the 
Militia Act of 1903, which ultimately replaced the militia with the National Guard.  
However, the National Guard’s ultimate establishment was the result of a series of failed 
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reform movements in light of the ongoing tensions associated with Gilded Age society.  
Interestingly late nineteenth century perceptions led many states to adopt the term, 
“national guard” for their organized militias in the mid- and late-1870s, although there 
was nothing “national” about these forces.  Indeed, the nature of federal control, and the 
role of the Guard as a dual force (between the federal and state governments) marks a 
distinct shift away from the militia’s origins, which had placed the militia’s control firmly 
with the states.  While this change may seem like a trivial semantic shift, it is indicative 
of the general decline of the militia in popular imagination.  By 1877, the term “militia” 
elicited images of fancifully dressed soldiers walking in parades and drinking heavily, not 
military pride.  States hoped a name change could rebrand the militia.  Importantly 
though, these forces remained under state jurisdiction until passage of the Militia Act in 
1903, and newspapers, state authorities, and even militia officers and adjutant generals 
used the two terms interchangeably until the years preceding the First World War.  For 
the sake of clarity, this chapter will use the term “militia” to describe the institution in 
general, and the term “National Guard” will refer to specific units or the organization 
after 1903.16   
Despite the unofficial name change, the militia remained connected to American 
political shifts during the latter half of the nineteenth-century, and internal social pressure 
ultimately dismantled the organization.  This chapter will thematically examine the 
breakdown of the old system, as it related to the disputes between the militia and 
organized labor, the changing nature of militia service during the Gilded Age, and the 
mobilization struggles in 1898.  Even the militia’s combat successes in the Philippines 
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during the Philippine-American War did little to rebuild the militia’s reputation amidst 
looming efficiency struggles.  Although regional differences played a role in determining 
funding (related to state emphases), a unit’s strike duty frequency, and overall enlistment 
numbers, the militia across the nation witnessed some general trends.  These trends 
influenced national perceptions, and while nineteenth century newspapers were not the 
pinnacle of accuracy, commonality found within various papers (even ideologically 
opposed ones) demonstrated a general inclination.  For a variety of reasons, at the turn of 
the twentieth century, many Americans agreed that the existing militia system was 
inadequate to meet the challenges of a new era.    
*** 
The militia and organized labor 
The militia’s decline and transformation coincided with larger military and social 
professionalization efforts that began after the Civil War.  Reformers like Emory Upton 
stressed the importance of professional standards within the United States officer corps.  
General William T. Sherman and Secretary of War William Belknap dispatched Upton to 
Europe, where he examined European militaries and hoped to increase the standards of 
the American military.  Upton noted that, “Entry into the officer corps was only by 
graduation from a military school or by promotion from the ranks after pursuing a course 
of professional study and passing a qualifying exam.”17  In other words, Upton believed 
officers, both regular army and militia, required professional military training.  And 
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although many militia units still held elections for officers well into the 1890s, the elected 
consistently came from educated, professional backgrounds.18 
While the military sought new professional avenues for officers, the nation as a 
whole witnessed an outgrowth of class tension and working class strife, and the militia 
became intertwined with labor struggles.  Working-class Americans found themselves at 
odds with an elitist upper-class and middle-class managers across the nation, and 
American workers organized against their corporate bosses.  Eventually, class struggles 
outside of the militia hindered military efficiency within state military organizations.  
When labor strikes, work stoppages, and riots grew out of control, civil authorities often 
called on the militia to restore order.  During such missions, enlisted men often 
sympathized with the protesters across the lines because they often shared similar ethnic 
or social backgrounds.  Officers, on the other hand, usually empathized with the 
managers and business leaders hoping to end the strikes and maintain a sense of order.  
Occasionally, troops refused to follow orders and even crossed the lines, but more 
commonly, working class union members avoided militia service, either out of animosity 
toward the organization or fear of reprisal from union leadership.19   
The potential for violence during labor strikes demonstrated the need for a 
professional and efficient militia during times of crisis.  In 1877, railroad workers from 
across the nation organized a massive strike.  When the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad 
company cut wages by ten percent, laborers responded by walking off the job and halting 
train movements.  The governor of West Virginia hastily called the militia to force the 
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strikers back to work.  Militiamen proved unable, and sometimes unwilling to end the 
strike in its earliest stages, prompting the governor to petition President Rutherford B. 
Hayes for federal military aid.  Hayes sent in federal troops, but the unrest grew out of 
control nonetheless.20  Eventually the work stoppage carried over to other states, and 
merchants, farmers, clergy, reform oriented politicians, and workers from other industries 
joined the striking railroad workers.  The massive strike created a sense of chaos 
throughout the nation, and reminded Americans of all classes of the Paris Commune 
seven years earlier, prompting middle- and upper-class Americans to feel that social 
collapse was imminent.21  
The railroad strike of 1877 continued for over a month as authorities of West 
Virginia, New York, Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, and California utilized the militia, 
local police forces, and federal troops to restore order.  In many instances the militia 
performed as well as the federal troops and carried out orders without hesitancy, but this 
was not always the case.22  Militiamen of West Virginia and Pennsylvania refused to 
oppose the strike and the 16th Pennsylvania National Guard even crossed the line and 
joined the strikers.23  Conversely, other militia units responded with great hostility toward 
the workers.  Some militiamen fired into crowds of strikers (not always with orders) and 
escalated hostilities between the two factions.24  The strike finally ended when federal 
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troops carried out a city by city campaign against the strikers, and though the strike did 
not result in a general social collapse, it displayed social class strains, and put the militia 
on national display.  
Worker upheavals and strikes continued to plague the nation in the decades 
following the events of 1877.  Corporate leaders and politicians repeatedly called in the 
militia when local police forces could not restore order, and the soldiers responded to 
strike duty in various ways.  In some cases, militiamen enthusiastically volunteered to 
maintain peace in their communities, upholding the interpretation that the militia thrived 
as an anti-labor organization.  In one instance, during an 1885 walkout in Indiana by 
workers of the Oliver Plow Works Company, members of the state militia and of the 
Grand Army of the Republic (a Civil War veteran’s organization) volunteered to put 
down the strike, and managed to do so without much hostility.25  Interestingly, Indiana’s 
adjutant general made no mention of this event in his annual report to the governor, and 
indeed made no mention of labor troubles in the state for the years between 1884 and 
1886.26  Similarly, during a meat packers strike in Chicago in 1886, local authorities were 
unable to contain the situation. The governor called out the militia and placed them under 
the orders of the local sheriff with little incident.27  The Chicago strike was one of three 
in which the Illinois militia responded to labor troubles that year, and the soldiers’ 
presence quieted each disturbance in a timely fashion with little incident.28  Generally the 
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militia’s presence led strikers and rioters to return home, but some interactions turned 
violent.   
Even though the militia trained for actions against mobs, the training did not 
always work itself in the field, as happened during a riot in Syracuse, New York, 
prompting the state’s Inspector General Thomas Barber to proclaim, “Time spent on the 
various systems of riot drill is wasted.”  Barber further noted that the officers and men of 
the New York militia spent countless hours practicing formations and crowd control, “yet 
these same officers and men, when confronted with an actual emergency, as at Syracuse, 
and while still fresh from the training school at Peekskill, permitted themselves to be 
surrounded by the mob to such an extent that they were unable to employ the weapons 
with which they were armed, either offensively or defensively.”29  Reasons for the lack of 
proficiency stemmed from antiquated riot control techniques where the soldiers trained 
against imaginary rioters in Napoleonic formations.  An 1883 report outlined a typical 
day at a militia summer encampment.  The troops awoke at 6:00AM and began official 
company-oriented drills at 8:30AM.  Militia units would train as a company for three and 
a half hours and work on rifle proficiency and small-unit formations.  Following lunch, 
militia units would spend four hours practicing large movements and battalion-oriented 
formation techniques.30   
Likewise, in 1888 Indiana’s militia centered much of their annual training 
regimens on marksmanship competitions and unit-based drill and ceremony techniques.31  
Though these militia units would train in mass formations, their skills became oriented 
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toward engaging an armed military force, not enraged civilians.  Interestingly, one 
Illinois captain “ignored the stereotyped routine of drill and dress parade” in 1892 and 
provided his troops with advanced combat maneuver training that was reportedly “deeply 
interesting” to both officers and enlisted soldiers.32  However, a captain with the 5th US 
Cavalry reported of the same 1892 encampment that “with the exception of very 
considerable progress made in target practice,” the Illinois militiamen still devoted the 
majority of their yearly training to interior guard duties, ceremonies, and close-order 
drills.  According to the captain, most militia companies were scattered around the state 
and needed to rely on “their own exertions” to keep up interest and carry out training 
programs.  As such, most of the Illinois militia only received actual training during their 
annual summer encampments.33    
Furthermore, the militia believed that riot duty should be centered on shows of 
force rather than engagement with “the enemy.”  Therefore, militia commanders believed 
tight formations would demonstrate a level of proficiency that would be adequate to 
disperse large and small mobs.  Other military theorists emphasized large-scale battles 
against urban “Marxist rioters” with the intent to physically wipe out the strikers.  
However, these theorists believed harsher actions should fall to regular military forces, 
not the militia.34  General Albert Ordway outlined a plan for “reasonable” militia reform 
in an article in the North American Review, where he pointed out flaws in the existing 
system.  In addition to the lack of necessary federal appropriations, Ordway believed that 
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a new militia law “should further prescribe the amount of drill and instruction to be 
required of the volunteer militia, and to provide for annual inspections, by officers of the 
army, to determine their efficiency.”35  In other words, the federal government should 
outline specific training techniques each state had to follow in order to increase efficiency 
and success in various endeavors because rifle proficiency did not translate well to riot 
control against a civilian crowd.   
Despite varying training emphases, the militia’s close connection to rifle training 
techniques proved hard to break.  In 1884, though Illinois’ rifle-ranges were reportedly 
underdeveloped and neglected due to poor funding, the state’s adjutant general declared 
that the “most important step” in a militiaman’s training was to “teach him how to use it 
[a rifle].”36  In many cases, rifle training took precedent over riot control drills because 
marksmanship “is a power eminently useful to the State for defense against internal and 
foreign foes,” and marksmanship as a sport contained many “manly” qualities.37  Even as 
late as 1894, When the Illinois militia found itself lined up against Pullman railroad 
strikers, their only unit-centered drilling was based on nineteenth-century linear firing 
techniques, and most of their rifle familiarization focused on familiarization and 
marksmanship rather than crowd suppression.38  Additionally, sometimes time limitations 
worked against the militia regarding adequate training during the Gilded Age because 
each state maintained individualized training protocols.  One Michigan captain believed 
that “The time allowed for annual encampment is too short to do what should be done,” 
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and that his state should increase its training time which was “much longer in other 
states.”39  Generally then, the militia trained to fight a nineteenth-century conventional 
battle, but lacked the ability to stand against a civilian mob who rarely assembled in 
linear fashion with shouldered rifles.   
An 1884 incident demonstrated the limitations of the militia’s antiquated training 
techniques when the 4th Ohio National Guard moved against a mob that was surrounding 
the local jail, but “when the commanding officer gave the command to charge on the mob 
and fight through to the jail the militiamen became demoralized and retreated to the 
depot, followed by derisive yells from the mob.”  The rioters then managed to disarm the 
Ohio troops, many of whom simply went home.  According to the militiamen, they 
retreated because “it would have cost the life of every man in the regiment to have 
charged the mob, which was 10,000 strong and armed,” though the crowd was likely 
much smaller.40  After a detailed investigation, the inspector general discovered that the 
sheriff and militia officers of the governor’s staff issued orders to retreat without 
authorization, and charged seven officers with offenses ranging from incompetency and 
disobedience to intoxication and desertion.41  Fortunately for the Ohio militia, their poor 
performance prompted the state legislature to increase the militia’s appropriations and 
allocation, and during a strike in Cincinnati the next year the Ohio militia performed 
effectively.42 
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Although the events in New York and Ohio demonstrated a high level of militia 
inefficiency and ineptitude, in other cases state troops met expectations.  And generally, 
militiamen carried out their duties despite personal animosity related to the fact that strike 
duty often pitted militiamen against their friends and neighbors from the same social 
class as themselves.  When prison laborers in a mine in Tennessee refused to work, the 
militia responded, but most were “not anxious to go.”43  In April 1894, the Iowa militia 
squared off against unemployed protesters who were marching on Washington D.C.  Led 
by Jacob Coxey, this “army” swept across the nation and gained support and media 
attention, and on one occasion, members of Coxey’s army under the direction of 
“General” Charles Kelly seized a train and rode toward Council Bluffs, Iowa.  The 
militiamen arrived in Council Bluffs just prior to Kelly’s protesters, but the two sides 
never engaged each other.  In fact, interactions between the troops and the marchers 
remained peaceful, and some troops exchanged pleasantries with the activists.  However, 
after only three days, public sentiment swayed toward Kelly’s army, and the Iowa 
adjutant general ordered the troops home in order to avoid escalation.  Events shifted 
though when the militia left the city.  Without a large armed force lined against them, 
Kelly’s mob grew restless and overconfident.  Council Bluffs authorities proved unable 
to contain the rabble and the militia returned days later.  The very presence of a military 
force carried martial authority, and the troops quieted the protesters without any violent 
interaction.44  For all the inefficiencies and internal struggles associated with strike and 
riot duty, the militia remained the largest and most effective force at a governor’s 
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disposal, meaning civil authorities repeatedly relied on the militia to maintain social 
order, despite soldier and officer objections.  
Because of the militia’s ties to social strife and unrest, the organization became 
popularly associated with strike-breaking, though that assumption ignored intra-
organizational dissent.  Civil authorities did little to mark this distinction, and at times, 
state government officials used the militia preemptively when they believed local 
authorities would not be enough to keep the peace.  In 1895, the Columbian Athletic Club 
arranged to hold a prize fight near the Illinois and Indiana border at Roby, Indiana.  
Although local law enforcement officials believed they were incapable of maintaining 
order if spectators at the event became unruly, “a large body of men in Chicago boasted 
that they would see that the arrangements were carried out.”45  Indiana’s governor 
responded to the situation by ordering a contingent of militia troops to Roby to prevent 
potential trouble, and his efforts worked.  In all, 613 men, including a Gatling gun crew, 
responded to the call, and although Chicagoans loaded two trains of men determined to 
hold the fight, they abandoned their plan when news of the militia’s involvement reached 
their city.  Indeed, two years after the suppression at Roby, Indiana’s governor praised 
the militia’s efforts at maintaining law and order in his state.46   
During the same year as Coxey’s march on Washington, state governors 
responded to a  massive coal miner strike by mobilizing militiamen from Iowa, Illinois, 
Colorado, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Ohio, and West Virginia, and the militia helped 
suppress the strike (with the aid of federal troops).  Guardsmen from twelve states 
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responded to the Pullman Railroad strike that originated in Chicago, and although some 
militiamen reportedly fired into crowds without orders, most soldiers carried out their 
orders and minimized hostilities.47  These events placed a high level of stress on 
militiamen.  According to Illinois’ adjutant general, during the two-year period between 
1893 and 1895, the Illinois militia performed “more active service than its entire prior 
existence,” but despite prolonged strike duty and isolated incidents, “the clerity [sic] of 
its movements, and the courage, patience, and fidelity evinced in the discharge of 
delicate, as well as hazardous duties, were the admiration of all impartial observers.”48  
Unfortunately for the militia, instances of success did not overcome negative public 
sentiments though.   
Many citizens and politicians viewed the militia as inept strikebreakers, who fired 
randomly into unarmed crowds and retreated when hostilities escalated beyond control.  
For the working class, the militia became the enemy of progress.  The Illinois militia took 
specific steps to break this association.  During a mine strike in LaSalle, Illinois in May 
1894, the governor responded to requests from LaSalle’s mayor and local sheriffs to 
mobilize the militia.  The militia arrived on the scene and set up camp on heights 
overlooking the city in order to promptly “quell disturbances” if any occurred.  However, 
the adjutant general issued a general order that established “that it is not the business of 
soldiers to act as custodians or guards of private property.”  Additionally, the state’s 
commanding officer ordered his soldiers to preserve only the peace, quell the riots, and 
execute the law.  While this order was in keeping with standard procedures, the adjutant 
general hoped to outline explicitly the militia’s role in the strike as defenders of public 
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property and state laws, not as tools of the corporate elite.  Reportedly, “This order met 
with the universal approval of the National Guard, who, under it, could no longer be used 
as private watchmen.”49  
  Despite the militia’s efforts, unions and workers continued to view the militia as a 
tool of corporate interests, whose focus was on maintaining the status quo and protecting 
private interests.  This perception remained into the twentieth century regardless of the 
fact that strike duty only made up roughly one third of militia mobilizations.  Indeed, 
during the 1870s, 80s, and 90s, only twenty-six of forty-five possible state militias 
performed strike duty when local authorities failed to maintain rioting crowds.50  
Throughout most of this period, the militia performed duties related to military 
proficiency, public aid, disaster relief, and social activities.  Many biannual adjutant 
general’s reports to state governors made extensive mention of rifle competitions, yearly 
training encampment programs, and recruitment programs, making no mention of strike 
or riot duty.51  On other occasions, militia units organized in anticipation of potential 
unrest, but never actually left their armories because no riot or strike broke out.52  Indeed, 
militiamen spent most of their military time at regular drills, at annual summer camps, 
and in local competitions.  
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While strike duty was not the most common form of militia activity during the 
Gilded Age, the scale and scope of strike duty garnered national attention.53  The 
perception of strike duty and hostile attitudes greatly hindered militia and eventually 
Guard recruitment into the twentieth century.  Labor unions hoped to minimize militia 
efforts by reducing their numbers.  In some instances, the strategy worked.  In 1892 a 
private of the 47th New York Infantry Regiment, withdrew from the militia after 
seventeen years of service because he was a trade-unionist, and refused to line against 
fellow workers (as was the case during a strike in Buffalo).  A captain in the private’s 
company said he, “would not be surprised to hear of an organized labor movement 
against the National Guard.”54  The captain’s comments were prescient.  The Chicago 
Federation of Labor started a trend when they called on their members to resign from the 
militia if they served, and some trade unions threatened to revoke an employee’s 
membership if the worker continued serving in or voluntarily enlisted in the militia.  
However, the Illinois adjutant general believed national reports of militiamen losing 
employment while in active service “has been largely exagerated [sic].”  Instead, General 
Alfred Orendorff expected that labor union efforts held little sway over long-term 
enlistments.55  However, in 1896, Indiana’s adjutant general alluded to “hard times” as 
one reason for reduced attendance at the militia’s yearly encampments, as those 
“fortunate enough” to have remained employed in manufacturing sectors were unlikely to 
risk losing their jobs in exchange for the rigors of annual training.56 
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Regarding the ongoing struggle between organized labor and state soldiers, the 
Rocky Mountain News out of Denver, Colorado explained that, “This feeling in labor 
circles against the National Guard is not a recent growth.  It has been gathering for years, 
and received an impetus whenever state troops have been called out to act as guards for 
employers’ property, or shoot down striking workmen in the name of the law.”57  
Chicago’s Daily Inter Ocean declared that the trade union’s strategy was, “exceedingly 
short-sighted and foolish,” and that “the militia in no case takes the place of strikers.  It 
does not do their work.  It does not find workmen to fill their places.  It does not interfere 
with any of their legitimate plans.  It does nothing but prevent unlawful acts.”58  These 
reports upheld General Orendorff’s claims that the public generally opposed union efforts 
in hindering the militia’s abilities, but the situation between unions and the militia did not 
improve as the nineteenth-century gave way to the twentieth.  This ongoing hostility from 
labor circles even forced the militia and National Guard to appeal directly to workers in 
order to reach wartime strength during the Spanish-American War and First World 
War.59  As an organization then, the militia was inherently tied to contemporaneous 
social trends in the United States, and the militia’s ability to function rested on its ability 
to carry out orders and maintain unit cohesion.  Ultimately, the Gilded Age tensions that 
pitted class against class placed great strains on the state militia system, and demonstrated 
many of the drawbacks of the existing disparities between the states.  
Additionally, the militia represented other social tensions, as racial strife became 
apparent in militia activities during the latter half of the nineteenth-century.  Southern 
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militia regiments found themselves in the center of the racial divide more frequently than 
their Northern counterparts, especially in response to lynch mobs.  On numerous 
occasions, militia units across the South responded to instances of racial violence when 
local authorities proved unable to maintain the peace.60  Midwestern militia units found 
themselves caught up in racial struggles as well.  In August 1892, about 100 men of the 
Illinois militia “broke camp Thursday night and came into the city [Springfield, IL] to 
have a row with the colored people.”  A small riot broke out between the militiamen and 
black civilians in the Illinois capitol when the soldiers apparently went into the city 
looking for a fight during their regularly scheduled drill duty.61  According to local news 
sources, racial tensions climaxed because “ever since the camp opened a few 
irresponsible colored men or boys have been hanging around and living on the camp, and 
perhaps indulging in a little pilfering,” and after a few small quarrels with white soldiers, 
two companies went into town with fixed bayonets to “clear out what colored people they 
could find.”62  While the militia authorities did not deny the troopers’ unlawful activities, 
the regiment’s colonel questioned whether or not bringing official charges against every 
man involved in the fray would be practical, but “says he will turn over any of them to 
the civil authorities for whom warrants may be sworn out.”63   
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Incidents such as this illuminate larger issues in American society regarding race 
at the turn of the twentieth-century, and as all too often happened, racial violence against 
blacks often ended without judicial recourse against the white antagonists.  Such was the 
case for the majority of the Illinois troops who went about usual camp duties two days 
after the disturbance.  Indeed, in Captain J.B. Babcock of the 5th US Cavalry made no 
mention of this incident in his official report to the War Department regarding his 
observations of the Illinois encampment, and instead reported that “their behavior in 
camp was very good.”64  Additionally, in 1895, Spring Valley, Illinois (a small mining 
town), witnessed a race riot after coal mine bosses brought in black workers to replace 
strikers, most of whom were Italian immigrants.65  Interestingly, though the Illinois 
militia had responded to a coal strike in Spring Valley the previous year, the local sheriff 
opted to not ask for militia assistance despite mounting deaths and injuries.66  In these 
cases, the militia became entangled with black citizens on some occasions, but racial 
prejudices determined the manner in which the militia responded to some disputes as well 
as how justice played out.  Ultimately, the militia found itself at the center of social 
antagonisms in the United States, and these struggles often played out within the militia’s 
ranks. 
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Manning the militia 
Throughout the Gilded Age, disillusion within in the militia’s ranks became 
associated with strike activity.  One anonymous soldier declared, “Even in those favored 
communities where the value of an efficient militia force has been so often proved, and 
where the citizen soldier finds this highest encouragement, there is oftentimes too little 
appreciation of the National Guard on the part of its members, and too little intelligent 
sympathy from the communities at large.”67  Why then did men continue to serve?   A 
sense of patriotism and civic duty drew many men toward militia service.  In the decade 
following the Civil War, the militia offered young men a public stage to demonstrate 
their patriotism and masculinity during a time when units donned elegant uniforms while 
they marched in parades and threw elaborate balls and parties for local citizens.  While 
these displays certainly served a valuable financial purpose (most units relied on private 
fundraising for survival), they also drew in members from all classes of society.  Single 
men from the working- and middle-class used militia service as a way of attracting 
female attention, while professional officers mingled with prominent and wealthy 
citizens.68  Politicians and militiamen took great pride in their role as public patriots.  The 
governor of Pennsylvania noted that the militia performed admirably during the 
Centennial Exposition of 1876, and declared that, “They were a testament to 
patriotism.”69  Eventually though, public parades and parties diminished in popularity, 
which created a shift in the militia’s general mindset across the nation, as monthly drills 
shifted away from public displays toward military proficiency and training. 
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Yet, militia service still provided men with a masculine outlet, as they used the 
military arena to compete against each other in marksmanship drills and sporting 
competitions, which ultimately established a sense of masculinity within the unit.70  The 
militia ultimately allowed men to prove their masculinity without having to live the life 
of a regular soldier.  By the twentieth century, the militia had effectively transformed 
itself into an organization where military proficiency took center stage, though the 
militia’s effectiveness remained closely tied to appropriations and unit cohesion.  
Nonetheless, in the early twentieth century (after Congress created the official National 
Guard), General Wilbur Sadler reminded Americans that “the public should bear in mind 
that the National Guard is no longer a social institution, upon whose dandified uniforms, 
which were anything but practical, money was lavished, and which devoted its time to 
acquiring proficiency in fancy drills and evolutions that made a pretty display at times of 
public ceremony, but had little connection with the stern duties of a real soldier.”71  
While militia service became more tactically oriented during the final two decades of the 
nineteenth century, the militia continued to appeal to a sense of masculinity at a time 
when industrialization and urbanization threatened masculine identity in the United 
States.72  
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Furthermore, the militia was a military organization that bridged the gap between 
the larger military structure and civil authority, as demonstrated by the fact that social 
desires and trends witnessed within the militia translated to other segments of American 
political culture.  While masculine endeavors took center stage in militia recruitment and 
training, Kristen Hoganson argues that gender notions shaped American foreign policy at 
the end of the nineteenth century, and American politicians engaged in aggressive 
diplomacy in the Caribbean and Philippines during the 1890s because they needed a 
venue to demonstrate America’s “manliness.”  Further, war-minded politicians often 
portrayed pacifists as “womanly,” because their views on warfare often aligned with 
nineteenth-century female activists.73  Eleanor Hannah carries this argument into the 
National Guard as an organization, and establishes that the militia and Guard allowed 
men to demonstrate their masculinity during a time when increased industrialization 
threatened masculine identity.74  The masculinity issue played a key role in maintaining 
the militia’s appeal, as service in the organization aligned with the desire to maintain a 
traditional sense of masculinity, and actually provided the avenue for many American 
men to meet that desire.   
Along similar lines, the militia continued to offer a men an avenue through which 
they could perform their civic duty along traditional American lines, dating to the 
colonial era.  Even during the height of strike duty—when many American men struggled 
to balance their patriotism with class loyalties—the militia continued to appeal to civic 
idealism.  For example, in 1893 on Iowa militia officer remarked that “the young men of 
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Red Oak [Iowa] experienced a revival of the martial spirit.  The enthusiasm became so 
intense that in August steps were taken towards the organization of a company.”75  When 
combined with existing notions related to masculinity, this “martial spirit” ensured the 
militia could continue to draw new recruits against the backdrop of class tension and poor 
funding during the Gilded Age.  Youthful men sought avenues to prove their manhood 
and experience the types of adventure associated with masculine exploits.   
Near the turn of the twentieth century, political leaders such as Theodore 
Roosevelt alleged that the symbolic closing of the frontier, combined with 
industrialization had reduced the arenas in which American men could prove 
themselves.76  Roosevelt believed military service and the “pioneer spirit” offered men a 
way to establish their manhood and avoid a weakness brought by industrial work.77  
Similarly, by the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, the Italian Futurist, 
Filippo Tommaso Marinetti, exemplified this desire when he called to all “living men of 
the earth” to glorify the love of danger and glorify war, “the only true hygiene of the 
world.”78  For many American men during the Gilded Age and Progressive Eras, the 
militia fulfilled this desire.  However, even masculine and patriotic yearnings could not 
reverse the militia’s ongoing struggles as the nineteenth-century drew to a close.    
Throughout the Gilded Age, the militia was in a state of flux.  While patriotic and 
masculine desires led men to continue enlisting in the militia, external events and trends 
also influenced the militia’s numbers and effectiveness.  As noted earlier, regional 
differences and national economic trends played a role in shaping some elements of the 
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militia’s development after the Civil War.  In 1873 total militia numbers were particularly 
high at more than 150,000; however, Reconstruction militias in the American South 
partially accounted for these high figures, as fifteen states reported having no organized 
militia that same year.  Two years later, the overall number had fallen to 90,000 with ten 
states still reporting no organized militia, and Texas accounted for most of the drop in the 
militia’s aggregate strength when they disbanded their Reconstruction force.  By 1880 
though, a number of factors increased the militia’s overall numbers to over 127,000, in 
part because many Midwestern states created new regiments and increased militia 
appropriations after the 1877 Railroad Strike.  Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, and Ohio 
increased their combined militia numbers by roughly 14,000 between 1875 and 1880.79  
However, as Reconstruction came to an end, many Southern states began disbanding their 
forces, and by 1885, militia numbers fell to less than 85,000.80  Over the next five years, 
the militia’s numbers steadily increased, and by 1890, aggregate numbers rose above 
106,000, and climbed over the next five years to over 115,000.81     
In addition to numerical shifts, state appropriations differed greatly between states 
and regions during the final two decades of the nineteenth century.  Midwestern struggles 
reflected national trends.  As early as 1877, the Illinois adjutant general pointed out that 
the fact troops needed to pay for their own equipment was the largest flaw in the militia 
system, and many states were unable (or unwilling) to expend funds on their militias 
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during peacetime, regardless of social strife.82  William T. Sherman weighed in on the 
situation when asked if he would serve as commanding general of the Missouri militia 
after his retirement from the army.  Sherman refused the offer and stated in a letter that: 
The state makes liberal provision for its local police, for its courts, Judges, Sheriffs, and 
marshals, for its legislative and executive officers, but foolishly expects its militia, 
composed of poor young men, to give gratis their time and money, to provide their own 
armories, uniforms, clothing, arms, and accouterments, and to respond to the call of the 
Governor to quell riots and mobs, always caused by some popular clamor of prejudice, 
whereby they often incur the ill-will of their neighbors and employers, and lose the very 
bread needed by their families.83 
In response, some state governments opted to reduce their militia numbers in order to 
better utilize funding, which illuminates another drawback of the Gilded Age militia 
system, and played into the manpower ebbs and flows of the 1880s and early 90s.84   
 In 1883 for example, Illinois opted to disband fifteen companies and reduce its 
militia force by 3,000 men in order to better utilize its $75,000 annual state 
appropriation.85  Once again (as with organizational manpower), regional disparities 
related to state funding gaps hindered the militia’s overall effectiveness.  By 1885, five 
Northeastern states (New York, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Rhode 
Island) accounted for nearly 50 percent of all state funding, with New York appropriating 
$825,000 annually to their state militia.86  Ten years later, New York reduced their annual 
funding by half, and nine states (including Illinois, Ohio, and Wisconsin) allocated over 
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$100,000 for their militia’s yearly, which amounted to 75 percent of national spending.  
Other states suffered from severe funding struggles.87  Throughout the 1890s, Missouri 
(which was the fifth most populous state) only appropriated $10,000 for their militia 
annually, and Arkansas offered no state funding for their state militia in 1895.  
Ultimately, the Northeastern and Midwestern militia’s enjoyed a relatively high amount 
of state appropriations (amounting to between $26 and $34 per soldier in 1895), while 
Southern states (who maintained numerically large militias) only spend about $4 per 
soldier.88  Ultimately then, although the militia’s numbers had stabilized by 1895, most 
states still reported numbers much lower than anticipated due to funding gaps and 
ongoing social tensions.  In 1897, on the verge of the Spanish-American War, adjutant 
generals from around the nation reported that their states remained well understrength.89    
   
Congressional reform efforts 
Social and cultural tensions associated with the militia, combined with instances 
of ineptitude and funding gaps, compelled political and social leaders to propose massive 
reforms to the existing militia system in the late 1870s.  In 1880, the United States House 
of Representatives examined a proposed bill intended to organize “the entire militia force 
of the country as a National Guard, to be armed and equipped out of the National 
Treasury.”90  The bill allowed for increased federal appropriations, and called for 
establishing an inactive militia consisting of all able bodied men between the ages of 
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eighteen and forty-five and an active militia consisting of volunteers, which would 
conform to federal army standards.91  This early attempt to reorganize the militia failed 
because of issues related to constitutionality and the separation between the federal and 
state governments.  In 1888, Congress again proposed a bill to create a national militia.  
This second attempt went further than the previous and called for the establishment of a 
volunteer National Guard, numbering 100,000 with no more than 400 members from any 
single Congressional district.  The troops in the proposed National Guard would enlist for 
a term of three to five years, and could return home if the president did not require a 
national force.  The fact that this new force would not replace the militia, but would 
actually be another force was the largest drawback of the proposal, and it eventually 
failed.92   
Militiamen responded to calls for a new system and the lack of federal funding by 
creating a national lobbying force that continually advocated for the militia’s continued 
presence in the American military structure.  In 1878, militia officers created an advocacy 
group for state volunteer soldiers, similar to the recently-organized National Rifle 
Association, and individual state militia organizations followed suit.  Militia delegates 
from around the United States formed the National Guard Association (NGA) in 1879, 
and held their first national convention in St. Louis, Missouri.  The NGA actually 
endorsed the 1880 House of Representatives bill, because it called for expanded funding 
to the state militias and it would replace the existing militia law, but Congress still failed 
to pass the bill through Congress.93  Over the next decade, the NGA enjoyed a significant 
level of success, and the organization began receiving federal recognition.  In February 
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1890, the Secretary of War detailed a regular army officer for special duty with the 
National Guard Association of Wisconsin “for the purpose of giving such instruction as 
may be practicable,” and over the next few years began similar programs in other states.94  
This program had such a high success rate that General John M. Schofield, Commanding 
General of the Army, stated that the inclusion of regular officers in state militia units was 
of such value that his office received “numerous application from the governors of States 
for the detail of officers for prolonged service, for the purpose of organizing, instructing, 
and disciplining the militia of their States.”  Schofield further proposed to the War 
Department and to Congress that these temporary officer assignments should be 
expanded to three or four years, and that Congress should make such assignments 
permanent through the “sanction of law.”95     
Despite the seeming improvement in the state of the militia by increased federal 
oversight and by regular army instruction, many in the federal government continued 
advocating for a revised system.  The NGA worked tirelessly to convince Congress of the 
ineffectual nature of the existing militia situation, but according to a New York Times 
article in 1886, “the appeal has thus far been ineffectual.”  The article went on to say that 
“at one time it was proposed to found a national militia, but this plan was open to several 
objections, among them being the opposition of the volunteer organizations that now 
furnish local militia defense, and do not care to be swallowed up by a different system,” 
and though the NGA and militia leaders understood they needed drastic reforms to 
promote efficiency, militia advocates refused to support legislation that would lead to 
their replacement.  Eventually, “after twenty years of doing nothing,” the NGA and other 
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militia supporters simplified their approach and asked Congress to increase the militia’s 
annual appropriation “to a sum more nearly corresponding to the growth of the country 
during the last eighty years.”  Congress understood that they either needed to increase the 
regular army’s size or strengthen the militia in order to meet the challenges of the day.96   
When the NGA began their quest for higher funding, the federal government 
provided $200,000 (split between the states based on population) annually.  This 
appropriation remained constant since 1808, despite a nearly eightfold increase in 
population.97   In the early 1880s the NGA proposed that Congress should increase 
annual appropriations to $1,000,000 which would be divided by the states, but Congress 
refused.98  In the midst of ongoing disagreements between the NGA and federal 
government, some states altered their existing militia organizations in order to better 
utilize available funds.  This restructuring often meant states would disband more 
expensive units such as artillery or cavalry regiments.  States hoped that by saving money 
they could dedicate more resources to infantry regiments as a means of increasing 
efficiency.99  By 1887, though, the NGA succeeded in persuading Congress to raise the 
federal appropriation to $400,000; however this number was only a fraction of the NGA’s 
original request.   
While the NGA fought for increased appropriations as a means of increasing 
efficiency and military standardization, militia advocates generally opposed fundamental 
reform legislation out of the fear that such legislation would serve as federal overreach.  
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An 1892 proposal “evidently ran upon the rock where so many of its predecessors have 
made shipwreck—the fear that the existing organizations of State troops were to be 
‘nationalized,’” however, this new bill altered the nature of appropriations from one 
where each state received funds based on congressional representation to a system where 
states received funds based on how well they maintained their forces and how sizeable 
their state militias were.100  This proposal gave militia reformers a manner to combine 
appropriation requests with the actual promotion of military prowess.  In 1896, the US 
House of Representatives passed a Senate bill which would allow the federal government 
to issue new Springfield rifles to each states National Guard in order to promote 
proficiency and standardization.101  On the eve of the Spanish-American War, the Senate 
passed a bill which would replace the existing law of 1792, and was intended to increase 
the efficiency of the militia, but it too failed to pass through the House of Representatives 
because it appeared to place the fate of the militia firmly within the federal government’s 
hands.102  
Over the course of the final decade of the nineteenth century, the NGA continued 
to press for increased funding and continued to come up short; however, by 1900 some 
US Senators agreed with the NGA.  New Jersey Senator, William J. Sewell, argued that 
in the wake of the Spanish-American War, “It requires no argument to show that the 
appropriations for years have been entirely inadequate for the purpose intended.  If 
$200,000 was considered necessary in 1808, $2,000,000 would be a fair amount to 
expend at the present time for this object.  The National Guard Association has presented 
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this case in very strong terms for several years.”103  Other members of Congress agreed 
with Sewell’s sentiments, but disagreed on the terms.  Illinois Congressman Benjamin F. 
Marsh amended the House’s version of a new appropriation bill in 1900 to cut the 
proposed increase from $2,000,000 to $1,000,000, but this was still a large increase from 
the existing sum of $400,000.104  While Congress agreed to increase militia funding as 
the nineteenth-century drew to a close, they continually refused to amend or replace the 
Militia Act of 1792, and would not until 1903.  
 
Mobilization problems 
While the NGA advocated for increased funding and federal recognition, the 
militia continued serving as strikebreakers well into the 1890s, but the onset of war in 
1898 changed that.  When the United States declared war on Spain, the militia realized a 
revitalized role.  In response to a nationalistic uprising by Cuban rebels, the Spanish 
government resorted to repressive and extreme methods to end the rebellion.  Many 
Americans, alluding to the nation’s own struggle for independence against a European 
empire a century earlier, sympathized with the Cubans.105  Patriotic fervor ran high, and 
American political leaders believed a colonial war with Spain provided the nation with an 
opportunity to demonstrate its power to the world.106   
The United States faced the question of what type of force would face off against 
the Spanish, and despite all the NGA’s successes and increased in federal recognition 
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between 1877 and 1898, old prejudices against the militia remained in place.  As the 
United States prepared for war, army officers solicited Congress regarding force 
structure, and “all alike dread the passage of an act or resolution looking to the use of the 
militia of the several states in such a war.”  While the officers claimed to hold no malice 
toward the existing militia, and considered the state soldiers as the major source of 
military power in the nation, they “realized” that, “as militia, this magnificent body of 
men cannot be employed in any foreign war requiring offensive operations” because 
“since the time of the Revolution the militia have been considered absolutely unsafe in 
the field against regular troops.”107  However, on a local level, the militia enjoyed high 
levels of support.  The city of Chicago “decked itself in the National colors,” and 250,000 
citizens lined the streets “and bade godspeed to its [the city’s] citizen soldiers.”  Indeed, 
“not since the departure of the volunteers at the time of the civil war have such stirring 
scenes been witnessed.”108  Unfortunately for the militia, good feelings and 
encouragement could not prevent the ensuing mobilization disaster. 
In order to raise necessary war-time numbers, Congressman John A. T. Hull 
introduced a bill to raise the wartime army to 104,000 men without including any militia 
troops.  Militia officers and the NGA firmly opposed the proposal because it ignored the 
organized militia and President William McKinley backed a new bill that granted the 
states the ability to draw volunteers from militia organizations to meet federal quotas 
based on population.  Eventually, the president authorized a new volunteer act intended 
to raise 60,000 men that included troops from the militia, but war enthusiasm was so high 
that the president raised the initial call to 125,000 troops in April, and even made a 
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second call for an additional 70,000 volunteers in May, 1898.109  Within six weeks of the 
declaration of war, 200,000 men volunteered for service in Cuba and the Philippines.110  
Each call for volunteers required states to meet numerical quotas, and required larger 
states such as New York, Pennsylvania, and Illinois to raise over 5,000 troops during the 
second call, where medium sized states such as Iowa and Michigan only needed to raise 
about 2,000 troops.  Some of the smallest states like Idaho only needed to supply 140 
volunteers.111  States seemingly had no problem recruiting the necessary numbers, and 
militia units swelled to their maximum allotted size, but incorporating these units into the 
federal army proved problematic.112  
Though a volunteer arrangement existed, mobilization exposed the inefficiency of 
the existing system.  The process of volunteering state troops for federal service caused a 
great deal of confusion in state legislatures, and Secretary of War Russell Alger’s 
directive to the states only exacerbated the situation.  He explicitly outlined number 
requirements, but provided little legal specificity.113  Under the 1792 law, the federal 
government did not have the authority to mobilize the state militias for overseas service.  
Instead, state troops needed to volunteer to enter the regular army, and those troops who 
did not officially volunteer for service, or who were medically rejected, remained in 
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service to their states, and were “liable for all duty.”114  The potential confusion grew to 
such proportions that President McKinley delayed officially calling for volunteers for a 
week because the War Department hoped to avoid “destroying the present organization of 
the National Guard which is to be called into service first.”115   
State governments hoped to streamline the process by offering entire militia 
companies and regiments as volunteers in order to meet quota demands, but state troops 
mustered into the federal army “involuntarily” could refuse to leave the country’s borders 
because their terms of service tied to their state rather than the federal government.116  
Additionally, most militiamen who initially volunteered for service did so “only under 
the condition that they serve as now organized,” meaning many remained unwilling to 
incorporate themselves into the regular army.117  The vagueness of Alger’s order, 
combined with unclear laws, resulted in a confused process of state governments 
volunteering whole militia units and incorporating them into the federal army, which led 
to delays across the nation.118  Additionally, under the initial call for volunteers, state 
governments needed to fund, equip, and transport their soldiers to designated rendezvous 
locations, which created more delays and exposed dramatic monetary shortfalls.119   
Despite an ineffective mobilization process, the militia responded to the 
president’s call for volunteers with enthusiasm, and states responded in kind.  On 25 
April 1898, Illinois’s governor called his state’s militia units to Springfield even before 
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the president’s official call, and the governor declared that “the troops will come to 
Springfield as the Illinois National Guard and remain so until turned over to the national 
government.”  However, Governor John Riley Tanner maintained the racial prejudices of 
the era when he mobilized every Illinois militia unit except the state’s all-black regiment 
out of Chicago.120  Even in wartime mobilization then, the militia reflected the ongoing 
racial and societal divisions that existed at the turn of the twentieth-century.   
Furthermore, wartime service provided militiamen with an opportunity to fulfill patriotic 
responsibilities and offered a welcomed respite from strike duty, and in order to 
maximize military potential, the War Department divided state militia volunteers into 
three distinct categories.  The first troops mustered into service quickly moved toward 
Chickamauga, Georgia and, after a hasty training period, embarked for Cuba.  The army 
stationed the second group of volunteer troops in and around Washington D.C., where 
they served as a reserve force and awaited potential deployment to the Caribbean.  The 
final group of volunteers moved to California for training and eventual deployment to the 
Philippines.121   
Service in the war varied between volunteer groups and organizations, and the 
four regiments of Iowa shed light upon the varied service avenues.  The 2nd Iowa 
National Guard Regiment (redesigned the 50th Regiment of Iowa Volunteers during the 
war) was in the first group sent to Florida to await Cuban service, but they remained in 
Florida for the duration of hostilities in Cuba and served in a support role.122  The 1st 
Iowa (who were designated as the 49th Iowa Volunteers during the war) also went to 
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Jacksonville, Florida, where they remained until the end of hostilities, and the 4th Iowa 
moved to Georgia as a reserve force because they were in the second muster group.  
Others, such as the 3rd Iowa National Guard Regiment (the 51st Iowa Volunteers during 
the war) served for an extended period of time in the Philippine theater.  These Iowans 
arrived in San Francisco early in June, 1898 and remained there until September, where 
they spent most of their time in training and drilling.  Unfortunately some soldiers fell 
victim to active army life.  Between 21 July and 14 September, five men of M Company 
alone died of various diseases spread throughout the camp.123  In October, the 3rd Iowa 
embarked on the U.S.S. Pennsylvania for Manila Bay in order to aid American forces 
during the Filipino-Insurrection. 
Like their regular army counterparts, the militia found themselves embroiled in 
larger diplomatic and political issues during the Spanish-American War and ensuing 
Philippine-American War.  Recent scholarship regarding America’s overseas endeavors 
just prior to the turn of the twentieth century argues that overlapping economic, geo-
political, and military issues led American policymakers to establish a colonial empire.  
Paul Kramer points out that this empire—though unique in its approach—still operated 
within a network of imperial thought and practice.124  Most general scholarship glosses 
over or omits the militia’s role in these conflicts; however, the militia played a central 
role in the United States’ military mission.  During the Cuban and Puerto Rican 
campaigns, observers commented on the militia’s performance as it pertained to the 
mobilization disaster of 1898, and the war’s short duration did not allow the militia to 
demonstrate their combat effectiveness in a nationally recognized way.  Indeed, Theodore 
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Roosevelt’s famous 1st Volunteer Cavalry gained a much higher level of national renown 
than any militia unit in Cuba or Puerto Rico.  Importantly though, by 1899, the US 
government worked out many of the issues that plagued the militia’s mobilization the 
previous year, and militiamen from around the nation found themselves bound for the 
Philippines, where they performed on par with the regular army.  
 
The militia in the Philippines 
Beginning in February, 1899, members of the Iowa, Nebraska, and South Dakota 
militias actively engaged insurgents northwest of Manila. After the troops retook Malolos 
in March, the militiamen pursued the retreating Filipinos for nearly five months, often 
resulting in small engagements.125  With few exceptions, fighting in the Philippines rarely 
included large-scale battles, and many of the confrontations between militiamen and 
insurgents resembled guerilla warfare.  In a letter to his parents, Henry Hackthorn of 
Iowa noted that officers at the front, “dress just like the men and carry no sword nor 
anything to denote rank, as the insurgent sharp-shooters are picking off all the officers 
they can.”126  As the nineteenth century drew to a close, militiamen viewed the 
insurrection in various ways.  Eventually, many soldiers such as Hackthorn came to 
sympathize with the insurgent cause.  Hackthorn noted that extended combat wore the 
volunteers out and they simply wanted to return home.  He further observed that the 
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Filipinos misunderstood American intentions at the onset of the war with Spain, and they 
simply grew impatient with American forces.127  
Henry Hackthorn’s observations about the Filipino Insurrection and the United 
States’ role in the region reflected trends in larger American society related to the war in 
the Philippines.128  Indeed, a large portion of the American populace believed that the 
United States government violated their principles by remaining in the archipelago as an 
occupying force after ousting the Spanish government.129  Hackthorn also represented 
larger militia trends near the turn of the twentieth century.  Indeed, the young Iowan was 
an educated citizen who volunteered for militia service in the 1890s and found himself in 
the Philippines as a member of E Company in the 51st Infantry Regiment.  After his 
return home, Hackthorn married and took up a job in the insurance industry.130  By the 
outbreak of the First World War, Hackthorn worked for the Union Central Life and Royal 
Hartford Insurance Company, and by 1920, Hackthorn owned his own home and 
provided for his wife and young son.131  Ultimately then, Hackthorn represented the 
American middle-class at the turn of the twentieth-century, and he epitomized the 
mindset that permeated the militia’s ranks.   
While Hackthorn never directly criticized the American war effort, others did.  
John. E. Fetterly of the Nebraska militia declared, “I do not approve of the course our 
government is pursuing with these people [the insurgents].”  Fetterly’s opinions also 
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aligned with a segment of American society who believed that the military’s mission in 
the Philippines ran counter to the original intent of the American war effort.  He 
continued by saying, “I marched into battle to make them free – not to make them 
subjects.”132  For many Americans and militiamen, the wars in Cuba and the Philippines 
initially offered new opportunities, but expectations waned.  Middle-class officers 
believed the wars represented progress, both in a national sense (America’s imperial 
entry into the world stage) and a racial sense, as they believed the United States had the 
duty to “civilize” the “lesser” races.133   
Additionally, some political leaders and struggling American workers hoped an 
independent Filipino ally would open new foreign economic markets.134  Therefore, both 
middle-class officers and working-class soldiers initially viewed the war in a positive 
light.  However, as the insurrection in the Philippines devolved into a guerilla conflict, 
many soldiers lost sight of the war’s objectives.135  Working-class militiamen held little 
desire to engage in extended conflict with the same Filipinos they hoped to aid at the 
onset of hostilities with Spain.  Yet, regardless of personal sentiments, the militiamen 
carried out their orders in the Spanish-American War and the ensuing Filipino 
Insurrection.  Indeed, due in part to ongoing strike actions and poor publicity, the militia 
expanded drill sessions and trained in more realistic scenarios, and state governments 
issued a variety of riot training manuals to militia units.136  Similarly, the Regular Army 
officers assigned to militia units helped increase military standards and streamline tactics.  
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By the 1890s, state soldiers trained in small unit tactics as well as company-based riot 
control procedures, and militiamen became subject to increased discipline and regular 
army officers inspected training sessions at annual summer encampments.137   
Therefore, the militia in the field at the turn of the twentieth century was the best 
trained militia force in decades.  Militia volunteers performed admirably during the 
conflicts in Cuba and the Philippines, but the inefficient and inept deployment, combined 
with long training periods demonstrated the pitfalls of the existing system.   As early as 
August 1898, plans calling for extreme militia revision regained steam in light of the 
mobilization disasters only a few months prior.  Cleveland’s mayor, Webb C. Hayes 
(former president Rutherford B. Hayes’s son), proposed a plan where the President “shall 
appoint an Adjutant General for each State; that as many bodies of militia shall be raised 
in each State as circumstances require, and that all officers of such militia shall be 
nominated by the Governors of various States,” and these troops would then fall under 
“direct control of the National Government and much of the difficulty experienced when 
the Guard was called into service for the Spanish war would be obviated.”138   
In October, 1898, the editor of the New York Times argued that reorganization of 
the militia was a matter of statesmanship rather than military ability.  According to 
Charles Lydecker’s article, “it is too late in the present era to expect the several States to 
maintain at their own expense a volunteer army for National purposes other than 
purposes of self-preservation.”  He went on to describe how a complete reorganization of 
the militia and National Guard would serve both political parties and strengthen the 
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United States as it expanded its imperial domain.  The Times article went on to suggest 
that many Americans believed the militia was at a crossroads during the Spanish-
American War, and political leaders needed to do away with the older system of 
volunteer mobilization because some men would only serve according to their political 
allegiance to whichever political party led each individual war campaign.  Additionally, 
the policy of enlisting “the most unfortunate of laboring classes” in the militia or National 
Guard for state and national defense at the expense of the state governments would only 
increase governmental spending, but would not alleviate the problems associated with 
uneasy mobilization.139  Seemingly, the mobilization quagmire in 1898 stemmed from 
poor and outdated organization, and not a total lack of military proficiency. 
Congress responded to the militia crisis with a series of federal actions that 
eventually replaced the old system with a new National Guard system.  The inefficiencies 
of the militia led military officials and civilian leaders alike to question the future of the 
organized American militia.  In a 1900 article, one militia critic proposed that the militia 
should be abolished and all civil associations “who supported the Guard too much” 
should also be abolished.140  According to the article, militia and National Guard 
deficiencies ranged from poor officer training to power struggles stemming from state 
control.141  Opponents of the militia proposed alternatives plans based on the concept of 
universal military training which will be discussed in the following chapter.  The 
“continental army plan” was the most common proposal, and it involved the abolishment 
of the militia and the creation of a federal force of all able bodied men between the ages 
of 18 and 45.  This proposal remained under consideration just prior to the passage of the 
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National Defense Act in 1916 despite Congress’s passage of the Militia Act of 1903 and 
its 1908 amendments.142  However, not all believed the militia needed to be abolished.  
The NGA worked tirelessly to reform and maintain the state soldiery, and they found 
allies in Congress.  These Progressive Era congressmen worked to strengthen the militia 
under a centralized structure with increased federal oversight. 
*** 
Throughout the Gilded Age the militia served at the intersection of American 
society and the American military.  In a broad sense, the militia appealed to traditional 
American ideals related to patriotism and virtue. When speaking of the militia in his 
biannual address to the state legislature, Illinois Governor John Peter Altgeld said, “they 
draw no pay except when on active duty.  They are all engaged in private business 
pursuits just as other citizens.  This being the case, there was impressed upon the officers 
the importance of making their arrangements for calling their men together so perfect that 
they could be collected at any hour of the day or night from their homes and places of 
business without the loss of a minute, and I am proud to say that the highest requirements 
in this regard have been met.”143  The governor stressed ideas of civic responsibility and 
the aspect that militiamen were citizens the majority of the time, yet answered the call to 
arms under various circumstances, often with little advanced notice.  During his address, 
Illinois’s chief executive went on to praise the militia for their service during a recent 
coal and railroad strike, and declared that “in many cases, especially in Chicago, the 
conditions under which they had to do duty for many weeks were very severe, but they 
bore all hardships like veterans.  It may be satisfaction to the people of Illinois to know 
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that they have one of the best military establishments in America, and that it is 
maintained at small expense.”144  Of course, this “small expense” to the state was one of 
the major complaints of the NGA, and one of the reasons for slackening standards 
between institutions during the latter half of the nineteenth-century, but nonetheless, 
Governor Altgeld’s statement embodied virtually every major aspect of militia service: 
civic virtue, strike duty, and funding.  Ultimately though, the existing militia system 
dissolved at the turn of the twentieth century. 
In the nineteenth century, social strains related to labor disputes and racial tension 
prompted state and local authorities to utilize the militia to protect public property and 
restore order.  Unfortunately for the militia, labor unions and some social commentators 
increasingly viewed the militia as little more than a corporate tool.  Regardless of the fact 
that most militia companies and regiments rarely, if ever, performed strike duty, 
organized labor advocates considered the militia an enemy of the working-class.  
Ultimately then, the militia found itself caught up in an ongoing battle between corporate 
interests and organized labor during the Gilded Age.  This association between the militia 
and strikebreaking illuminated a few inherent problems within the existing militia 
structure.  For one, many militiamen came from the same social class as the workers 
against whom they sometimes found themselves aligned.  These working-class soldiers 
became torn between a sense of duty and a sense of loyalty to their fellow workers, and a 
strong sense of animosity toward strike duty emerged within the militia.  While workers 
continued to enlist in the militia as a means of carrying out a sense of civic duty or as a 
way of maintaining a masculine identity, they increasingly came under scrutiny for their 
dual role as both unionists and militiamen.  On some occasions these soldiers risked 
                                                          
144 “Raps at Cleveland,” The Daily Inter Ocean, January 11, 1895. 
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losing their jobs or union positions if they continued serving in the militia, and on other 
occasions, militiamen found themselves sympathizing with strikers across the lines. 
The situation between the militia and organized labor also exposed serious 
shortcomings in the system.  Instances of militia inefficiency and ineptitude demonstrated 
the inadequacy of the militia’s existing training protocols.  Throughout much of the 
nineteenth century, the militia focused on close-order drills and unit marching order.  
While the militia increased its overall emphasis on military tactics and marksmanship in 
the 1880s and 90s, poor funding and state-by-state standards led serious training lapses in 
many companies and regiments.  Indeed, as one regular army officer pointed out after 
observing the Illinois militia, the only companies who regularly trained in combat 
maneuvers and riot-control techniques were those units near major industrial centers.  
The rest of the Illinois militia spent many of their monthly drills trying to keep their 
soldiers entertained in order to maintain enlistment levels.145  Regional differences in the 
United States resulted in some militia variances, but exposed many of the same 
shortcomings.  Class tension related to worker strikes were much more prevalent in the 
American Northeast and Midwest, while racial tension required militia activities more 
frequently in the South.  However, despite these regional differences, the lack of 
interstate cohesiveness and standardized funding greatly hindered the militia’s ability to 
respond to various instances of social discord.  By the end of the Gilded Age, social strife 
revealed many of the militia’s serious flaws, and the militia struggled to meet new 
challenges amidst these larger tensions.   
                                                          
145 Report of Captain J.B. Babcock, 5th US Cavalry, of the Encampment of the Illinois National Guard in 
1892 for the United States Adjutant General, War Department, August 31, 1892, found in Biennial Report 
of the Adjutant General of Illinois, 1891 and 1892. 
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Meanwhile, calls for militia reform reflected middle-class desires for 
professionalism and efficiency.  The emerging middle-class directed social reform 
through a search for order among chaos and by reconnecting with America’s traditions.  
In this manner, middle-class officers and soldiers achieved massive reforms within the 
militia and National Guard systems, while maintaining close ties to American patriotic 
and civic traditions.  Additionally, the new middle-class sought occupational legitimacy 
through organizations designed to increase efficiency and standardization.  The National 
Guard Association grew out of the same sentiments that promoted the American Medical 
Association and the American Bar Association, and NGA members stressed the creation 
of a professional militia officer corps while lobbying the federal government for 
increased financial support.  By the turn of the twentieth century, the NGA and middle-
class officers achieved a high level of success, but serious militia forms came slowly.   
Beginning in the early 1880s, Congress began considering alternatives to the 
militia and reassessed the antiquated Militia Act of 1792.  Militia opponents within the 
federal government generally supported replacing the militia with some form of universal 
military training or state constabulary force.  Reformers believed these replacement 
proposals would allow the federal government to increase their control over the nation’s 
military elements and ease the tensions between the state soldiers and organized labor.  
Conversely, militia advocates (with NGA backing) also called for reform, but rejected 
replacement proposals.  Instead, these reformers sought to standardize the militia and 
increase federal appropriations, while maintaining the militia’s state-centric nature.  
Eventually, Congress agreed to increase federal appropriations (which had remained 
stagnant since 1808), but failed to reach any systematic reforms during the Gilded Age.  
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The only major changes related to training techniques near the end of the nineteenth 
century (both as a response to ongoing strike duty and some increased federal oversight).  
Indeed, by the Spanish-American War’s onset, the militia was better trained than it had 
been in decades, and ultimately performed well in combat.  However, internal strife and 
the ineffective mobilization during the war forced militia officers and politicians to 
advocate for a new system at the turn of the twentieth century.  
As the nineteenth-century drew to a close, new international developments and 
American foreign policy demonstrated the militia’s shortcomings.  Poor funding 
(especially during economic downturns), the lack of federal oversight, and social tensions 
related to race and labor prompted militia advocates to press for comprehensive reforms.  
And while the middle-class and working-class differed on many issues, those within the 
militia agreed that the organization’s benefits outweighed its shortcomings.  In a larger 
political sense, the same political leaders who pushed for social and economic reforms 
examined the American military system.  Just as with business, reformers sought to 
maximize military mobilization efficiency.  Political leaders used the lessons of 1898 to 
create a supplement to the federal army, which fell under presidential authority during 
national emergencies, but still maintained its traditional role as state forces.  In a similar 
vein, Progressive Era reformers examined the militia under the guise of social control and 
cultural divisions.  The tense relationship between labor unions (who represented the 
working class) and the militia (who, fairly or unfairly, represented corporate interests) 
reflects a major division in American society during the Gilded Age.  Ultimately, 
numerous social factors influenced militia reform, but the officer corps needed to 
maintain a delicate balance between themselves and the working-class soldier.  The 
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militia system ultimately collapsed in the years following the Civil War.  Due to 
problems related to military efficiency, social stigma, and class antagonisms, political 
reformers sought a new military system.  The old state militia system’s downfall reflected 
the larger issues in Gilded Age society, and militia reform became a product of 
Progressive Era politics.
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CHAPTER 3 – THE NATIONAL GUARD’S RISE 
Jerauld Olmsted paced back and forth in the Des Moines Telegraph Office 
throughout the night of 17 May 1898 as operators tapped their transmitters and translated 
official messages from the United States War Department regarding recent setbacks in 
the deployment of Iowa’s militia regiments to Cuba.  Prior to his service in the Iowa 
National Guard Inspector General’s Office, Olmsted graduated from the United States 
Military Academy at West Point and served in a variety of administrative positions in the 
American West, but now his office tasked him with overseeing a portion of Iowa’s 
mobilization for the war with Spain.1  Olmsted eventually wired Washington his bleak 
report; Iowa would not be able to get the 50th regiment—the first to go to the front 
lines—ready by the weekend deadline.  Though the troops were motivated for possible 
conflict, and the people cheered their cause, the existing laws hindered the War 
Department’s ability to supply the state militias with the necessary supplies needed for a 
hasty deployment to the Caribbean.2  As discussed in the previous chapter, cases similar 
to Iowa’s occurred throughout the United States as the federal government attempted to 
supplement the Regular Army with state troops as a means of attaining the necessary 
numbers required for the war effort.  The Spanish-American War demonstrated the need 
for a reformed militia system, and even though many in Congress opposed reform 
legislation, the events of 1898 made continued postponement impossible.   
The militia also remained in a tense relationship with organized labor, and 
suffered from a lack of assured financial support.  After a fire in the Illinois National 
                                                          
1 “U.S., Find a Grave Index, 1600s-Current” (online database), Jerauld Olmsted, accessed November 2015, 
http://search.ancestry.com. 
2 “Soldiers Are Not Ready,” The Fort Dodge Chronicle, May 20, 1898; Documents, Spanish-American War 
Era Collection; Iowa National Guard Archives, Gold Star Military Museum, Camp Dodge, Iowa. 
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Guard clothing and ordinance stores led to an equipment shortage in 1894, Illinois’ 
governor petitioned the Federal government to replace such items “as far as possible.”3  
Under the existing system, the federal government did not guarantee that states who were 
underequipped or who lost military items due to unforeseen circumstances would receive 
replacements within a year.  Therefore, the militia was in a perpetual state of military 
limbo regarding appropriations and equipment.  Furthermore, states needed to appeal to 
the War Department to garner funding for required annual training sessions.4  Once 
again, requisitions were not definite, so while the federal government required state 
militia units to attend a set amount of training periods to attain federal subsidies, any 
additional funding necessary to meet such requirements fell to the War Department.  
While the War Department granted most requests, this loose relationship between the 
federal and state governments regarding militia funding was a serious shortcoming in the 
old militia structure.  Therefore, the federal government, filled with Progressives who 
desired efficiency and centralization, ushered in a series of protocols that replaced the 
antiquated militia system with a truly nationalized state-centered force, the National 
Guard.  Ultimately, the Militia Act of 1903 became the first major step at militia reform 
in over a century.  However, vagueness in the new law, combined with charges of 
unconstitutionality and continued hostility from labor circles prompted government and 
military officials to press for continued reform which resulted in a series of amendments 
                                                          
3 John Peter Altgeld, Governor of Illinois to Daniel S. Lamont, Secretary of War, May 8, 1894; Box 23, 
Correspondence, Pre-Federal Period, 1886-1899 (Pre-Fed), Records of the National Guard Bureau, Record 
Group 168 (RG 168); National Archives at College Park, College Park, Maryland (NACP). Hereafter as 
Correspondence Details; Box number, Pre-Fed, RG 168; NACP. 
4 Numerous letters between state adjutant generals and the War Department have survived regarding 
training appropriations during the final decade of the nineteenth-century.  For examples see: C.C. Hilton, 
Illinois Adjutant General to Daniel S. Lamont, Secretary of War, March 10, 1896; Wisconsin Adjutant 
General to Daniel S. Lamont, Secretary of War, July 2, 1895; and Iowa Adjutant General to Joseph Doe, 
Assistant Secretary of War, June 29, 1896; Box 23, Pre-Fed, RG 168; NACP. 
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to the 1903 law and ultimately culminated with passage of the National Defense Act in 
1916. 
In 1882, when the militia remained torn between rival social factions, one 
political commentator noted that Constitutional limitations made altering the existing 
arrangement difficult.  According to General Albert Ordway, “there are certain 
limitations imposed by our form of government that make the question a more difficult 
one.  Under these limitations the question becomes, how can the National Government, 
under the powers conceded to it by the Constitution, provide that the militia of a large 
number of separate States shall be so equally and uniformly organized as to be available 
for national defense when required?”  While Ordway believed there was a solution to the 
problem, he readily admitted that “If the solution of the problem be left entirely to the 
different States, it is evident that no State will make any greater expenditure for the 
organization and instruction of its militia than its own necessities require.”5  Ultimately 
then, the federal government needed to enact stricter legislation which would allow for 
increased uniformity and efficiency, but that would not violate existing Constitutional 
provisions. 
As the United States entered the twentieth-century, congressional leaders and 
military lobbyists proposed replacing the militia with a system capable of complementing 
the Regular Army, generally centered on some form of universal military training 
(UMT).   Under such a structure, all men of military age would receive some amount of 
military training and could be activated for service at any time.6  Meanwhile, other 
                                                          
5 Albert Ordway, “A National Militia,” The North American Review 134:305 (1882), 397. 
6 “Senate Debates the Militia,” New York Times, January 16, 1902. Throughout this chapter, New York 
Times articles and editorials were accessed through the “New York Times Historical Edition, 1857-1922,” 
via proquest.com.  
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prominent politicians and militia officers supported a new system based upon 
strengthening existing militia organizations.  One political commentator, compared the 
two concepts and wrote, “In view of the vast difference between the degrees of readiness 
and efficiency offered by the two systems, the question immediately presents itself 
whether our Government should not commit itself without delay to the European system 
of universal military service in time of peace.”7  Throughout this debate though, the 
National Guard Association continued to press for laws that reinforced the existing 
militia structure, but remained willing to cede some state control to the federal 
government in exchange for increased militia appropriations.  Congress responded to the 
NGA’s lobbying and replacement proposals by passing a series of laws intended to 
increase militia efficiency, but ultimately replaced the old militia with a new National 
Guard.  Nonetheless, these laws did not stop opponents, as they continued to attack the 
new Guard system, and debates concerning UMT continued throughout the first decades 
of the twentieth-century. 
A transition to the National Guard occurred between 1898 and 1916 during a 
general army modernization and reorganization process.  Ultimately, the new National 
Guard system was a result of Progressive Era reform movements because Progressive 
politicians generally sought to increase federal authority to promote centralization and 
efficiency.  Congress intended these military measures to prepare the United States for 
the trials and necessities associated with modern warfare.  Yet, these modernizing and 
professionalizing efforts developed against the backdrop of long-standing traditions.  As 
discussed in the previous chapter, the United States had maintained a state-controlled 
militia force since the colonial period, and although the system failed during mobilization 
                                                          
7 John F. O’Ryan, “The Role of the National Guard,” The North American Review 202 (1915), 364. 
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for the Spanish-American War, many state governments and civilians opposed a 
complete break with convention.  Meanwhile though, critics questioned the validity of 
maintaining the old militia system.8  The prevailing notion among militia opponents was 
that a volunteer force consisting of “amateurs” could not adequately support the Regular 
Army, and the militia’s struggles during the Gilded Age and the mobilization debacle of 
1898 seemed to validate their opinion.9   
Although the militia performed adequately in the Philippines, observers continued 
to emphasize the organization’s inefficiencies.  And while the militia survived this tense 
period in some ways, they did not do so under the existing structure.  National Guard 
historians (as well as the National Guard itself) generally argue that the Guard was the 
next logical step in a militia evolutionary process.10  While the modern National Guard 
certainly has its roots in the colonial and nineteenth century militia system, the Guard 
after 1903 was a new organization.  Unlike the traditional militia, Congress established 
the Guard as a state force with high levels of federal oversight, and new laws allowed the 
president or Congress to federalize the National Guard for emergencies without state 
approval.  While this transition did not happen overnight, the move toward a more 
centralized and truly “national” National Guard began to take shape in the early twentieth 
century, and solidified itself by the onset of World War I.  Furthermore, in comparison to 
the old militia, the Guard’s association with federal oversight allowed the redesigned 
organization to serve in a more standardized fashion, while states maintained 
organizational control during peacetime.   
                                                          
8 Charles Sydney Clark, “The Future of the National Guard,” The North American Review 170 (1900), 732-3. 
9 “Defense Sentiment Shown by Poll of Businessmen,” The Chicago Daily Tribune, May 26, 1916. 
10 This is the generally supported argument forwarded by William H. Riker, Jim Dan Hill, John K. Mahon, 
and Jerry Cooper. 
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The new National Guard also served at an intersection between the federal and 
state governments and bridged the gap between the military and civilian spheres in ways 
the Regular Army could not.  Indeed, the Guard’s unique nature as a civilian force 
allowed America’s professional class to press for increased efficiency from outside the 
military system, whereas professional-minded regular officers attempted to reform the 
system from within.  Long-standing civilian suspicion of the military meant that many 
Regular Army officers were often at odds with their civilian governmental counterparts.11  
The National Guard, though, allowed reformers to press for change from a “less 
threatening” source.  Officers in the NGA worked closely with their Congressional allies 
to increase the Guard’s legitimacy and increase federal funding and oversight.  And 
Congressmen such as Charles Dick actively served in National Guard regiments and 
essentially became Guard representatives within America’s civilian government, where 
they could influence structural changes.  Therefore, the National Guard effectively 
connected the American military to federal and state governments in areas where the 
Regular Army failed to do so.   
For working-class Americans, the Guard continued to offer men an avenue to 
express their masculinity through company drills and public displays.  Guardsmen 
competed with each other in marksmanship competitions, and took pride in their ability 
to outshoot and outmarch, their fellow troops.  And along similar lines, soldiers staged 
boxing matches and participated in masculine-oriented games (like blanket tossing) at 
monthly drill sessions.  Finally, though the Guard moved away from flamboyant public 
displays, guardsmen continued to demonstrate their manly qualities to the opposite sex in 
                                                          
11 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations 
(Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 80-98. 
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unit-sponsored balls and parades.12  Additionally, the National Guard provided minorities 
and immigrants a means of attaining citizenship and assimilating into American culture.13  
By the onset of the First World War, the National Guard maintained eight all-black 
regiments across the nation, including the 8th Illinois Infantry Regiment and the 15th New 
York Regiment who would fight bravely with the 93rd Infantry Division in the First 
World War.  For men like Johannes Anderson (a Finnish immigrant whose exploits will 
be discussed in the following chapters), the National Guard promised a higher level of 
citizenship without the hardships of Regular Army life.14  Ultimately then, the Guard 
drew its numbers from every element of American society despite continued labor 
hostility and a fluctuating legal structure.   
Redefining and reshaping the militia into the National Guard proved difficult.  
Opposition to the Guard system came in many forms, and tensions between supporters 
and detractors led to years of Congressional debate.  Interestingly, these debates rarely 
fell along party or regional lines, and militia reform proposals were non-partisan in 
nature.  Congress ultimately voted in favor of the National Guard in the form of the Dick 
Act of 1903 and the law’s 1908 amendments, as well as the National Defense Act of 
1916.  However, the vagueness and vastness of the new laws raised questions of 
Constitutionality and created high levels of confusion among the ranks.  Prior to the First 
World War, calls for reform threatened the new Guard’s long-term inclusion in the 
                                                          
12 Eleanor Hannah, Manhood, Citizenship, and the National Guard: Illinois, 1870-1917 (Columbus: The 
Ohio State University Press, 2007), 59-63; and Eleanor Hannah, “From the Dance Floor to the Rifle Range: 
The Evolution of Manliness in the National Guards, 1870-1917,” The Journal of the Gilded Age and 
Progressive Era 6:2 (2007), 149-77. 
13 Hannah, Manhood, 13, 17-18, and 70-75. 
14 Johannes Sigfrid Anderson, Diary, Memorandum Pages; Johannes Anderson Collection, Medal of Honor 
Recipients; Illinois National Guard Military Museum and Archives, Camp Lincoln, Springfield, Illinois.  The 
Majority of Anderson’s diary was dedicated to his wartime service, but he expressed a sense of pride in 
the Guard’s close ties to his home state. 
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modern American military system, and the organization’s continued existence was not a 
foregone conclusion.  Between 1903 and 1916, the National Guard transitioned from a 
state-centric militia force into a nationalized military entity.  The Spanish-American War 
exposed many inadequacies in the existing militia system, particularly related to overseas 
deployments.  This chapter will examine how Progressive Congressional officials and 
military leaders used their power to promote efficiency and centralization, and ultimately 
created a new, stronger, and more effective citizen army.     
 
*** 
The Militia Act of 1903 
High profile calls for militia reform were not new at the beginning of the 
twentieth-century.  Throughout the nineteenth century, numerous American Presidents 
called on Congress to revise the militia structure.  Prior to the Civil War, Jefferson, 
Madison, and Jackson pointed out the militia’s shortcomings, and Lincoln expressed 
similar sentiments in the 1860s.  However, presidential demands for militia reforms 
seemingly increased as the militia became more embroiled in social and political 
tensions.  In 1880 President Rutherford B. Hayes supported legislation “for organizing, 
arming, and disciplining the active militia of the country, and liberal appropriations are 
recommended on this behalf.”  Similarly in 1882, President Chester A. Arthur called “the 
attention of Congress to the propriety of making more adequate provision for arming and 
equipping the militia,” and in 1890 President Benjamin Harrison declared that “the 
encouragement hat has been extended to the militia of the States should be continued and 
enlarged.  These military organizations constitute in a large sense the Army of the Unites 
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States, while about five-sixths of the annual cost of their maintenance is defrayed by the 
States.”  And perhaps most to the point, in 1901, President Theodore Roosevelt 
pronounced, “Our militia law is obsolete and worthless!  The organization and armament 
of the National Guard of the several States should be made identical with those provided 
for the regular forces.”  Roosevelt encouraged further legislation by saying “the 
obligations and duties of the guard in time of war should be carefully defined.”15   
While many of the chief executives’ calls for reform remained unanswered 
throughout the nineteenth-century, this trend shifted in the wake of the Spanish-American 
War mobilization crisis.  Early plans centered upon the establishment of a national part-
time army which could be called at the president’s behest, and President Hayes’s own son 
called for the formation of a peacetime militia that would fall under the permanent 
control of the federal government.16  However, the National Guard Association 
continually lobbied on the militia’s behalf, and convinced Congress to reject such 
schemes.  As the twentieth-century dawned, militia opponents found renewed vigor in 
light of the 1898 mobilization failures.  The most notable alternate proposal of the early 
twentieth-century became the “continental army plan,” which involved the creation of a 
federal force of all able-bodied men between the ages of 18 and 45, who would be 
compelled to serve on active duty for at least two years, and this proposal remained under 
consideration just prior to the passage of the National Defense Act in 1916.17  Other plans 
supported the establishment of a national constabulary for use during emergencies that 
                                                          
15 These quotes are found in: Committee on the Militia, Efficiency of the Militia, H.R. Rep. No. 1094, at 10-
11 (1902). 
16 “National Guard Revision,” New York Times, August 31, 1898. 
17 “The Militia Question,” The New York Times, February 7, 1916. 
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would train in peacetime, but would be separate from the existing militia.  The NGA 
rejected these suggestions, and they found powerful allies in Congress. 
Progressive Congressman Charles Dick—who was also served in the Ohio 
National Guard—was one of these influential Guard allies [figure 1].  In many ways, 
Dick came to represent how the National Guard (which officially replaced the militia) 
grew out of Progressive Era political trends.  Since the United States’ founding, the 
military has remained subject to civilian control, and increasingly over the course of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, regular officers served as the professional wing of 
America’s military sphere.  Militia and National Guard officers often served in a dual 
capacity as both civilian authorities and military professionals.  During the Spanish-
American War, Dick served with the 8th Ohio Volunteer Regiment and won election to 
Congress shortly after.18  Charles Dick simultaneously served as president of the NGA, 
and he was reelected to three succeeding Congresses and served as chairman of the 
House Committee on Militia Affairs until 1904 when he resigned to serve in the US 
Senate upon the death of Marcus (Mark) Hanna, the “Ohio Kingmaker.”19  However, 
unlike the man he eventually replaced in the Senate, Dick supported many of Theodore 
Roosevelt’s Progressive agenda items, particularly those related to the military and the 
militia.  Not surprisingly, as both a high ranking militia officer and president of the NGA, 
Dick rejected many universal military training (UMT)-style replacement proposals based 
on some form of conscription, and he developed a working relationship with Colonel 
William Sanger, New York’s inspector general.  In 1900, Secretary of War Elihu Root 
                                                          
18 “Biography of Charles William Frederick Dick,” Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, 
1774-Present, Library of Congress, accessed December 2015, http://bioguide.congress.gov/. 
19 “Ohio, Rutherford B. Hayes Presidential Center Obituary Index, 1810s-2013” (online database) accessed 
July 2015, http://ancestry.com; and William T. Horner, Ohio’s Kingmaker: Mark Hanna, Man and Myth 
(Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010). 
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dispatched Sanger to Europe to report back on how other Western nations handled their 
civilian reserves, particularly Great Britain and Switzerland.  Sanger reported that “an 
effective militia is a force of the greatest value.”20 
After Sanger returned from Europe, Charles Dick began regularly meeting with 
him, and moved forward in an effort to strengthen the nation’s militia.  Dick appointed a 
panel to outline a bill he could present to the NGA at their annual meeting in January 
1902.21    Dick and his supporters in Congress hoped to increase the militia’s efficiency 
through a modernization process that involved placing the militia firmly within the 
federal army system.  Dick’s proposal gained momentum, and the War Department 
submitted a reform bill to Congress that closely resembled Dick’s original bill.  However, 
the War Department’s bill held one element that Dick and the NGA opposed outright.  
Section 24 of the proposal would establish a 100,000-man national reserve consisting of 
men with prior military service, but had no connection to any state.  Secretary Root 
argued that this was simply a move to keep 100,000 veterans closely connected to the 
nation’s military structure, but the NGA believed this was an effort (with support from 
the Regular Army) to marginalize the militia in the long term.  Despite Section 24 and 
Dick’s opposition, the bill passed through the House.  However, in the Senate, 
Republicans favored the bill, while Democrats (with labor union support) argued that the 
bill was at once anti-state and militaristic.  Senator Stephen Mallory II (Florida) took 
particular issue with Section 24 and declared that “the measure is disingenuous,” because 
“under the guise of being a scheme for the promotion of the efficiency of the militia, it 
                                                          
20 William C. Sanger, Report on the Reserve and Auxiliary Forces of England and the Militia of Switzerland: 
Prepared for President McKinley and Secretary of War Root (Washington D.C.: US Government Publishing 
Office, 1903), 9. 
21 John K. Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 
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deliberately declares that a certain body of men, to be called national volunteers, are a 
part of the militia,” which the senator believed violated constitutional provisions.22  
Secretary Root and his Senate allies withdrew Section 24 in order to ensure passage, and 
the Senate passed the bill in January 1903.23  This law designed “to increase the 
efficiency of the militia,” effectively became the Militia Act of 1903, commonly referred 
to as the “Dick Act.”   
The Act established that “the militia shall consist of every able-bodied male 
citizen of the respective States, Territories, and the District of Columbia, and every able-
bodied male of foreign birth who has declared his intention to become a citizen, who is 
more than eighteen and less than forty-five years of age, and shall be divided into two 
classes—the organized militia, to be known as the National Guard of the State, Territory, 
or District of Columbia, or by such other designations as may be given them by the laws 
of respective States or Territories, and the remainder to be known as the Reserve Militia.”  
Furthermore, “the regularly enlisted, organized, and uniformed active militia in the 
several States and Territories and the District of Columbia who have heretofore 
participated or shall hereafter participate in the apportionment and the annual 
appropriation provided” will “constitute the organized militia.”24  Illinois Adjutant 
General Thomas Scott noted in his biennial report that the Militia Act of 1903 established 
the National Guard as “part of the military force of the United States, thus giving it a 
definite relationship with the United States Army.”25  Iowa’s adjutant general, Melvin 
                                                          
22 57 Cong. Rec. 570 (1903) (statement of Sen. Mallory). 
23 Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 139. 
24 Militia Act of 1903: An Act to Promote the Efficiency of the Militia, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 
57-33, 775 Stat. (1903), Sections 1 and 3. Hereafter cited as Militia Act of 1903, Section number. 
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Byers, who personally witnessed the law’s signing, similarly noted that the Dick Act 
“will greatly benefit the Guard of the states,” because it brought the Guard and army into 
a closer relationship.  He went on to say that “we [the National Guard] should make the 
most of it, and be worthy of the benefits accrued under this law.”26   
Under these provisions, the existing organized militia became the new National 
Guard (assuming they met federal standards), and anyone who enlisted in the organized 
militia after implementation of the Dick Act automatically transferred to the newly-
created organization.  Similarly, all those already enlisted or commissioned in the 
existing militia transferred directly to the National Guard.  This new law also allowed the 
president to call the National Guard into federal service for the “period for which such 
service is required, not exceeding nine months, and the militia so called shall continue to 
serve during the term so specified unless sooner discharged by order of the President.”27  
However, the Dick Act held to the Constitutional provision regarding militia deployment, 
where the president or Congress could only federalize the force “to execute the laws of 
the Union, to suppress insurrection, and to repel invasion.”28  Therefore, the Militia Act 
of 1903 did not allow for the federalization of the Guard in the event of a foreign war.  
Despite this, the new law did set the precedent where the president could activate the 
Guard without state approval and without the need for a volunteer provision in the event 
of a national emergency.  In this way then, the Dick Act kept with general Progressive 
Era trends which increased executive power.  During Senate debates surrounding the bill, 
one of the largest complaints came from senators who argued that the Militia Act would 
                                                          
26 Report of the Adjutant-General to the Governor of the State of Iowa, for Biennial Period Ending 
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27 Militia Act of 1903, Section 5. 
28 U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 15; and Committee on the Militia, Efficiency of the Militia, H.R. Rep. No. 57-
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give the president the power to activate the National Guard without Congressional 
authorization.29   
On 21 January 1903, President Theodore Roosevelt, the nation’s first Progressive 
president, signed the Dick Act into law amidst a crowd of people, including Congressman 
Dick and Secretary of War Root.  After a brief ceremony, President Roosevelt declared 
that he “hoped that no president ever would be confronted by such an emergency as 
would render it necessary for him to avail himself of the services of the troops provided 
for in the bill.”30  With the stroke of a pen and a few words, the National Guard was born.  
During this same period, Congress passed the General Staff Bill aimed at modernizing 
mobilization methods in order to avoid the problems exposed in 1898, and naval 
reformers established the United States Navy League, which influenced naval policy and 
ideology.31  When combined with the Militia Act, these policy efforts effectively 
reorganized and centralized the American military structure.  Similarly, Congress passed 
the Army Appropriation Act in March 1903, which guaranteed that each unit of the 
“organized militia” would receive the same “armaments and equipment” as the Regular 
Army, without any added costs to the individual states.32  The combination of these three 
bills ensured that the National Guard would have a place within the American military 
structure, and the laws allowed the Guard to increase its military potential.  Furthermore, 
many hoped that the Dick Act would increase the “efficiency of the National Guard in the 
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States in which it is greatest” and that in more “backward States, the standard will be 
gradually but steadily raised under the pressure of the law.”33  
Congress’s first major reform of the Militia Law of 1792 also guaranteed that 
federalized guardsmen would receive the “same pay and allowances as are or may be 
provided by law for the Regular Army,” which was a major victory for the NGA and 
other advocates who sought pay equality for services rendered, but the federal 
government was not willing to leave the National Guard and the states to their own 
devices.34  In order to promote efficiency and military standards in the National Guard, 
the War Department officially detailed “one or more officers of the Army to attend any 
encampment of the organized militia, and to give such instruction and information to the 
officers and men assembled in such camp as may be requested by the governor,” and 
those officers “shall immediately make a report of such encampment to the Secretary of 
War, who shall furnish a copy thereof to the governor of the State or Territory.”35  
Furthermore, Congress gave the War Department the authority to ensure states adhered to 
the new policies, and the Secretary of War was “hereby authorized to issue, on the 
requisition of the governors of the several States and Territories, or of the commanding 
general of the militia of the District of Columbia, such number of the United States 
standard service magazine arms, with bayonets, bayonet scabbards, gun slings, belts, and 
such other necessary accouterments and equipments [sic] as are required for the Army of 
the United States.”36  While the government intended these equipment appropriations to 
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be of no costs to the states, the War Department basically held the authority to execute or 
ignore the new law.  
Under the provisions in the Dick Act, the National Guard needed to meet military 
proficiency standards, and Congress and the War Department required each state to 
participate in marksmanship drills and submit reports to the federal government each 
year.37  Additionally, the Militia Act of 1903 outlined that the National Guard should 
have a minimum of 65 infantry organizations, 65 cavalry organizations, 120 artillery 
batteries, 120 coastal artillery batteries, and 100 engineering organizations.38  Under this 
guideline, the new National Guard would have uniformity with the Regular Army 
regarding organizational breakdown, and these guidelines fixed one drawback of the old 
militia system.  This new structure ultimately dissolved some of the disparities between 
states and standardized the overall force structure.  The Secretary of War further 
mandated that Regular Army officers would inspect state organizations as a means of 
ensuring compliance with new regulations.39  This new emphasis on uniformity was 
evident by 1908 when Illinois’ adjutant general reported that there was a “remarkable 
change in the National Guard,” particularly related to “the strides taken toward efficiency 
and the assumption of a more professional air and the getting away from the amateur 
ideas of a soldier.”40  Ironically, at the time of this report, Illinois still failed to meet the 
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Dick Act’s organizational regulations, but the law still established a move toward more 
effective training actions.   
Though the new law strictly outlined the organization of the new National Guard 
while federalized, Congressman Dick sought to assuage state fears related to federal 
overreach and appease political opponents who could potentially argue against the Dick 
Act’s constitutionality.  Dick assured the War Department and the states that, “in time of 
peace it might properly be liberal, when not interfering with the true intent of the 
provision.”  Additionally, while during times of peace, states could have extra officers or 
non-commissioned officers “as a necessity of instruction,” and could even have more 
units than tactically allowed in the event of heightened volunteerism because “it is not 
unreasonable to assume that with the increased public appreciation of the importance of 
the organized militia under the new law, the necessary increase of companies and 
recruiting would follow.”  Finally though, under the original Dick Act, states would 
maintain their current unit designations because “there appears to be nothing in the new 
law to conflict with present nomenclature.”41  Therefore, states maintained localized 
designators, as the Third Iowa Infantry Regiment, the First Illinois Infantry Regiment, 
and the First Wisconsin Cavalry Regiment kept their state-centric names unless 
federalized.  
National Guard proponents hoped the new law would quickly modernize 
America’s fighting forces, and fix the militia’s efficiency limitations.  However, the Dick 
Act contained some inherent flaws.   And although many, including President Theodore 
Roosevelt applauded congressional efforts at military reform, carrying out the new 
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legislation proved problematic.42  One major problem related to the fact that even though 
the president signed the militia act into law in January 1903, the bill did not have 
immediate consequences for every National Guard unit.  When outlining the Dick Act’s 
provisions to various local authorities, General Samuel Baldwin Marks Young, stated that 
“Under the law the organized militia are given until January 21, 1908, to adopt ‘the 
organization, armament, and discipline’ of the ‘regular and volunteer armies,’ and within 
that time the organized militia is expected to conform as rapidly as practicable to the 
standard.”  And while the new law gave states five years to meet the new standards, 
General Young expected that most states would “take reasonable steps towards the 
attainment of the standard” in a relatively short period of time.43  As noted, the law’s 
execution rested with Assistant Secretary of War William Sanger, which meant that 
implementation of the new regulations fell to the federal government and kept state 
governments on the periphery.44  Therefore, many states did not put much effort into 
meeting the new standards very quickly.  Indeed, by 1907—four years after passage of 
the Dick Act—only Massachusetts met the established requirements.45   
Most other states took their time in implementing change, but eventually planned 
to align with the new law.  As required in the Dick Act, each state had until 1908 to instill 
the necessary protocols to comply with the new laws.  In November, 1907, Illinois’s 
commanding general confirmed to the War Department that “we are now revising the 
Rules and Regulations and when completed they will cover all necessary changes to 
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conform to said Order.  This will be done before January 21, 1908.”46  In order to 
demonstrate compliance with the original Dick Act and its amendments, Illinois 
established the Military and Naval Code of Illinois in July, 1907, and many elements of 
the Military and Naval Code reflected the existing federal laws.  For example, the Illinois 
code book stated that “All of the able-bodied men of the state, aged 16-45 are subject to 
military duty and make up the Illinois State Militia.  However, as article II states, the 
state’s organized land force would be the Illinois National Guard “and shall consist of not 
more than twenty-four (24) battalions of infantry, one battalion of artillery, one regiment 
of cavalry of nine (9) troops, a company of engineers, one signal corps, and shall be 
organized as a division under the command of a major general.”  In order to make Guard 
service slightly more appealing, the state guaranteed that “every officer, non-
commissioned officer, musician, private, or enlisted man of the Illinois National Guard or 
Illinois Naval Reserve shall be exempt from jury duty, from payment of road labor and 
head or poll tax of every description during the time he shall hold a commission as an 
officer or be enrolled as an enlisted man in the Illinois National Guard or the Illinois 
Naval Reserve.”47   
Similarly, Wisconsin’s adjutant general, C.A. Boardman, ensured that his state 
would conform to the government’s guidelines by the end of January, and enclosed a 
copy of Wisconsin’s National Guard regulations.48  Apparently Wisconsin was well on 
their way to compliance because the War Department responded by saying “the 
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organization therein outlined, in so far as the War Department is concerned, appears to 
meet all requirements.”49  By the end of 1907, then, states were more apt to institute 
changes to their military organizations in accordance with federal regulations than they 
were in 1903 because of the looming deadline, but other drawbacks to the Dick Act 
prevented the law from effectively fixing existing shortcomings.  Though the act would 
strengthen the overall American military structure, the War Department hesitated to 
enforce the law’s regulations strictly.  And while many historians and contemporaries 
credited Secretary of War Elihu Root for pushing Guard reforms though governmental 
channels, he was actually a proponent of an all-volunteer force for times of war.  Root 
believed, even as late as 1916 that using the National Guard as a supplement to the 
Regular Army was, “quite absurd.”  Root maintained in a letter written for public 
consumption that, “the National Guard are primarily State troops for state purposes, and 
they must continue to be so.”50     
While some elements of the Dick Act allowed for high levels of resistance and a 
very gradual shift toward compliance, the law did work as planned in other respects.  In 
addition to detailing Regular Army officers to serve as National Guard trainers and 
liaisons, the War Department also ordered numerous non-commissioned officers to 
oversee National Guard training activities and institute Regular Army standards at the 
enlisted level.  These sergeants then submitted quarterly reports to the War Department 
and the National Guard Bureau as a means of ensuring Guard units met federal mandates.  
For the most part the Regular Army sergeants participated in seemingly mundane 
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exercises, but such training actions were necessary to guarantee the National Guard 
performed effectively and at a high level.  For example, the Army detailed Sergeant 
Tiffin Annesser to the Hospital Corps of the First Wisconsin Infantry Regiment, where he 
trained soldiers in how to properly carry a litter, how to apply and use blanket rolls, and 
how to use and apply field dressings.51  Sergeant Charles Baird trained with B Battery of 
the Fourth Minnesota Field Artillery and taught upcoming National Guard non-
commissioned officers every Tuesday evening and drilled with the field artillery batteries 
every Friday.  Sergeant Baird also worked with the headquarters detachment of the 
Fourth Minnesota Field Artillery and oversaw training related to personal hygiene in the 
field as well as how to properly mark routes, scout artillery positions, and signal between 
forward units.52  Similarly, Sergeant J. Leland Bass trained with Troops A, C, E, F, and H 
of the First Illinois Cavalry Regiment and instructed soldiers in proper mounting, 
bridling, saddling, and dismounting techniques, as well as manual of arms drills with 
rifles and pistols.53  Overall, the efforts of these Regular Army sergeants helped ensure 
that the National Guards of various states would be able to meet and in some cases 
exceed the federal government’s standards of military effectiveness. 
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The Dick Act’s flaws 
The flaws in the Militia Act of 1903 demonstrated themselves in a variety of 
capacities during the first decade of the twentieth century.  In early January 1908, as the 
conformity deadline approached, the Committee on Militia Affairs reported that only four 
states (Idaho, Wisconsin, Massachusetts, and South Dakota) were up to standard, and 
only another four (Illinois, Maine, Michigan, and Nebraska) reported that they would 
meet the requirements by the deadline.  Therefore, the Committee supported a Senate bill 
to extend the deadline two more years—to 21 January 1910.54  Due partly to the lack of 
compliance, and partly to other limitations of the original bill, Congress decided to 
amend the existing law in 1908 (and again in 1909 and 1910), and while the amendments 
did extend the deadline two years, they further clarified the Militia Act’s provisions.  One 
of the major changes in the law related to time constraints, as Congress removed the nine-
month limit on presidential authority.  The amended law read, “it shall be lawful for the 
President to call forth such number of the militia of the State or of the States or 
Territories or of the District of Columbia as he may deem necessary to repel invasion, 
suppress such rebellion, or to enable him to execute such laws, and to issue his orders for 
that purpose to such officers of the militia as he may think proper,” provided that “no 
commissioned officer or enlisted man of the organized militia shall be held to serve 
beyond the term of his existing commission or enlistment.”55 
Additional amendments to the Dick Act clarified the fact that when federalized, 
the National Guard would receive the same pay allotted as the Regular Army, and “their 
pay shall commence from the day of their appearing at the place of company 
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rendezvous,” but the law did not cover allowances for payment prior to the arrival at 
specified camps.56  Furthermore, Congress gave the War Department expanded discretion 
regarding inspections of state units as well as more authority to detail Regular Army 
officers to serve with National Guard units for training purposes, and clarified pay 
allowances for guardsmen who attended courses of study at military schools or 
academies.57  Finally, Congress established that the National Guard and Regular Army 
would attend joint training sessions in order to promote organizational cohesiveness and 
establish a singular standard for the American land forces.58  Once again, these 
amendments followed Progressive Era trends regarding executive authority.  During 
House debates, Democratic Congressman John Floyd of Arkansas argued with John Hull 
(Republican, Iowa) regarding Hull’s proposed amendment which would allow the 
Secretary of War to order Guard units to conform to federal organizational guidelines.  
Floyd was opposed to the amendment because the amendment “takes away from 
Congress the power to fix these regulations.”59    
Although the amended Dick Act expanded executive authority over the National 
Guard regarding organizational structure and deployment options, the law did not 
specifically give the president the authority to deploy the National Guard to foreign 
countries.  However, many federal officials hoped the amended law implied such a 
possibility.  In a January 1908 address, Assistant Secretary of War, Robert Shaw Oliver, 
spoke of the National Guard and proclaimed, “Now, I do not think that many of the 
National Guardsmen realize that they are exactly on the same plane as the Regular Army 
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if war occurred to-morrow.  Every National Guardsman, the day he signs his enlistment 
paper, or every officer of the National Guard, whenever he takes his oath, enlists for the 
war.”  Oliver went on the say that much talk of whether the National Guard would be the 
first line or the second line of defense was basically moot because as guardsmen, “you 
are in the first line, and you have volunteered.  The thing is done.”60   
  The amendments to the Dick Act that took effect in 1908 strengthened the bond 
between the Regular Army and the National Guard, and clarified some other issues 
pertaining to federalization.  In June 1908, the National Guard and Regular Army began a 
series of joint military training sessions at nine locations throughout the nation.  While 
the army attempted a similar program in 1906, only four states participated, leaving the 
mission a failure, but by 1908, thirty nine states sent troops (totaling over 45,000) to the 
ten-day military camps.  Assistant Secretary Oliver hoped these camps would become 
permanent rendezvous points for the Guard and Regular Army in order to “so organize 
the militia that every militia command will be permanently connected with certain 
commands of Regulars,” with “one co-ordinated whole army being organized.”61  While 
each state did not necessarily send their entire Guard contingents to these camps, they did 
send regiments to receive what Illinois’s instructor general referred to as, “more efficient 
instruction.”62  By 1910, Oliver’s plans seemed to be working, as a system for a general 
mobilization became part of the National Guards’ and the Regular Army’s general orders.  
Under this structure, “the whole country will be divided up into districts that will 
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ultimately take the place of the present military departments.”63  Generally, the War 
Department hoped that the clarified relationship between the National Guard and federal 
government would lead to a streamlined mobilization process and would ease some 
tensions with state governments. Nonetheless, a high level of ambiguity remained in the 
existing Militia Act. 
Ultimately, the 1908 amendments served to solidify the National Guard as a 
federal force under state authority; but some state governments continued to resent the 
new system.  One major point of contention among various states was a new provision 
that required Guard units to receive state approval if they needed to pass through that 
state for training purposes.64  This was displayed in 1914, when troops from North 
Carolina and Georgia needed to travel through South Carolina in order to carry out their 
required annual training, and in an effort to oppose Senator (and former Secretary of 
War) Elihu Root, South Carolina’s governor refused to let troops enter his state.65  The 
Governor used this opportunity to voice his disapproval of the secretary after the War 
Department moved a military encampment from South Carolina to Georgia.  Seemingly, 
Congress’s attempts to clarify the Guard’s role and to diminish the divide between the 
federal government and the states could not completely erase existing divisions. 
 
The new Guard, organized labor, and social strife 
Although Congress and the War Department actively worked to strengthen the 
new system, civil leaders and labor leaders continued to raise questions concerning the 
benefits of a federally supported state military force.  Indeed, organized labor’s 
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opposition to the militia did not disappear just because the federal government redefined 
the overall structure of the new National Guard.  Despite an unofficial truce between 
organized labor and the old militia during the Spanish-American War, tensions re-
emerged as the Gilded Age gave way to the Progressive Era.  When the Dick Act became 
law, labor unions took action against guardsmen within their organizations, and generally 
responded to the act’s passage with increased hostility.  Seemingly, the clause that 
declared every able-bodied man as part of a reserve militia, and every volunteer as part of 
the National Guard created a sense that the government was taking steps to suppress labor 
rights because now virtually every citizen became part of the militia or National Guard, 
who organized labor still viewed as an enemy of worker progress.  Indeed, while the 
National Guard moved toward centralization, it still represented larger elements of 
American society.  Therefore, the same tensions that plagued the militia threatened to 
unravel the National Guard from its inception.   
Shortly after Congress implemented the Dick Act, labor organizers in New York 
set forth a series of initiatives that would allow unions to expel members who also served 
in the National Guard during a labor convention in Albany.  Responses to such initiatives 
were mixed at best, and the New York Times went so far as to say “Organized labor has 
never put itself, not even in the outrages committed with its approval or connivance 
during the excitement of a strike, in so wretched a plight as the people who speak in its 
name at Albany are trying to put it in by insisting upon the right of trades unions to 
punish their members for doing their duty as citizens in the ranks of the National 
Guard.”66  New York’s adjutant general reported a year prior to the Albany labor 
conference that he believed legislative action had become necessary to ensure there be 
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“no adverse discrimination toward those who voluntarily offer their services for the 
protection of life and property and the preservation of law and order.”67  Meanwhile, 
organized labor voiced its opposition to the National Guard in more subtle ways.  For 
example, members of local labor unions boycotted a dance put on by a New York 
National Guard regiment who “was in active service” during a recent strike.  However, 
despite the boycott, “the dance was a success.”68 
Only a few weeks prior to the Albany labor congress, the Painter’s Union forced 
George A. Hindley, a Connecticut guardsmen, to retire from service in the National 
Guard or face expulsion from the union because “the by-laws of the Painter’s Union 
prohibit any member from belonging to the militia.”  Additionally, the union suspended 
the soldier from their organization for 60 days as “punishment” for his insolence.  While 
Hindley desired to continue serving in the National Guard, he submitted his resignation 
because he believed permanent expulsion from the union would make finding work 
nearly impossible, and another Connecticut guardsman voluntarily resigned his 
commission because he was a union man.69  In the months that followed, some states 
attempted to make “discrimination against the employment of National Guardsmen” a 
punishable offense.70  Despite these efforts, unionists continued to voice opposition to the 
National Guard.  Robert Walker said that he “recently joined the Car Builders’ Union, 
Federation of Labor, and has been made secretary,” and in his view “it is inconsistent for 
a member of a labor union to belong to the militia, as in the event of a strike he would not 
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be able to be loyal to both sides.”71  According to the Illinois adjutant general, the 
ongoing tension between “capital on one hand and organized labor on the other” had 
hindered the Guard’s recruitment efforts, but he hoped that both sides were coming to the 
conclusion that “the National Guard is organized for the purpose of guaranteeing life and 
safeguarding the property of all citizens irrespective of their varied interests.”72 
During a Central Federated Union meeting, a delegate reported that there was an 
entire militia regiment in Pennsylvania composed of union members who “are liable to be 
called onto take up arms against their brethren who are on strike for living wages.”  The 
delegate who brought this to the union’s attention proposed that the United Mine 
Workers prohibit future members from joining the militia, but not all agreed.  One 
delegate wished the entire National Guard was composed of trade unionists because “the 
soldiers would hardly care to shoot their fellow-workers when on strike,” and he 
concluded that “they would be better than the United States Army.”  Another attendee 
proudly declared that he was a member of the National Guard, but if his officers ordered 
him to “shoot down” workers on strike, “I would resign.”73  In another case, roughly fifty 
percent of one Illinois regiment’s enlisted personnel were members of labor unions, and 
twenty five percent of their officers held membership in labor associations.  Though this 
unit demonstrated that they would turn out in full to follow orders, as they had during a 
strike in 1903.74  On the other hand, many believed some states would form military 
organizations where “the representatives of organized labor cannot gain admission,” and 
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indeed, the tension between trade unions and the National Guard could reach such lengths 
that, “In the event of trouble necessitating the intervention of the State for the protection 
of life and property, the chance of serious trouble for riotous strikers is greatly increased 
by the growing ill feeling which is developing between the unions and militia.”75   
 Throughout this period, the National Guard repeatedly found itself caught up in 
larger social issues, and just as during the Gilded Age, these issues were not only labor 
oriented.  On the evening of 14 August 1908, an angry mob in Springfield, Illinois 
converged on the city jail with the intention of killing a black prisoner accused of raping 
a white woman, as well as another out-of-town black man accused of killing a white train 
engineer a month earlier.  When the lynch mob found that the city’s mayor secretly 
transferred the accused men out of town they turned increasingly violent and 
methodically destroyed a small black business district downtown.  Eventually the rioters 
turned their attention on a poor black neighborhood in town, known as the Badlands.76  
Due to the size of the riot, “the police were utterly powerless to cope with the mob, and 
the Fire Department, which had been called out, was not allowed to extinguish the 
flames.”77    Desperate, the governor ordered an infantry company from the Fifth Illinois 
Infantry, a cavalry troop from the First Illinois Cavalry, and a Gatling-gun section from 
Springfield to the scene by special train, with an additional infantry company from 
Peoria, Illinois in reserve.  Shortly after their arrival, the Gatling-gun section cut off one 
of the city’s main streets to the mob, but they moved through side streets, and continued 
looting and burning homes and businesses.  Sometime around 2:30 AM, the local troops 
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“fired a volley into the mob, which was putting the torch to negro houses in the ‘bad 
lands,’” and shortly after more guardsmen arrived and went to work “to aid in breaking 
up the crowds wrecking and firing the disreputable houses.”78 
 Eventually, the Illinois National Guard managed to restore order to the state 
capital, but not until after the throng left a path of destruction through Springfield’s black 
neighborhoods.  After the initial clashes between the Guard and the mob, the rioters 
dispersed, but the violence regained intensity the next day, forcing the governor to 
declare martial law.79  Even this declaration did little to end the riot though, as the horde 
lynched an elderly black man during the evening of 15 August, pushing the overall death 
toll to four, and later that night a guardsman killed a young rioter who was attempting to 
board his regiment’s transport train.  Eventually Guard numbers in the city reached 3,000, 
and later that evening the Illinois cavalry charged through the unruly mob, and an 
infantry company then moved in to serve as support.  Finally, after many similar military 
actions, the riot collapsed, but bullet fire wounded at least sixteen men (two fatally), with 
“scores of men wounded in other ways, and twenty-five buildings wrecked.”80  The 
Springfield Race Riot was the second such riot the city witnessed in four years, and one 
of the worst in Illinois’s history, and as in many other similar cases, the National Guard 
became central to the protest’s narrative.   
The same Illinois governor, Charles Deneen, again declared martial law in 1912, 
this time in Rock Island, Illinois, after a massive crowd (which mostly consisted of men 
from Davenport, Iowa) attacked city hall.  The riot began after Rock Island’s mayor 
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arrested John Looney, a local gangster who published an inflammatory newspaper as a 
means of extortion.  Four days after the arrest, Looney’s supporters issued a series of 
incendiary speeches to throngs of people that eventually grew to over 1,000.  When the 
protestors began breaking windows in city hall, the police began firing into the mass and 
injured at least nine with one dead.81  After the clash, the police became unable to restore 
order, and the governor ordered 800 Illinois guardsmen to the scene.  The Illinois troops 
“raised the siege of the City Hall and the police station and dispersed all crowds.  
Twenty-five men who refused to move on or give any satisfactory account of themselves 
were promptly placed under military arrest.”82  Over the next few days, the guardsmen 
continued patrolling the city, closed all bars and saloons, and dispersed any crowds of 
any size.  Eventually the riots drew down, and the Guard restored order.83  These events 
reflect how the National Guard found itself at the center of American social and cultural 
strife.  Similar situations required National Guard mobilization in Alabama and Virginia 
in 1902, Mississippi and Georgia in 1906, and numerous other states throughout the 
nation in the first two decades of the twentieth century.84 
Although the National Guard was indispensable in quelling many cases of mob 
violence, the situation between the state soldiers and organized labor continued to draw 
negative attention.  A 1910 article declared, “The hostile attitude of labor unions towards 
the organized militia has created a very pessimistic feeling among officers of the army 
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and the National Guard, and the feeling is reflected strongly in the annual report of Col. 
E.M. Weaver, head of the Division of Militia, to the Chief of Staff.”85  The article further 
noted that Weaver believed states should create a highly trained constabulary dedicated to 
the suppression of social unrest in the hopes that the Guard would ultimately be viewed 
as a defensive force.  And when Congress passed a bill in 1914 “to prevent the 
transportation by interstate carriers of certain personas and articles for the alleged 
prevention of so-called labor troubles,” they specifically exempted the “Organized Militia 
of any State or Territory,” as well as soldiers in the Regular Army and uniformed police 
forces.86  Congress essentially maintained the precedent that the government would 
continue to use the National Guard to maintain order during labor disputes.  Overall then, 
because of the vagueness of the Dick Act, questions of Constitutionality, and labor 
hostility, the new Guard system came under attack from various circles.  
 
Proposed alternatives 
In addition to the ongoing struggles with organized labor, the new National Guard 
faced a series of legal debates under the Dick Act’s structure.  While the War Department 
alluded to the notion that as volunteers, guardsmen were liable for overseas service, the 
law remained vague, and such a deployment could still warrant calls of 
unconstitutionality.  Critics generally argued that the federal government could not force 
state military units into the federal army without state approval.87  The federal 
government responded by claiming that the distinction between the “organized” and 
“unorganized militia” solved this problem because only those who volunteered for 
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service in the National Guard would be called into service, and members of the 
“unorganized militia” would still need to volunteer in the event of a war, but opponents 
were not convinced.  One legal scholar, B.M. Chiperfield, noted that even the Judge 
Advocate General of the Army cited the unconstitutionality of the Dick Act and its 
amendments.88  Further, opponents argued that the existing system unlawfully forced 
state governments to re-structure National Guard units in times of peace, even though 
Congressman Dick assured states that they would have some peacetime leniency 
regarding organizational structure.89  In light of these attacks, renewed calls for a UMT 
replacement to the National Guard emerged, and the NGA and their Congressional allies 
once again hoped to solidify the existing system without replacing the National Guard.  
As the first decade of the twentieth-century closed, the federal government again began 
reassessing the nation’s military structure. 
Ultimately, the United States witnessed a dramatic transformation during the first 
two decades of the twentieth century related to Progressive desires for increased 
centralization and effective management.  The ongoing reassessment of the National 
Guard’s abilities coincided with general trends in the larger American political and social 
process.  Frederick Winslow Taylor’s 1911 booklet, The Principles of Scientific 
Management serves as an example of this mindset.  Taylor outlined a plan to increase 
manufacturing output by maximizing worker efficiency, and he believed that businesses 
could maximize profits if managers used scientific methods to determine who performed 
the best work at the maximum rate.  Ultimately businesses could use this method to 
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increase worker pay, increase corporate returns, and increase safety protocols.90  Though 
Taylor and similar Progressives focused on the business world, the values they espoused 
translated to militia service and reform.  Militia officers (as well as Regular Army 
officers) required managerial and intellectual skills to maximize soldier efficiency, and 
officers often attended lectures on tactics, law, and discipline in efforts to establish 
efficient and professional military organizations.91  On a macro level, militia reformers 
used similar language when they proposed new laws or amendments.  The original Dick 
Act was aptly named “An Act to Promote the Efficiency of the Militia,” and its 
amendments centered on better increasing the National Guard’s effectiveness.  Despite 
these efforts, many military and civilian leaders believed the Dick Act did not do enough 
to prepare the nation and the National Guard to effectively meet the twentieth century’s 
military challenges.   
Regardless of the Dick Act’s shortcomings, some high ranking members of the 
federal government believed the current structure was sufficient in dealing with potential 
conflicts with foreign powers.  When the National Sunday Magazine asked Secretary of 
War Lindley Garrison to write an article regarding the standing of the US Army in 1913, 
he spoke very highly of the Regular Army and expressed pride what the army 
accomplished in “Cuba, the Philippines, Porto Rico, and Panama,” as well as in 
numerous public works projects, and the army’s smooth operation to commemorate the 
fiftieth anniversary of the Battle of Gettysburg.  Garrison then disputed claims that the 
nation needed a stronger reserve force (i.e. National Guard) by saying “It has been well 
said that what our Army needs more than anything else is, first, a trained reserve to draw 
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upon in time of war; second, a more widespread interest on the part of the public.  But I 
should reverse the order.”  Garrison went on to say that the army’s abilities and pride in 
their service would be enough to promote enlistment in a trained reserve.92  In other 
words, Garrison deflected any calls for a replacement of the existing structure along the 
lines of a UMT plan, but also avoided discussing any efforts to modify the current Guard 
system.  However, many civilian officials pressed for further reform.   
National Guard opponents in Congress again introduced serious plans to replace 
the Guard with some other military system, and most of these ideas centered on some 
form of UMT.  Many supported the revival of the old continental army plan, which 
allowed the federal government to implement a draft as a means of mobilizing this 
national “volunteer” force.  Another proposal would have expanded the Regular Army’s 
size, with two regiments of regulars stationed in each state to carry out the traditional role 
of the militia and the Guard.93  Other plans called for creation of state police forces for 
the repression of social uprisings and strikes, which would fall completely under state 
governmental control.94  Proponents of these plans hoped to increase the efficiency of the 
American military system based on European models, where the central government 
could mobilize an entire nation for warfare very quickly.   
Generally speaking most American reformers who advocated for a European-style 
military, supported something similar to the Swiss system where, “The whole manhood 
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of the nation is subject to service and there are no officers but those who have served as 
privates. There are no such colleges as at West Point, but the man who is to become an 
officer must get his instructions in a few weeks training in the schools at Thun or Basle.”  
Additionally, “The Swiss boy learns his drill at school, and from 20 to 32 he is liable to 
service if he is physically capable.  Rich and poor, professional man and laborer, serve 
side by side in the ranks,” and “every year the recruits have a six weeks training.”95  
German based proposals were slightly different and more geared toward compulsory 
military service in a reserve militia for an active period of two years with an inactive 
period to follow, but grew out of favor as the First World War loomed in Europe.96  In 
any event, each replacement plan found some level of support among civilians, 
politicians, and even military officers.97  Indeed, the Progressive Era’s complexities 
created a vast array of reform proposals in both society and the military.  Therefore, 
though many political leaders supported the new Guard system, others pressed for more 
extreme structural overhauls. 
Amidst this ongoing debate, Regular Army officers held differing views regarding 
the new National Guard and their ability to adequately supplement the army during 
wartime.  Generally speaking, army officers supported Emory Upton’s theories regarding 
the old militia and Guard, which downplayed the citizen-soldier’s military 
effectiveness.98  However, some regular officers in high positions weighed in on the 
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ongoing debate regarding the National Guard and UMT.  When General Leonard Wood 
became the fifth Army Chief of Staff, he set himself apart from many in the officer corps 
by supporting the citizen-soldier’s role in national defense, though he did so as an 
advocate for UMT.  Wood mistrusted the National Guard’s state-centric nature while he 
favored a nationalized militia, and he once referred to the organization as “an 
uncoordinated army of fifty allies.”99  In order to support a move toward UMT, Wood 
increased civilian training programs, though he did seek to strengthen the Guard by 
encouraging inter-service rivalries and Wood advocated for joint army and Guard 
participation in summer encampments.100   
While Wood pressed for comprehensive military reform, Adjutant General Fred 
Ainsworth challenged him at every turn.  Eventually the ongoing fights between Wood 
and Ainsworth resulted in Ainsworth’s early retirement in 1912, but he remained 
diametrically opposed to a highly centralized military structure.101  Ainsworth eventually 
supported the NGA and Guard supporters in Congress.  The Army’s judge advocate 
general, Enoch Crowder, also weighed in on the issue in early 1912 [figure 2].  Secretary 
of War Henry L. Stimson had asked Crowder to examine the existing laws and determine 
the legality of utilizing the National Guard in the event of possible intervention in the 
ongoing Mexican Revolution.  Crowder determined that the National Guard was little 
more than the militia under a new name and could not therefore serve as a legal substitute 
for a volunteer army.  He went further to declare that Congress made a mistake in 1908 
by amending the Dick Act to permit the use of the organized militia outside the United 
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States.102  Crowder would later deal a major blow to the National Guard in the First 
World War’s immediate aftermath, which will be discussed in Chapter 6.     
Within individual units though, a relatively high level of cooperation existed 
between Regular Army and Guard officers.  Provisions in the Dick Act established a 
system where regulars inspected annual Guard encampments and drill sessions, and 
guardsmen generally welcomed their advice.  Through this arrangement, officers in both 
organization developed working relationships as well as friendships and worked toward 
the mutual benefit of both the Regular Army and National Guard.103  Despite this, high 
ranking regular officers often held a sense of superiority over their Guard counterparts 
because the state soldiers carried an amateur status (despite professionalization efforts).  
These officers hesitated to support the National Guard fully and believed that, as 
amateurs, the Guard was ill-equipped to face the twentieth century’s military challenges. 
John McAuley Palmer penned a fictitious narrative entitled, An Army of the 
People in 1915.104  Palmer’s work never achieved commercial success, but his account 
demonstrated the division over the continuance of the National Guard versus the 
implementation of a Swiss-style volunteer organization that would train during 
peacetime.  Some within the Regular Army staunchly supported the latter.  Palmer 
outlined a “new” American military system based upon the “fiction that Congress is to 
pass THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ACT in the near future, and that I am simply writing a 
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popular history of the American ARMY OF THE PEOPLE as it stands complete a few 
years later.”  According to this story, Congress passed the National Defense Act in 
January 1916, just five weeks after the law’s proposal.  Here, Congressional leaders 
debated the issue, but when “a few courageous leaders frankly presented the issue of 
National Security to the common-sense of the people, the response was overwhelming 
and immediate.  This condition of the public mind materially simplified the legislative 
problem.  That our military institutions were antiquated, expensive, and inadequate, was 
the general consensus of public opinion.”105  In many ways, this chronicle predicted the 
fact that Congress was indeed on the verge of redefining the military structure, but the 
anonymous officer certainly had some personal bias as to how that new structure would 
look. 
An Army of the People outlined how the existing forces would become 
modernized and strengthened, and “it follows that no body of citizen soldiers having the 
constitutional status of militia can be welded into an effective fighting team for war 
purposes under modern conditions.”  Therefore, true military effectiveness meant “that 
the officers and enlisted men of the organized militia should be encouraged to transfer to 
the new national force and should thereby become its nucleus and leaven of training and 
efficiency.”  Of course, “a large number of the more intelligent officers of the Organized 
Militia” accepted this “fact,” and the American people generally understood the benefits 
of the Swiss model, but rejected the idea of conscription.106  In this book, after Congress 
established a new, national, all-volunteer force, young Americans flocked to the 
president’s call for volunteers to serve in Europe in 1916.  They formed a new volunteer 
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army, consisting of over 320,000 recruits and 15,000 officer candidates, organized into 
fifteen infantry divisions, three cavalry divisions, and a volunteer coast artillery corps of 
216 companies.107  While An Army of the People had a limited readership, this book 
outlined UMT’s appeal, and though it was only one officer’s opinion, this book captured 
broader sentiments among Regular Army officers who supported an alternative to the 
National Guard.  Palmer certainly believed that the American people would ultimately 
support his concept of a universally conscripted and trained defense force.   
 
The National Defense Act of 1916 
Despite some successes of the Dick Act, many prominent officials still viewed the 
Guard system as flawed and ineffective.  A major reason for this perception reflected the 
states’ unwillingness to carry out the law, but the law itself did not fix all the failings of 
the old system.  When Leonard Wood stepped down as army chief of staff in 1914, the 
Army War College released A Proper Military Policy for the United States, which 
outlined training protocols for war service.  According to the booklet, soldiers needed no 
less than twelve months’ training at 150 hours per month, which the National Guard 
simply could not achieve with only 24 drill periods per year with one mandatory summer 
encampment.108  Furthermore, an already noted problem with the Dick Act and its 
amendments pertained to deployments, which did not include overseas service.109  With 
the First World War already underway in Europe, American political leaders and 
civilians weighed the possibility of the United States joining the war effort, and President 
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Wilson called for a form of armed neutrality.  Under the existing structure, if the nation 
did go to war, the National Guard could only mobilize for overseas duty with 
gubernatorial authority, and the nation risked another mobilization debacle reminiscent of 
1898.  The War Department and Congress were aware of this problem, and hoped to fix 
the issue through amendments to the existing law, or the Constitution itself.  In 
December, 1915 once concerned senator wrote a letter to the War Department stating that 
he received a number of requests from constituents asking for a Constitutional 
amendment authorizing the use of the National Guard in wars outside of the United 
States.110   
Secretary Garrison had earlier noted that the existing system would allow for an 
adequate national defense, but he altered his position in 1915.  Garrison presented a bill 
to Congress that would create a “Continental Army,” made up of 100,000 regulars and 
400,000 national reservists with no state connections.  President Woodrow Wilson, who 
publicly supported the Preparedness Movement, endorsed Garrison’s plan (as well as a 
naval buildup plan) amidst growing international anxiety.111  The NGA remained 
obstinately opposed to the plan though, and took efforts to block it.  Congressman James 
Hay of Virginia, the chairman of the House Committee on Military Affairs, refused to 
accept the notion of a completely federal army, and led the effort to block Garrison’s 
plan.  Over the course of the next year, Hay and his allies (who included retired Major 
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General Fred Ainsworth) battled against Wilson and Garrison’s proposal, and Garrison 
backed down slightly.112  In a January 1916 letter, Garrison announced that he was more 
open to the idea of increasing the Guard’s military potential, and said that Congress 
should amend Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution by adding the words, “and to carry 
on war.”113  This would allow the president to utilize the National Guard (still referred to 
as the militia in the secretary’s letter) in any war scenario, not just to put down 
insurrections and repel invasions.  However, Garrison still believed the existing National 
Guard was much too small to carry out its mission.   
In 1916, both the Senate and House Committees on Military Affairs addressed the 
issue of overall manpower and how the National Guard should fit into the military 
structure going forward.  Former Secretary of War Elihu Root spoke before the 
committees and openly denounced the National Guard, arguing that the notion that forty 
eight different governors could establish “the basis for developing an efficient, mobile 
national army is quite absurd.”  Garrison predictably testified that the existing 129,000-
man National Guard was much too small, and an adequate reserve needed a minimum of 
400,000 troops, and General Leonard Wood voiced his support for a UMT-oriented 
force.114  Following these hearings, Congress addressed the issues at hand, and had before 
it three bills designed to raise the military’s manpower and increase the nation’s potential 
to wage conflict overseas. 
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Congressman Hay’s bill (which the NGA supported) was one proposal before 
Congress, and Secretary Garrison’s was another.  Senator George Chamberlain of Oregon 
offered the third proposal.  Chamberlain’s bill would create a national reserve fed by 
UMT that would be free of state influence.  As debates over these various bills 
intensified, the NGA and states’ rights supporters swayed President Wilson toward a 
modified version of Hay’s proposal.  Lindley Garrison resigned soon after, and Wilson 
replaced him with Newton D. Baker, an ardent progressive and Wilsonian idealist.  
Shortly after, the United States faced another military situation that demonstrated the 
need for further reform when Francisco “Pancho” Villa raided two Southwestern US 
towns (this event will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter as it related to the 
National Guard’s mobilization along the Mexican border).  Facing the looming threat of 
war and the upcoming 1916 election (where Wilson campaigned on the fact that he kept 
the nation out of war), Wilson pressed Congress to move forward.115  Without Garrison’s 
personal backing, his plan fell apart, and Congress voted 402 to 2 in favor of Hay’s bill 
(which had broadened in scope during the ongoing debate).  When the bill moved to the 
Senate, the body weighed it against Senator Chamberlain’s bill, and after some debate, 
the bill passed the Senate.  President Wilson signed the bill into law on 3 June 1916.116 
This monumental piece of legislation revised the entire United States military 
code, which included the regular forces as well as the National Guard and ready reserve. 
The Hay-Chamberlain Law, officially known as the National Defense Act of 1916 
(NDA) firmly established “That the Army of the United States shall consist of the 
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Regular Army, the Volunteer Army, the Officers’ Reserve Corps, the Enlisted Reserve 
Corps, the National Guard while in service of the United States, and such other land 
forces as are now or may hereafter be authorized by law.”117  Additionally the NDA 
guaranteed that the Militia Bureau would be part of the overall army command 
structure.118  Apropos the general composition of the militia, the NDA maintained that 
the “militia of the United States shall consist of all able-bodied male citizens of the 
United States and all other able-bodied males who have or shall have declared their 
intention to become citizens of the United States, who shall be more than eighteen years 
of age and, except as hereinafter provided, not more than forty-five years of age, and the 
said militia shall be divided into three classes, the National Guard, the Naval Militia, and 
the Unorganized Militia.”119   
The National Defense Act of 1916 clearly defined the National Guard’s role in the 
new military structure and expanded federal authority over the organization.  Many states 
needed to alter their existing officer commissioning processes.  Though most states did 
away with the tradition of electing officers (and sometimes returning officers to enlisted 
status after a period of duty) between 1900 and 1916, some states still held to this custom.  
Under the NDA, each state needed to ensure that all commissioned officers met federally 
mandated qualifications and that said officers would remain commissioned until they 
retired due to age or other specified regulations.120  Iowa’s adjutant general believed this 
was the most important element of the new law because “It assures an officer, if he works 
hard, that he will be maintained in his position,” and “an officer must therefor [sic] come 
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up to a required standard.”121  Additionally, the army could force any officer who did not 
meet the new federal guidelines to retire or accept an honorable discharge.    
Furthermore, the federal government outlined the size and structure of Guard 
units, and authorized the president to assign the National Guard of various states to 
divisions, brigades, or other tactical units commanded by either Guard or regular officers 
for training purposes.122  Some states needed to alter their existing Guard structures 
slightly to comply with new regulations.  Iowa broke up one of its infantry regiments and 
solidified its Guard into three, and the state decided to drop the existing numerical 
designators and simply maintain the “First, Second, and Third” regiments.123  Most 
importantly though, the NDA set the enlistment period in the National Guard to six years 
(the last three years of which could be in the National Guard Reserve), and established 
that “hereafter all men enlisting for service in the National Guard shall sign an enlistment 
contract and take and subscribe to the oath prescribed in the preceding section of this 
Act,” which declared that those already enlisted in the National Guard became obligated 
to “defend the Constitution of the United States and to obey the orders of the President of 
the United States.124  Once Congress authorized the use of the army for any purpose, “the 
President may, under such regulations, including such physical examination, as he may 
prescribe, draft into the military service of the United States, to serve therein for the 
period of the war unless sooner discharged, any or all members of the National Guard and 
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of the National Guard Reserve.”125  Under the new law then, the president could deploy 
the National Guard anywhere in the event that Congress authorized the use of military 
forces.   
Many currently serving in the National Guard believed the requirement of a 
second oath of service violated their constitutional rights, and refused to serve when 
President Woodrow Wilson sent the Guard to the Mexican border only weeks after 
passage of the National Defense Act (this issue will be discussed in the following 
chapter).  In addition to requiring guardsmen to take a federal oath of service, the 
National Defense Act established training parameters, clarified equipment regulations, set 
payment protocols, and outlined legal proceedings regarding courts-martials of 
guardsmen in federal service and those in regular state service.126  And, in order to 
maintain effectiveness of existing Guard units, the NDA continued the process of 
assigning Regular Army sergeants to National Guard units “for the purpose of assisting in 
the instruction of the personnel and care of property in the hands of the National Guard,” 
but this number could not exceed “one thousand sergeants for duty with corresponding 
organizations of the National Guard.”127   
Overall, when the National Defense Act became a law, Congress allowed the 
Regular Army to double its size to over 200,000 men, and the National Guard to increase 
its strength to 17,000 officers and upwards of 400,000 men (as Lindley Garrison 
originally proposed).128  Furthermore, the Hay-Chamberlain Law established the Reserve 
Officers Training Corps (ROTC) as a means of bolstering the level of competent 
                                                          
125 The National Defense Act of 1916, Section 111. 
126 The National Defense Act of 1916, Sections 80-110. 
127 The National Defense Act of 1916, Section 36. 
128 Newton D. Baker, Secretary of War to Senator Chamberlain; DC 005.5-012.4, Analysis of the Army 
Reorganization Bill, RG 107; NACP. 
127 
 
 
commissioned officers, and allowed “qualified” guardsmen between the ages of “twenty-
one and forty-five” to attend military schools and academies to gain commissions in the 
National Guard or Regular Army.129  In many ways, the NDA revised and replaced many 
of the problematic clauses in the Dick Act, and firmly placed the Guard within a 
redefined military structure, and established that the National Guard was an integral part 
of the US Army when in federal service.  However, questions remained about the 
Guard’s role in American society.  One major question related to the constitutionality of 
the new laws regarding federalization procedures.  Another looming question concerned 
organized labor and whether or not the NDA would ease existing hostility.   
Legal experts examined the federal government’s ability to federalize a state’s 
military force as defined by the U.S. Constitution.130  Traditionally, militia mobilizations 
were voluntary or state-imposed, but under the new law, Guard authority was transferred 
to the president upon the declaration of a national emergency.  Prior to the law’s passage, 
J. Leslie Kincaid, the chairman of the New York Assembly Military Affairs Committee, 
argued that the new law would be constitutional.  According to Kincaid,  “The only 
power reserved to the States in respect to the militia are the appointment of officers and 
the authority in training, but it is significant that this latter power is carefully limited by 
the addition of the following words: ‘According to the discipline prescribed by 
Congress.’”131  Therefore, Congress and the federal government held the authority to 
utilize the militia for nationalistic purposes.  Others were less certain.  In June, 1916—the 
same month that Congress passed the National Defense Act—American high schools 
increasingly imposed compulsory military training, which many viewed as a “step by 
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[the] United States toward [the] Swiss System.”132  And even as late as January 1917, 
B.M. Chiperfield noted, “So then after viewing the whole situation, I conclude that the 
status of the National Guard under the Army reorganization bill is most indefinite and 
uncertain and but little improved over what it was before the passage of that bill.”  He 
went on to say, “The need of truly nationalizing the Guard is great, but the difficulties are 
many and hard to overcome.”133  Indeed, only months before passage of the National 
Defense Act, The New York Times still supported a continental army plan and declared 
that the proposed act, “saviors of politics and suggests that the idea of adequate national 
defense is not uppermost in the minds of its projectors.”134   
Additionally, the NDA did not erase existing hostility between the new National 
Guard and organized labor.  In 1917, Captain Irving Goff McCann of the Illinois National 
Guard wrote: 
One of the serious drawbacks to the adequate and efficient National Guard is the 
opposition of labor unions.  Strange as it may seem to those whose lives have been given 
to the unselfish labor of preparing themselves and others to defend our government in 
times of emergency, yet every guardsman in the United States has had to face this 
problem time and again.  The men in the ranks have had to defend themselves against the 
slurring remarks that have been cast at them as the minions of capital.  The officers, in 
their efforts to increase the Guard, have either felt the cold and silent opposition of the 
moderate unionist, which made their efforts very difficult, or the outspoken and bitter 
antagonism of radicals, which made their efforts fruitless.135 
Indeed, organized labor continued to view the Guard as their enemy.  McCann believed 
that the unions “have a sadly distorted conception of the motives and functions of 
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National Guardsmen,” and that the Guard spends ninety percent of their time preparing 
for war in times of peace.  And though McCann claimed to sympathize with organized 
labor, he asked “is it asking too much for labor unions to have a somewhat larger 
conscience than their own little group and think in terms of our country for a while?”136  
McCann, who was a middle-class Progressive pastor from Chicago noted how he once 
spoke to a class of twenty boys regarding the value of the National Guard for the nation 
and the individual.  By the end of his lecture, almost the entire class was interested in 
joining the First Illinois Infantry Regiment out of Chicago, but when they “returned to 
their homes, their parents and brothers said to them, ‘So you’ll join the National Guard 
and shoot down your own father and brothers will you?’ and not a single boy enlisted.”137  
So then, even as the National Defense Act took effect, the National Guard remained 
embroiled in a social battle with organized labor, but would face a new set of challenges 
only a month after passage of the National Defense act in 1916. 
*** 
In many ways, continued Guard opposition and calls for reform reflected ongoing 
trends in the Progressive Era United States.  Because American Progressives came from a 
variety of backgrounds, no single type of Progressive existed.  Indeed, historian Glenda 
Gilmore noted that, “Asking ‘Who were the Progressives?’ provokes answers that 
contradict one another.”138  Similarly, various civilian and political leaders supported 
some form of UMT replacement, while others supported the Militia Act of 1903 and its 
amendments.   In December 1916, the new secretary of war, leading Progressive Newton 
Baker, applauded Congress for their continued military reforms.  According to Baker, 
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“The latest codification of the military laws of the United States is found in the second 
edition of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which includes all military legislation 
of a general and permanent nature down to and including March 2, 1877.  Since that date 
the military laws of the United States have undergone repeated and often extensive 
modification.”  Secretary Baker went on to note how these continued shifts in military 
policy and structure were necessary and instrumental in preparing the United States 
military for a potential conflict in the twentieth century.139  Ultimately then, while the 
National Defense Act of 1916 came under fire from outside the government regarding 
Constitutionality and the seemingly unending stream of military revision dating back to 
the turn of the century, those within the War Department stood behind the new law. 
Between 1898 and 1916, the militia transformed into the National Guard.  The old 
militia demonstrated numerous inefficiencies during the latter half of the nineteenth 
century, which culminated in the disastrous mobilization during the Spanish-American 
War.  Though training reforms and limited governmental reform allowed the militia to 
perform adequately in Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines, the US government 
realized that the old system could not face the military challenges of the twentieth 
century.  In 1903, Congress passed the Dick Act with the NGA’s support, and took the 
first step in establishing the National Guard.  In many ways, the Dick Act followed 
general Progressive Era trends by granting the federal government—particularly the 
executive branch—increased authority over state soldiers.  While the Dick Act increased 
federal oversight and Guard appropriations, some serious drawbacks in the new law 
became apparent when states hesitated to implement various provisions.  Additionally, 
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the original Dick Act limited the federal government’s ability to mobilize the Guard for 
overseas service or for any extended length of time.  In 1908 Congress passed a series of 
amendments to the Dick Act, which further increased federal oversight, but the law still 
maintained the National Guard as primarily a state organization.  
Even with approval of the Dick Act in 1903, and again in 1908, the Guard’s 
survival remained in doubt.  And indeed, throughout the first decade and a half of the 
twentieth century, poor public perception and pressure in Washington from many who 
supported replacing the Guard with some form of UMT added to the Guard’s uncertain 
future.   Meanwhile, continued hostility from labor unions who viewed the Guard as a 
tool of big business created tension within the organization and threatened the Guard’s 
overall validity.  Calls for replacement came in many forms, as some supported the 
continental army plan, while others hoped to create constabularies tasked with 
maintaining law and order at the state level.  Unfortunately for the Guard, Regular Army 
officers and many top-tier political leaders hoped to replace the Guard with a more 
universal system because of a fear that citizen soldiers could not adequately supplement 
the Regular Army.  However, the NGA and Guard supporters rejected these claims and 
took further steps to strengthen the National Guard within the American military 
structure.  
In 1916, the US government implemented a series of military reforms designed to 
increase efficiency and military prowess.  For the Army, the National Defense Act 
outlined a new divisional structure as well as an updated force structure.  The new law 
engrained the National Guard within the Army’s official structure and again increased 
levels of federal oversight.  The National Defense Act allowed the President and 
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Congress to mobilize the National Guard for overseas service in the event of a war or 
emergency, and would ultimately reshape the Guard’s force breakdown.  Within a month 
of the NDA’s passage, the National Guard found itself in active service.  However, 
events in Mexico and along the border added to the confusion regarding the Guard’s new 
role.  Even as President Wilson activated the National Guard in June 1916, mobilization 
issues and oath requirements threatened to unravel the new system.  Indeed, this period 
between 1903 and 1916 in the Guard’s history was not simply an evolutionary step, but a 
process of recreation, redefinition, and reform.  By the middle of 1916, the federal 
government established the National Guard as a supplement to the Regular Army in a 
modernized military structure, but that system was about to be tested along the Mexican 
border. 
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CHAPTER 4 – THE GUARD’S FIRST TEST: THE BORDER 
 In early 1918, large contingents of the United States Army and National Guard 
were serving in the trenches in France, but in the US Senate, William Calder was fighting 
a related battle regarding service medals for guardsmen.  Senator Calder was not worried 
about soldiers in France failing to receive battlefield recognition, but was concerned 
instead with the Guard’s service along the Mexican border throughout 1916 and into 
1917.  Calder proposed a bill that would allow the Secretary of War to “procure a bronze 
medal with a suitable device, to be presented to each of the several officers and enlisted 
men and families of such as may be dead, of the Regular Army & Natl. Guard, who 
served not less than 4 months in the U.S. service on the Mexican border, or with the 
American expeditionary forces in Mexico, in the years 1916 to 1918, inclusive.”1  For the 
most part, the National Guard’s actions along the border were limited to mundane patrols 
and extensive drilling, and National Guard deaths during this period were accidental or 
due to disease rather than enemy contact.  However, this period at the border became an 
invaluable interlude between the Guard’s federal creation and their service in France 
during the First World War. 
Only weeks after passage of the monumental National Defense Act of 1916 
(NDA), the National Guard found itself poised for action along the Mexican-American 
Border.  While at the border, the National Guard never engaged Mexican raiders, but 
received valuable training that prepared them for future military engagement, ultimately 
allowing a highly-trained National Guard element to be among the first American 
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soldiers deployed to Europe in 1917 and 1918.2  Additionally, this extensive training 
period at the border came at a crucial time in the Guard’s history because, despite 
Congressional and Guard advocates’ efforts throughout the first decade of the twentieth-
century, the Guard’s long-term position in the American military structure still remained 
in doubt in 1916.  Even as late as May 1916, 800 of the 970 commercial organizations 
who held membership in the United States Chamber of Commerce voted in a referendum 
advocating for the implementation of universal military service.3  Furthermore, the same 
week that the Guard left for the border, political and social leaders continued to call for 
compulsory military training for schoolchildren as a means of emulating the Swiss 
military system.4   
Historians have given the National Guard’s service along the Mexican border 
limited attention for a variety of reasons.  Military historians often focus on the United 
States’ actions in France during World War I, which overshadow discussions about the 
Guard’s brief stint along the border.  While such historical accounts may mention the 
border duty, these mentions are brief and many historians focus instead on the Guard’s 
performance during the war.  Additionally (as will be discussed in the next chapter), 
much existing historiography comes from the Regular Army’s point of view, and thus 
unjustly disparages the Guard’s combat performance.  Other historians group the 
Mexican border duty together with General Pershing’s Punitive Expedition into Mexico 
during the same time period, despite the fact that the Army only assigned two National 
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Guard units (the 1st New Mexico and 2nd Massachusetts) to join the expedition in Mexico.  
Indeed, the two military events were distinct and had very different missions.  The 
Punitive Expedition sought to capture Pancho Villa, while the border duty was 
specifically a defensive posturing.5 
National Guard historians have kept their mentions of the border duty brief.  Jerry 
Cooper discusses the border duty for less than ten pages in his comprehensive work, The 
Rise of the National Guard, and although Cooper discusses mobilization issues, internal 
tensions, and the military system’s shortcomings, he places the border mobilization 
within the larger context of the Guard’s deployment during the First World War.6  
Recently, Charles Harris and Louis Sadler published The Great Call-Up, which 
comprehensively covers the Guard’s border service.  Harris and Sadler conclude that the 
Guard’s service on the border reveals the shortcomings of the National Guard (as it 
existed in 1916), as well as the downfalls of the US Army (which was under-strength and 
logistically overwhelmed).  Harris and Sadler accurately conclude that the border service 
better prepared the Guard for World War I combat because the men received badly 
needed training and equipment, and officers received invaluable experience commanding 
large groups of men.7  Indeed, the Guard’s extensive training along the border was one 
important element of the border duty, and it allowed the Guard to carry out their overall 
mission in France less than two years later.  However, the border duty influenced the 
Guard’s growth and place in the American military system in other important ways as 
well. 
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Harris’s and Sadler’s monograph provides a valuable contribution to the 
historiographic understanding of border service.  While this dissertation supports their 
argument that border duty created a well-trained cadre of soldiers—many of whom 
eventually served in the First World War, their monograph builds off of some outdated 
assumptions regarding the National Guard’s nature.  For example, Harris and Sadler note 
that many regulars disdained the Guard because many units resembled quasi-social clubs.  
While this perception was true during the latter half of the nineteenth century, the 
Guard’s growth and focus on efficiency after 1903 reduced greatly the amount of Guard 
units with little to no military proficiency.  Additionally, Harris and Sadler note that the 
Guard traditionally elected its officers and noncommissioned officers based on popularity 
not skill.8  Once again, by 1916 the National Guard had moved away from this practice.  
While many Regular Army officers still viewed the Guard with derision by 1916, the 
National Guard had addressed many of the issues that weakened public perception during 
the Progressive Era. 
Another issue Harris and Sadler focus on throughout their work is regional 
differences between Guard units.  They point out that some states, such as New York, 
fielded a well-equipped and well-funded division of 18,500 men during border duty while 
other states, such as New Mexico, maintained small forces with little state-based financial 
support.9  These differences played a role in Guard preparedness when border duty 
began.  Regardless of these differences, the National Guard remained a civilian force, and 
the Midwestern experience at the border encapsulates the Guard’s shared experience.  
The American Midwest remained a largely rural region but contained densely populated 
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urban areas.  Illinois equipped and maintained a large Guard force, but dedicated most of 
their resources to Chicago units who participated in numerous strikes and riots.  States 
such as Iowa and Wisconsin fielded Guard units mostly from rural areas.  Because of 
these variances, the Midwestern National Guard serves as a laboratory through which to 
view the larger border duty experience. 
The National Guard continued to exist at an intersection between American 
politics, military affairs, and international developments.  Service at the border grew out 
of the Punitive Expedition’s failures to capture Villa after he raided two US towns.  The 
federal government utilized the Guard as a defensive force after the diplomatic situation 
between the US and Mexico deteriorated and the Army demonstrated its weaknesses in a 
public fashion.  Furthermore, just as the National Defense Act of 1916 (NDA) had a close 
connection to the upcoming presidential election, so too did the border service.  President 
Wilson needed to demonstrate to the American public that he was taking every available 
effort to keep the public safe, while maintaining a high preparedness level.10  Therefore, 
the Guard became the president’s best military option to address not only international 
developments, but military developments as well.  Finally, the Guard continued to exist 
in both the military and civilian spheres, and guardsmen carried civilian social dynamics 
to the border.  Middle-class and working-class antagonisms remained relevant within the 
National Guard and the organization continued to reflect racial tensions while deployed 
to the border.  Ultimately then, Woodrow Wilson’s activation of the National Guard to 
serve along the Mexican border in 1916 provided invaluable training, which notably 
aided combat effectiveness in the Great War, and reveals how the new Guard remained a 
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defensively-oriented institution that reflected broader trends in American social and 
political history.   
When the National Guard found itself at the Mexican border, the organization’s 
long-term survival remained in question, and societal concerns related to class, race, and 
masculine identity continued to define the Guard as representative of larger national 
concerns, even while on active duty.  The National Guard held a unique position within 
American society as both a civilian and military entity, and often found itself embroiled 
in larger social tensions and rifts.  The strife between organized labor and the National 
Guard took a heavy toll on the working-class troops within the organization, many of 
whom served as a means of fulfilling a sense of civic pride, or as a way to ensure their 
masculine identity during a time of increased industrialization.11  Similarly, middle-class 
officers and soldiers served in the National Guard in order to perform their patriotic duty 
as citizens.  While the border offered soldiers and officers a respite from strike duty, the 
same social relationships pertaining to race, class, and gender carried over to border 
service and played out in various ways in military camps and during training periods. 
The National Guard’s service along the Mexican border took place during a 
pivotal time in the Guard’s overall history.  Paradoxically, the border duty was 
simultaneously the final action of the old Guard and militia and the first military 
endeavor of the modern National Guard.  When President Wilson mobilized the Guard 
for border service, he did so under the guidelines of the outdated Dick Act even though 
he recently signed the NDA into law (the new law had not taken effect yet).  Therefore, 
the Guard’s mobilization to the border was their last mobilization under the old law, and 
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it illuminated some of the NDA’s potential downfalls.  Despite the legality of the 
mobilization process, the federal government opted to include the NDA’s new oath 
requirement for all guardsmen entering federal service, and many soldiers refused to 
swear an oath to the federal government on top of the previous oath they already made to 
their individual states.  Some guardsmen went so far as to risk a court-martial in order to 
avoid taking this new oath.  Other soldiers feared their dependent families would suffer 
financially if they travelled to the border, and they hoped to avoid federal service.  
Therefore, during the border deployment, the federal government granted leaves of 
absences for many troopers with dependents at home, and upon completion of the border 
service, the federal government decided to allow states to grant discharges to soldiers 
who refused the second oath of service.  Ultimately then, the National Guard that 
remained in service when the border duty ended were highly trained in military 
proficiency, acclimated to military life, and fully embodied the more centralized nature of 
the new Guard system.  As such, the border service was a major step in establishing the 
National Guard as part of the American military system.   
*** 
The president’s call 
Tensions with Mexico did not begin when Woodrow Wilson mobilized the 
National Guard in 1916, but instead dated back to Porfirio Diaz’s election as Mexican 
President in 1910.  Over the next few years, the United States became diplomatically 
caught up in an ongoing power struggle within Mexico.  The two nations came to the 
verge of war in 1914 when US Marines occupied Veracruz, Mexico after Mexican 
authorities arrested US citizens in the area.  By the middle of 1915, foreign pressure 
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allowed Venustiano Carranza to assume the Mexican presidency in the hopes of renewed 
peace.12  However, shortly after Carranza’s victory, some influential Mexican rebel 
leaders opposed the new power structure, and after years of tense relations and false 
promises, Francisco “Pancho” Villa raided two American towns in March 1916.  
Incensed by these raids, the United States demanded a response to these actions and 
justice for Villa.  President Wilson—at the recommendation of the new Secretary of War, 
Newton Baker—chose John “Blackjack” Pershing to lead an expedition to capture the 
Mexican bandit.13  General Pershing’s Punitive Expedition proved to be a massive failure 
as American troops always seemed one step behind Villa and suffered from constant 
equipment failures and poor lines of communication.14  Furthermore, the expedition 
demonstrated that the United States Army remained unprepared for potential conflicts 
with other nations, especially in the event that the nation would become involved in the 
ongoing war in Europe.  In June 1916, President Wilson declared a national emergency, 
and ordered the National Guards of every state (except Nevada who maintained no 
National Guard) and the District of Columbia to the Mexican Border in anticipation of 
further Mexican raids. 
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The National Guard responded to Wilson’s orders with enthusiasm.  After all, 
answering the nation’s call reflected notions related to civic virtue and was ideally the 
role many troops hoped for when they enlisted.  Furthermore, new federal laws did little 
to sway the views of many Americans who still viewed the National Guard as a tool of 
corporations and the government against working-class people.  Therefore, federal 
service offered a welcomed shift away from strike or riot duty.15  When war fever first 
struck in March 1916, the Chicago Daily Tribune reported, “[at] All of the armories of 
the Illinois National Guard, the scenes of such bustle and activity has not been witnessed 
within them since the Spanish American War,” the headline of that same article was, 
“‘On to Mexico’ Spirit Sweeps Over Chicago: Recruiting Stations Swamped and Militia 
Armories Crowded by Eager Civilians.”16  In Springfield, Illinois, guardsmen swarmed to 
the Illinois State Fairgrounds conjuring up images of “the excitement that prevailed” in 
1898 when the nation went to war in Cuba.17 
  Officers and men alike became excited when the June call-to-arms came, as the 
Chicago Daily Tribune declared Illinois’ officers to be “Elated by Call,” and in 
Springfield, non-commissioned officers answered “with alacrity.”18  Scenes of excited 
mobilization such as in Chicago and Springfield occurred throughout the nation.  Iowa’s 
adjutant general ordered the Third Iowa Infantry to proceed to Camp Dodge in Des 
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Moines on 21 June 1916, with the rest of the Iowa National Guard to follow.19  In 
Columbus, Ohio, “all members of the Ohio National Guard have taken the oath of 
allegiance to the government and are ready for border service at any time,” and 600 
Missouri Guardsmen from St. Louis waited fully equipped and ready for service in the St. 
Louis armory, where “not since the days of the blowing up of the Maine has military 
interest been so high.”20  Captain Irving Goff McCann of the First Illinois Infantry 
described the feeling of the troopers in his memoirs: 
On Sunday night, June 18, 1916, came the call to arms for which the National Guard had 
been waiting so long.  After two years of exasperating expectancy, during which our 
government made scrap iron of typewriters, raised the price of white paper, indulged 
itself to drunkenness on grape juice and treaty writing, and coined half dozen catchy 
peace phrases, the National Guard had come to think that our government did not give a 
‘tinker’s dam’ for the lives of its citizens or the honor of our flag.  If you asked a National 
Guardsman what the United States was going to do about Mexico, he would give you a 
sickly grin and answer: ‘there is no such thing as being too proud to fight.’21 
 
 In addition to offering insights about troop attitudes and individual activities at the 
border, McCann’s memoirs (like other Guard writings) demonstrate a comprehensive 
understanding of the US’s military system and the intricacies of civil-military relations.  
McCann dedicated an entire chapter to the “Handicaps of the National Guard” in 1916 
and 1917, which he believed were mostly related to hostilities of organized labor.22  
Additionally, McCann embodied the National Guard’s middle-class appeal and 
orientation.  McCann was born in 1887 to a Methodist minister in Alabama.  He initially 
followed in his father’s footsteps and served as a minister in various locations, finally 
                                                          
19 “Iowa National Guard Ordered to Fort Dodge,” Illinois State Register, June 22, 1916. 
20 “Soldiers Gathering throughout Union,” Illinois State Journal June, 20 1916. 
21 McCann, With the National Guard, 90. 
22 McCann, 174-207. 
143 
 
 
finding himself in Chicago as Chaplain in the First Illinois Infantry Regiment in 1916.  
However, McCann held other aspirations and by 1917 he moved to St. Louis, Missouri 
and declared himself as a lawyer on his draft registration card as well as the 1920 census.  
By 1930, McCann was a general practicing attorney and lived in Wyoming with his first 
wife, son, and three daughters.  Eventually, McCann divorced and moved to Kansas City, 
Missouri and then to New Hampshire, where he remarried in 1938.23  McCann’s 
background as both a minister and lawyer place him firmly within the Progressive Era’s 
middle-class, many of whom defined themselves as reform oriented professionals.24  
McCann then, went to the border as an educated citizen with a firm grasp of society’s 
values who held traditional notions of civic virtue. 
 In the month after the president’s call, guardsmen from across the nation travelled 
to mobilization camps as they prepared to “go to war.”  Life at these mobilization camps 
was fairly comfortable for the guardsmen, as they prepared to enter federal military 
service.  When the soldiers arrived they underwent physical examinations, received 
various inoculations, and subsequently took the new federal oath.  Lieutenant Fred 
Ballard of the Second Iowa Infantry Regiment noted how he personally “assisted in 
examining candidates who wished to take the new federal oath.  I examined the teeth, 
throat, and hearing of every officer in the 2nd Reg. Inf. Ia. N.G. and also those of several 
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hundred enlisted men.”25  Not everyone passed the physical examinations; for instance, 
25 out of 100 men of K Company, First Iowa Infantry Regiment failed, and A Company 
saw 16 men fail for various reasons.26  Those troopers who passed their physicals 
immediately speculated as to how long they would stay at the camps, or whether or not 
they would ever leave, and a few troopers even believed that they would stay in camp 
until after the November elections.27  However, most of their stays were very short.  The 
First Illinois Infantry Regiment left Camp Dunne on 28 June 1916, only five days after 
arriving in Springfield, and Troop A and Battery B of the First Wisconsin Infantry 
Regiment left Camp Douglas two days after muster on 1 July 1916.28  Others stayed 
much longer, for example, the Second Iowa took the oath of service in Des Moines on 28 
June, but did not leave for the border until 22 July.29  Troopers who stayed in camp 
longer than a few days were able to enjoy the sights and sounds of their adjoining town, 
as numerous Iowa guardsmen enjoyed a baseball game between a local Des Moines team 
and a team from Sioux City, Iowa, and the fact that “all the boys in kaki are admitted 
free” only added to the enjoyment.30  
 Although these longer stays in camp were generally uneventful, there were 
instances worthy of note.  Some Iowa troopers experienced a catastrophe during a 
                                                          
25 Lt. Fred F. Ballard, Diary, July 1, 1916; 2004.44.1, Papers of D. Gallant (Gallant), Mexican Border 
Collection (Mexican Border); Iowa National Guard Archives, Gold Star Military Museum, Camp Dodge, 
Iowa (INGA). Hereafter cited as Ballard, Diary, Date; Gallant, Mexican Border; INGA. 
26 Dick Dreyer, compiler, Iowa Troops in Mexican Border Service, 1916-1917; Miscellaneous Documents 
(Mis Docs), Mexican Border Collection (Mexican Border); Iowa National Guard Archives, Gold Star Military 
Museum, Camp Dodge, Iowa (INGA). Hereafter as Iowa Troops in Mexican Border Service; Mis Docs, 
Mexican Border; INGA. 
27 McCann, 109. 
28 Moses Thisted, With the Wisconsin National Guard on the Mexican Border, 1916-1917 (Milwaukee: 
Milwaukee Journal Publishing Co., 1917), 41. 
29 Corporal Rulison J. Parker, “The Melody of Life, F. Co, 2nd Iowa Infantry;” Miscellaneous Documents, 
Mexican Border Collection; Iowa National Guard Archives, Gold Star Military Museum, Camp Dodge, Iowa. 
30 Ballard, Diary, July 8, 1916; Gallant, Mexican Border; INGA. 
145 
 
 
summer storm.  According to Lieutenant Ballard, a strong storm initially offered a 
welcomed respite from the July heat as many young soldiers were “running through the 
rain up and down company streets in their underwear.  They were shouting and laughing 
like kids.”  But this seemingly innocent event turned tragic when the storm intensified.  
Ballard recalled that a lightning bolt struck near where he was standing, and “down I 
went, dazed but not injured.”  He went on to sorrowfully recount that, “Just as I rec’d the 
shock I could hear screams from Co. A. 2nd. Reg. about 50-100 ft. away.  I also saw two 
or three boys shoot out from one of the tents.  They screamed and raved for several 
moments afterwards.  As soon as I got to my feet and realized what was going on I ran 
over to where the boys were and assisted only a little as the hospital corps had charge.  
One of the boys got it in the heel, ripping his shoe from his foot.”  The lieutenant went on 
to describe how others received shocks in different parts of the body, and in all, at least 
20 troops went to the hospital suffering from the shocks.31  Of course, events such as this 
storm were isolated, and most guardsmen endured life in camp with little incident. 
Iowa guardsmen celebrated Independence Day at Camp Dodge in Des Moines, 
and listened to a variety of military bands as well as a few fiery speeches.  Former US 
Senator, Lafayette Young, gave a “very fine speech” to the Iowans, where he proclaimed 
that “If I were president of the United States I would take all of the troops available to the 
Mexican border and withdraw all the troops now in Mexico to the border.  Then I would 
wait until just one shot was fired across the border at which time I would order my troops 
forward and make a Desert of Mexico!”32  The Iowa guardsmen responded to Young’s 
speech with resounding applause, but regardless of rhetoric, the soldiers needed to tie up 
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loose ends related to their personal lives.  And although “reports that the national guard 
troops would be called out for border duty were received in this city [Springfield, Illinois] 
last night with much enthusiasm and comment,” men sought to get their affairs in order 
before possibly engaging in hostilities.33  One major issue pertaining to federal service 
related to pay and dependent issues at home, and many women saw the advantages of 
being married to a soldier on active duty because a spouse could draw a pension if her 
husband was killed in action.    
 The Chicago Daily Tribune reported that “Romance began to spread among the 
troops like a conflagration,” and soldiers and their sweethearts rushed to the wedding 
altar before being shipped out.34  Of course, some families did not support such rushed 
actions, and on one occasion the parents of the soldier refused to witness the wedding, 
believing their son was making a mistake.  However, their efforts at stopping the 
ceremony were in vain, as an entire company of troopers were more than willing to serve 
as witnesses to the nuptials.35  While many soldiers sought marriage licenses on the eve 
of their mission to the border, military service also inhibited existing marriage plans.  
Illinois Governor Edward F. Dunne’s son, Richard, enlisted in the Illinois National Guard 
prior to President Wilson’s call, and border service meant that he would miss his wedding 
to Frances Fitzgerald of one of Chicago’s leading families.  And “Mrs. Dunne regarded 
the matter seriously,” because “about 500 invitations have been issued, and this order will 
probably bust up the festivities.”36  In any event, soldiers ensured that their financial and 
legal affairs were in order before they moved to the border.      
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 Some guardsmen were not as enthusiastic as others about the possibility of 
traveling to the border and possibly facing combat, and though many troops married prior 
to service, others hoped to use their personal situation as a means of avoiding service.  
Guardsmen from across the nation with dependents petitioned the War Department for 
early discharges, as they feared their spouses and children would suffer financially and 
socially from the separation related to service.  This anxiety did not dissipate when 
border duty began, as rumors spread that upwards of twenty percent of Wisconsin troops 
already at the border asked for discharges related to issues with families at home.37  Some 
soldiers even went to deceitful means to get out of service.  One young woman with a 
child in her arms approached an Illinois captain and declared, “I am Mrs. Arthur Karafte, 
and I came for my husband, who left me to starve and support this infant.  He is a private 
in your regiment.”  Private Karafte reinforced the woman’s claims, and the captain drew 
up papers for the private’s discharge, only to find that the young soldier had sworn he 
was single on his enlistment papers, and the destitute woman was the private’s sister.  
Their ploy ultimately failed.38  Honest soldiers did have some success though, as only a 
few weeks after mobilization, President Wilson “took steps to forestall criticism” by 
instructing Secretary Baker to grant discharges to guardsmen with dependent families in 
need who sought reprieve from service.39   
 While many guardsmen willingly responded to the possibility of carrying their 
state and national flag into battle, others resented President Wilson calling them from 
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their civil lives in order to intimidate Villa or serve Wilson’s political ends in a reelection 
year.40  Some guardsmen who hoped to avoid service took a different approach than those 
with dependents.  In May 1916—a month before official mobilization—the president 
activated the Texas National Guard for federal service and 116 Texas men failed to report 
for muster.41  Some of these men were simply away from their home stations at the time 
of Wilson’s call, but others outright refused service.  Fourteen of the Texas soldiers made 
a point of refusing to take a second oath of service to the federal government.42  The War 
Department responded by threatening the mutineers with a court-martial, but this case 
illuminated a larger issue pertaining to Guard mobilization under the new National Guard 
system.  As a means of avoiding the gridlock and confusion associated with militia 
mobilization during the Spanish-American War, the Dick Act of 1903 and its 
amendments in 1908 and 1910 established that the president could simply order the 
Guard to any location within the country in times of a national emergency.  Subsequently, 
the Hay-Chamberlain Law expanded the president’s war powers, but required mobilized 
guardsmen to take a second oath of service to the federal government (in addition to 
earlier oaths taken to their states).43  While the laws dictated that these oaths were not 
optional, there were no set protocols in the event of refusal. 
 Additionally, although Congress passed the National Defense Act in June 1916, 
the law did not officially take effect until 1 July.  Therefore, President Wilson’s 
mobilization orders technically fell under provisions in the Dick Act.  In order to ensure 
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compliance, General A.F. Mills, chief of the Militia Bureau, informed state adjutant 
generals that mobilization was to proceed “under army regulations … April 22, 1914,” 
and that the “troops are to be mobilized as organized militia, not as national guard.  Act 
of Congress, June 3, 1916, does not influence details of your present preparedness and 
movement to mobilization camp.”  This distinction meant that guardsmen could 
technically refuse foreign service (which was contingent under the new law), but the old 
law still obligated the troops to enter federal service as state soldiers, and therefore, were 
subject to military discipline if they failed to take the second service oath.44  Captain 
Henry Reilly of the Illinois National Guard reiterated this sentiment to his troops and 
declared that border service was not voluntary, “as it is mandatory,” and a court martial 
awaited any who refused service.45  The War Department followed through with its threat 
and the Texas guardsmen faced the military’s highest court, and so would any other 
“slackers” within the Guard. 
 The threat of justice proceedings seemed to be enough to dissuade guardsmen 
from other states from following the Texans’ example, and mobilization continued, but 
was beleaguered by difficulties from the start.  The fact that the United States Army sent 
little—if anything—to the state mobilization camps was the largest issue related to early 
mobilization.  State governments needed to supply their troops with equipment and 
rations, while they hastily constructed the camps.46  The original Dick Act and the Army 
Appropriations Act of 1903, required the federal government to provide the National 
Guard with the same armament and equipment issued to the Regular Army, and these 
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reform laws further outlined that the federal government and state governments would 
establish state rendezvous locations to expedite mobilizations.47  Ultimately though, a 
lack of execution left many states with inadequate camp sites and provisions.  Despite the 
lack of federal resources, the various states enthusiastically worked to prepare their 
troops for service, and sites quickly took shape.48  State engineers cleared sites of manure, 
dirt, and trash, and constructed housing and latrines for the thousands of soldiers in route.  
Incredibly, many of these bases were ready in less than ten days, and Captain McCann 
declared that the work of the general in charge of building up the camps and his staff 
“was a tribute to their patriotism and enterprise.”49        
 
To the border 
 Guardsmen began travelling to their respective border locations in June 1916, and 
their destinations varied depending on need, threat, and unit designation.  Most of the 
Illinois and Wisconsin National Guard traveled to San Antonio (Camp Wilson), and the 
majority of the Texas Guard operated out of Corpus Christi.  The First Illinois Cavalry 
Regiment, the First Virginia Infantry Regiment, the Oklahoma National Guard, the Iowa 
National Guard, and contingents of the South Dakotans, Texans, and Wisconsinites 
travelled to Brownsville, Texas.  The New York National guard anchored the most 
dangerous section of the border (the Brownsville District), and operated out of three 
locations: McAllen, Mission, and Pharr.  The First Missouri Brigade and elements from 
Maine and New Hampshire moved to Laredo, Texas, and soldiers from Maryland, 
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Kansas, Vermont, and Tennessee operated out of Eagle Pass, Texas.  The army stationed 
guardsmen from every other state in camps near the Big Bend and El Paso, Texas, 
Deming and Columbus, New Mexico, Naco and Nogales, Arizona, and in Southern 
California. 50  However, as guard elements returned home or moved stations, troops from 
other states would replace them, so throughout the border service these assignments 
fluctuated somewhat.  
 As the Guard prepared to travel to their destinations, the organization met a series 
of logistical and strategic limitations.  Because the president’s call came less than a 
month removed from passage of the NDA, both the Regular Army and National Guard 
were in a transitory phase.  States who provided more Guard resources during peacetime 
could concentrate their troops quickly and move to the border.  Other states needed to 
select mobilization sites, and in some cases recruit large amounts of men to reach full 
strength.51  Furthermore, the War Department devised a new divisional organization for 
the US Army (including the National Guard) in 1914 amidst growing anxiety related to 
the First World War.  Under this structure, the National Guard would be divided into 
twelve divisions, numbered five to sixteen (with the Regular Army comprising divisions 
one through four).  New England’s National Guard units would make up the Fifth 
Division, New York would make up the Sixth, Pennsylvania the Seventh, and so on 
based on region.52  However, few states managed to conform to the new twelve-division 
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structure which replaced the old state quota system.53  In 1916, the War Department 
informed individual governors of which types of units (combat or auxiliary) and what 
size elements (battalion, regiment, or brigade) they needed to supply.  The Army’s 
adjutant general, Henry McCain, sent a response to any governor or guardsmen opposed 
to this policy where he stressed the divisional plan and argued that any departure would 
create a confused mobilization process.54  Ultimately though, the War Department and 
National Guard did depart from the plan in exchange for a hasty mobilization.  Due to 
variances in readiness levels and railroad limitations, the Guard generally moved to the 
border and arrived at duty stations with little regard to divisional breakdown.55   
For many troopers, the trip to the border was unpleasant.  Most of the soldiers 
rode the entire journey in day coaches without the comforts afforded in larger sleeper 
cars, though officers enjoyed a few more luxuries.56  The First Illinois Cavalry’s journey 
to the border was delayed for a day because their commander, Milton J. Foreman, refused 
to allow his men to move to the border in chair cars, but instead waited for twelve 
Pullman sleeper cars.57  Foreman’s regiment also happened to include socialite Major 
Robert McCormick, president and editor of the Chicago Daily Tribune, who certainly had 
a hand in influencing his regiment’s fortunes.58  Furthermore, numerous men recounted 
that frustrating delays that plagued the long journey.  For instance, after a delay of over 
24 hours due to a series of small accidents, “the first section of the Second Wisconsin 
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Infantry detrained at Camp Wilson at 11 A.M., Friday, July 14, 1916, and marched into 
camp.  A wreck ahead of them at Texarkana delayed them for 7 hours.  Their locomotive 
killed a cow, causing another delay, and three cars broke loose from one of the trains, 
causing a stop of many hours.  The men had no complaint about the travel rations, but 
every man, it seemed, was indignant over the Day Coaches and the poor service 
enroute.”59   While most soldiers grumbled about their accommodations, there were 
simply not enough cars available to accommodate the nearly 120,000 troops from around 
the country to the border.    
  Nevertheless, reports circulated that troops travelled in overcrowded cars without 
lights, and numerous men were crammed into small spaces with little room to move 
about.  The Chicago Daily Tribune reported that the train cars were filled with “weary, 
sleepless, unwashed human freight,” though the paper’s editor avoided such a fate.60 One 
political cartoon of the period hinted at class warfare, National Guard exploitation, and 
outlined the hypocrisy of the railroad companies regarding the border situation and strike 
duty [figure 3].  In the cartoon, a wealthy railroad magnate welcomed guardsmen onto a 
fine dining and sleeper car, complete with a personal servant for service during a railroad 
strike, and declared “Hop on, boys, there’s’ nothing too good for you.”  The cartoon then 
showed the same magnate saying “Day coaches are good enough for them, we need our 
good cars for the vacation rush” during the border crisis.61  Indeed, for many, the train 
situation illuminated larger issues pertaining to Guard service and fair treatment, but the 
rail companies did in fact go to great lengths to ensure troop comfort.  Robert 
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McCormick’s personal influence certainly swayed the Tribune’s reporting, but these 
types of reports swayed public opinion.   
 Ultimately, many reports of ill treatment turned out to be exaggerations.  The New 
York Times noted that complaints regarding food shortages were “not so general as has 
been supposed, and in every case of dissatisfaction so far reported the investigation has 
shown that the guardsmen had a sufficient supply of food and were themselves to blame 
for going hungry.”62  Rumors of poor treatment on the journey to the border nonetheless 
prompted Secretary Baker to investigate each complaint of poor treatment, and he sent an 
official letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, which refuted many of the 
claims.  Baker stated that “No cars without lights were used to transport troops,” and that 
the troops were given Regular Army rations, “which were sufficient.”  Furthermore, he 
explained the reasons for using day coaches as a means of financial efficiency, and the 
secretary discounted rumors that the troops were delayed unreasonably on the journey.63  
Baker’s letter went into further details regarding sleeping space, food rations, and 
passenger car usage.   
 Secretary Baker sent his letter, as well as a series of telegrams, to various state 
governments as a means of quelling rumors of mistreatment.  Following receipt of these 
telegrams, Illinois Governor Edward Dunne issued a public statement denying the 
assertions by many of his state’s soldiers, refusing to call a special session of the state 
legislature to address such claims.64  Despite the grievances, exaggerated or not, the First 
Illinois Infantry Regiment’s largest complaint related to the lack of stabilizing springs on 
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the food cars.  8In order to promote efficiency, the Army used simple freight cars as 
cooking cars, causing many meals to find their way from the stoves to the floor before 
being served.65  While the lack of creature comforts irritated many soldiers, the trip to the 
border was a feat in itself, as all in all, nearly 120,000 guardsmen traveled to the border 
between 28 June and 31 July 1916.  The federal government utilized over 3,000 
passenger cars and day coaches for the journey, and the American Railway Association 
supplied over 400 baggage cars, 2,000 stock cars, and 1,300 box cars as a means of 
transporting troops and supplies to the border.  Interestingly enough, had all the trains 
used been fastened together, the train would have been 90 miles long.66   
 The First Illinois Cavalry Regiment was among the first troops to arrive at the 
border after only two days aboard the transport trains, and some among the ranks 
believed they were destined to go to war.67  On 1 July, Colonel Foreman invited his 
officers to accompany him to Christmas dinner in the presidential palace of Mexico City 
after his regiment had helped pacify the nation.  Certainly, this invitation contained some 
jingoistic and humorous qualities, but also carried a hint of expectations.  Indeed, many 
officers and civilians alike wondered why a veteran organization such as the First Illinois 
Cavalry (whose lineage dated to the Civil War) would go to the border if not for the 
purpose of waging war.  Others noted that the reasoning was more precautionary, as the 
troops would be at the border in the event of a war declaration, which was not out of the 
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question, given the existing hostility between the United States and Mexico.68  Near the 
end of July, some guardsmen still believed they would cross the Rio Grande and march 
into Mexico, and one Iowa private remarked to his parents that there were “20,000 
Mexicans within a mile of us,” and “shots are exchanged across the river [Rio Grande] 
almost every night.”69  However, war never came to fruition, and the Guard’s official 
assignment related to defensive posturing.   
 General Frederick Funston laid out the Guard’s mission by declaring patrols from 
the Pacific Ocean in California to the Gulf of Mexico in Texas would commence upon 
the Guard’s arrival, and used his authority as commander to “designate the time and place 
for movements of guardsmen to the international line as the occasion shall require.”70  In 
1915 Funston had taken command of the Southern Department and worked out of his 
headquarters at Fort Sam Houston in San Antonio, Texas.  When the Guard’s 
mobilization began, Funston was waiting to take command of this newly federalized 
force.71  Funston had earned a reputation as a daring soldier during the Spanish-American 
War and Philippine-American wars after he served with Cuban insurgent forces in 1898.  
He earned the Congressional Medal of Honor, along with two privates, after swimming 
across a river under intense fire to tie ropes allowing his regiment to cross by raft and 
overtake insurgent positions.  Less than three months later, Funston captured the Filipino 
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rebel leader, Emilio Aguinaldo, and earned instant fame.  The Army commissioned 
Funston as a brigadier general after he captured Aguinaldo and placed him in command 
of the Department of California where he commanded troops in the aftermath of the 1906 
San Francisco earthquake, and some proclaimed him as “the man that saved San 
Francisco.”  In 1914, Funston’s involvement with Mexico began.  Funston served as 
military commander in Veracruz after the US seized the port in April 1914, and in 
recognition of his administrative achievements, the army promoted Funston to major 
general in November 1914.  When the border duty commenced though, neither Frederick 
Funston nor Secretary Baker were willing to overstep their authority and spark an 
international war, and Baker publicly announced that “no additional troop movements 
into Mexico were contemplated, except in pursuit of raiders.”72   
 Additional speculation existed related to how the federal government would 
accommodate the Guard at the border.  Illinois Senator Lawrence Sherman stated in a 
reply to a constituent that there were no existing provisions for supplying the Guard at the 
border, and “Outside of the Regular Army there is no preparation for the enlisted men.  
There is neither food, clothing, nor shelter for his care.  He is without arms.  Outside of 
the Regular Army if we needed 50,000 men for instance, for service we do not have 
them.”  Sherman concluded with the words, “I believe in universal military training.  It 
ought to be part of every able bodied boy’s education.”73  And though Senator 
Sherman—among others—continued to support replacing the Guard with some 
semblance of UMT, he sponsored legislation which would offer fifty dollars a month to a 
guardsman’s dependent family during the border crisis, but the Senate defeated this bill 
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45 to 30 after a “fiery debate.”74  In the end, while the Senate voted in favor of upholding 
the president’s use of the Guard under the National Defense Act of 1916, the federal 
government basically had no plan in place for the payment, housing, and supplying of the 
National Guard.     
 Even as late as 30 July 1916, the lack of adequate supplies continued to plague the 
Guard at the border.  Moses Thisted of the Wisconsin Guard blamed the problems on 
logistics and lack of experience, as well as incompetence.  According to Thisted, the 
guardsmen:   
Are learning the science of warfare.  The troops wonder where the money for military 
training provided by States and Congress has been spent during the past few years.  Had 
it been spent by competent military authorities than by politicians, every troop, company, 
or battery would be effective military units today.  As it is, Infantry, Cavalry, and 
Artillery from Massachusetts,  New York, New Jersey, Illinois, Montana, Texas, and 
several other States are losing time and  money being outfitted or re-outfitted in the 
elementary essentials of Warfare.75 
An editorial in the Milwaukee Journal used these shortages to stress the need for 
universal military training and noted that there were “Cavalry without horses, Infantry 
without guns, Artillery without batteries and gunners, a dozen little armies without 
officers capable of leading their men into battle with a fighting chance.”  Some men 
remained at the border for over a month without a government issued blanket, and the 
editorial went on to say that:  
Shortages of clothing, blankets, cots, and tents can be remedied rapidly, but the lack of 
trained  horses, mules, machine guns, of trained men to handle artillery batteries, are 
defects that can  be remedied only after months of delay.  Here in Douglas, Arizona, the 
guardsmen of Arizona,  Colorado, Montana, and New Jersey loll around their camps with 
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empty rifles.  There is no question of the courage of these patriotic Americans, but the 
past national military situation has proven a failure.76 
 
 Despite the lack of adequate supplies, the federal government did take steps to 
ensure the base camps were up-to-standard.  When the Illinois troopers arrived, they 
found government workers constructing bathhouses and making a water connection to the 
nearby town.77  However, the camps were still in an early stage of development and 
readiness when the soldiers de-trained.  Once again—in a repeat of the arrival at 
mobilization camps—the troopers needed to dig latrines, set up pup tents, secure the 
perimeter, and build mess areas.  Furthermore, the soldiers found numerous kinds of pests 
and critters scattered throughout their campgrounds in need of extermination.  Private 
Dubbert confirmed his parents’ fears when he described the numerous tarantulas around 
his campsite, but assured them that “they aren’t the deadly ones, I guess.”78  When the 
Second Iowa Infantry Regiment arrived in camp at Brownsville, Texas on 27 July 1916, 
it found that its new home was infested with “locusts (beetles), lizards, camillians [sic], 
red ants, black ants, horned toads, and even rattle snakes have been killed on the camp 
grounds.”79  Interestingly enough, Fred Ballard described this infestation ten days after 
General Tasker Bliss, Assistant Chief of Staff of the War Department, issued initial 
inspections of the troops at Fort Sam Houston, San Antonio and at Brownsville, where he 
confirmed the camps to be up to standard and the troops to be fit, well fed, and 
adequately sheltered.80 
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 Various factors marred the overall border mobilization process.  Confusion over 
the twelve-division structure and low numbers meant that the Guard arrived at state sites 
and border camps somewhat haphazardly.  Additionally, Army inspectors and 
commanders witnessed Guard units across a broad readiness spectrum.  Some units 
remained at their mobilization camps upwards of four months before travelling to the 
border because inspectors declared them unfit for duty.81  For some Regular Army 
officers, the logistical struggles confirmed their doubts regarding the National Guard’s 
ability to supplement the Army.  One former inspector declared that the border 
mobilization “only strengthens my belief that the militia is worthless,” and one inspector 
at the border camps remarked that the Guard “has proved a hopeless failure.”82  However, 
the Army was not without fault in the mobilization process, and the federal government’s 
inability to supply the Guard adequately or uphold standards hindered the Guard’s 
effectiveness.  Furthermore, the Regular Army’s performance a year earlier on the 
Punitive Expedition was as disastrous as any Guard operation.  When the Army 
considered these factors, they saw the border mobilization as an opportunity to both 
strengthen the existing Guard and increase overall readiness.  Therefore, when the 
guardsmen arrived at the border, they prepared for the mission at hand, which centered on 
the coast-to-coast patrols, meaning that the guardsmen needed to undergo a series of long 
hikes and marches, and when the soldiers were not hiking or drilling, they dug trenches.83   
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Political implications 
 While social issues played out within the guard at the border, this service also 
carried important political implications, and politicians used border service as an avenue 
for carrying out political attacks.  In early November, former President Theodore 
Roosevelt, addressed a large crowd in Cleveland, Ohio, where he took the opportunity to 
denounce President Wilson’s Mexican policy as well as his use of the National Guard and 
Regular Army.  Roosevelt declared, “We have about 150,000 American soldiers on the 
Mexican Border and deep in Mexico, enough to ‘eat Mexico raw,” but “they aren’t doing 
anything.”  Roosevelt continued by saying, “Mr. Wilson has put then down there because 
he can’t make up his mind whether we are at Peace or War.”84  Months earlier, 
Congressional authorities denounced Wilson’s policies after he declared he opposed 
intervention in Mexico.  These congressmen and senators questioned why the president 
intended to hold civilian soldiers at the border for an undisclosed length of time “at a cost 
which bears heavily upon the nation,” when the Regular Army could perform the same 
job.85  Ultimately, Congressional Republicans believed President Wilson was using the 
National Guard as a political tool to implement a wartime policy while running the 1916 
election on a peace platform. 
 In one heated debate shortly after President Wilson’s call, two Democratic 
senators (Charles Thomas of Colorado and Blair Lee of Maryland) slightly broke with 
party lines when they argued that the Guard’s mobilization tore guardsmen from their 
families, and that the president should have made a call for volunteers prior to mobilizing 
the National Guard.  Senator John Works (Republican, California) pressed his 
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Democratic colleagues, and asked “whether that can justly be said under the 
circumstances,” because “As I remember, when the provision that they should be made 
Federal Soldiers was before the Senate in connection with the military reorganization bill 
[NDA], the friends of the National Guard very strongly favored that proposition and 
insisted that provision should be enacted as part of the law.”86  As the debate went on, 
Senator James Reed (Democrat, Missouri) proposed offering guardsmen additional 
foreign service pay, despite the fact that the soldiers remained on US soil.  Senator Works 
argued against the extra pay, and offered a lengthy retort to on the Senate floor where he 
argued that the President was using the National Guard as political pawns, and that “The 
country is being stampeded by fear.”87  Senator Reed and other Democrats vehemently 
opposed Senator Works’s accusation.   
The Wilson administration responded to Congress’s claims of Guard misuse.  
President Wilson argued that the Guard’s presence was in fact a peace protocol and was a 
means of keeping the nation out of a potential war with Mexico.  On 22 August 1916, 
Secretary Baker issued a statement supporting the president’s stance, and declared that 
“By its very presence on the Border, the National Guard is winning bloodless victories 
every day.”88  The secretary further ensured the public that “the Guard will be retained on 
the Mexican border until it can be withdrawn without again endangering American lives 
and property.”89  Some Republican political leaders agreed with the administration 
regarding the peaceful mission of the Guard.  Senator Lawrence Sherman wrote in a letter 
that if the United States did not pursue an aggressive strategy to pacify Mexico, then “we 
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must maintain a military force from the mouth of the Rio Grande to the Pacific Ocean.  It 
is the only way to safeguard our citizens.”  Sherman concluded the letter by denouncing 
other Republican senators who “believe in ambling peaceably along until the earth blows 
up under them.”90  As the border duty was winding down, and many troops were 
returning home, Secretary Baker sent a personalized letter to various state adjutant 
generals where he praised the Guard’s service.  Baker played up the danger associated 
with “formidable bandit raids,” as well as the “danger of international war.”91  Regardless 
of these claims, the opposition gained steam, and many believed the border service was a 
political ploy.   
 Private Rudolph Dubbert weighed in on the political situation in a letter to his 
family in Iowa.  In the letter, Dubbert commented on a conversation he had with his 
“Mexican friend” who “tells us that Roosevelt is the man for peace, and explains the 
Columbus and other raids.”  Dubbert went on to say that “It is certain that the 
Republicans with [William Randolph] Hearst are backing Villa for Hearst’s interests are 
all in Villa’s control and he has to back him to keep his money and oil fields.”  While 
these claims were unlikely, they demonstrate the political divide over the border duty and 
the US’s involvement in the Mexican Revolution.  Dubbert continued his letter by saying 
“twenty train loads of food would do more to settle the minor difficulties than an army, 
but the U.S. has to go in.”  Ultimately, Dubbert believed the nation’s best political 
interests involved entering Mexico as a benevolent force to feed the countryside and 
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settle things.  Not surprisingly, Dubbert’s “Mexican friend” agreed with his sentiments 
and said that “there wouldn’t be a shot fired” if the US entered Mexico because “they 
want the Gringos to come in and settle things.”  The Iowa private also encouraged more 
US involvement because there was an abundance of land “worth $15 gold an acre and is a 
veritable gold mine.”92  Of course, Dubbert’s letter and claims came from a partisan 
background and did not reflect the complexities of foreign involvement in the Mexican 
Revolution, but did demonstrate the political nature of the border duty as a whole, as well 
as a sentiment shared by some guardsmen. 
  
Hikes and patrols 
 Unfortunately, officers and observers quickly realized that most troops were not 
physically or mentally prepared to undergo long patrols, and therefore, guardsmen spent 
their first month or so at the border drilling and undertaking short hikes with lightened 
loads.  When the officers implemented this policy, they hoped the marches would not 
only prepare the soldiers for the tasks ahead, but also turn them into a more efficient 
fighting force.  Irving McCann declared that, “no matter how skillful a man may be at 
goose-stepping, no matter how much aplomb he may show at dress-parade and in the 
manual of arms, no matter whether he can outshoot the traditional Robin Hood.  If he is 
physically weak, shiftless, lazy, selfish, or a moral leper, he is a detriment to any military 
organization.”93  Initially, planners limited these hikes to only a mile or two in duration, 
but eventually they grew a bit longer, and after about a month at the border, the troopers 
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set out on hikes in full marching order, with full backpacks, a nine pound Springfield 
rifle, fixed bayonet, and all other essential equipment.94   
Generally, officers hoped these short marches would condition the troopers for 
their mission ahead, and prepare them to undergo hikes upwards of fourteen or fifteen 
miles per day.  At the end of July—less than a month after their arrival—the First Illinois 
Infantry Regiment embarked on their first long march, which spanned about twenty-five 
miles in length from San Antonio to Leon Springs, TX.  Intense heat, combined with poor 
execution took its toll, and troops began falling out of the march in droves, causing 
ambulances to clog the streets, and in all, about 600 men failed to complete the first day’s 
trek.95  The poor showing on this march enraged General Funston, who became “savagely 
angry,” and commented on the First Illinois’s lack of courage and motivation.  Funston 
even condemned the officers by blaming them for lacking the ability to handle their men, 
which was responsible for “the agonizing exhibition.”  Seemingly, Funston’s berating did 
not fall on deaf ears, and the guardsmen—bound and determined not to have a repeat of 
the first day—performed much better on the second day of the march, as less than 50 
troopers failed to complete the hike the rest of the way to Leon Springs.96  Of course, 
newspapers proved more than willing to pick up this story, resulting in increased 
censorship efforts, and “alarmists” who complained to their families about the heat and 
conditions in border camps ran the risk of facing disciplinary actions if those accounts 
reached the papers.97   
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 While this disastrous first march hurt the Illinoisans pride and morale, their failure 
offered motivation for other state troops.  Moses Thisted recorded in his diary that “The 
poor showing of the Illinois troops in their first day’s hike Monday, July 24th, has aroused 
the Wisconsin officers and enlisted men to greater effort.  Fully 600 Illinois guardsmen 
dropped out of their Brigade on its ten-mile hike.  The Wisconsin troops hiked over six 
miles today without a single drop-out.”98  Furthermore, General Funston ordered all 
regiments at the border to increase their level of short training hikes in preparation for the 
longer hikes to various training sites, and eventually a day’s march could be as long as 
seventeen or eighteen miles with only a few small resting periods.  The First Iowa 
Infantry Regiment partook in a 20 mile march in the middle of August, and finished with 
only a few drop outs.  The next day though, the regiment took the day off to sleep.99   
Personal motivation and increased officer incentives prompted the men “to see the 
marches through” and prove themselves as competent soldiers.  Eventually, soldiers 
could expect to endure long marches numerous times per week with little rest.  During 
the first week of September, the First Iowa Infantry Regiment marched twenty two miles 
in eight hours on Monday, and then hiked another fifteen miles on Wednesday.  The unit 
participated in some short marches of less than ten miles on Thursday and stood for 
inspection on Friday.  In each of these marches the soldiers hiked with a full load 
consisting of a rifle, an ammunition belt, a bayonet, a canteen, and a forty-five pound 
rucksack.  Unfortunately for the Iowans, nearly 300 soldiers dropped out of these 
marches over the week.100  Increasingly, these marches—long and short—became a 
source of pride for the men.  Earl Beeson of the First Iowa Infantry Regiment noted in his 
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diary that his company completed a four-mile hike in “46 minutes, with no men out,” 
while I Company took 56 minutes to complete the same march, and they lost four men, 
one of whom required a stretcher to carry him out.101  Although Rudolph Dubbert of F 
Company boasted that his company completed the same march in “53 minutes and 40 
seconds,” which was “the fastest it’s been done.”102  Regarding the Illinois troops who 
fell out on their first march, Captain McCann declared the regiment “hard as rocks” after 
only three months at the border.103 
 
Proficiency training 
 In addition to the hikes and patrols, another major aspect of border service 
pertained to weapons training, and guardsmen became proficient in bayonet drills, 
marksmanship, and fire distribution (coordinating fire so that targets were adequately 
covered).  Furthermore, weapons aptitude became a major source of pride for the 
soldiers, in the same manner as competently completing a long march.  Beginning in the 
first decade of the twentieth-century, Guard identity moved away from ceremonious 
company level displays and shifted toward individual military accomplishments within 
larger social constructs of masculinity.104  According to Eleanor Hannah, the complex 
process between 1877 and 1914 in which rifle training took on increased characteristics 
of importance which could define a man’s worth, not only militarily, but also socially.  
Marksmanship competitions became central to demonstrating one’s masculine identity 
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within the National Guard, and these competitions remained prevalent at the border.  As 
Guard units from different states began competing against each other and the Regular 
Army at the border, these competitions intensified.  Therefore, weapons competitions 
allowed not only individual soldiers, but also entire state organizations to demonstrate 
their level of prowess.  Lieutenant Park A. Findley boasted that Iowa’s troopers “won the 
championship of the world” in the border shooting competition.105    
 Although marksmanship drills became a vital aspect of border service, not all 
camps contained a rifle range.  Troopers then, needed to march from their base camps to 
the training sites, and commanders combined weapons training with long-range hikes and 
patrols.  Indeed, the above mentioned march where the Illinoisans performed less than 
admirably occurred during a hike from their base camp near San Antonio to a rifle 
training facility in Leon Springs.  Furthermore, due to the lack of training sites, soldiers 
could spend anywhere from a week to fourteen days on a weapons range, which included 
rifle, pistol, and machine-gun ranges.  Moses Thisted lamented that his brigade’s 
“shooting record was just fair, not remarkable,” which he partially blamed on  the fact 
that they needed to focus on putting the camp at Leon Springs back in shape because 
“Some of the Illinois companies had left the incinerators and camping grounds in bad 
shape and these had to be rebuilt and cleaned.”106  Regardless of the state of the camp, 
weapons training and marksmanship competition became a staple of border duty training, 
and Thisted found it important to note that “some exceptional shooters hit 27 out of 30 
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shots on one strip of bullets,” further demonstrating the high level of unit pride placed on 
marksmanship ability. 
Marksmanship was of course closely related to the types of weapons the soldiers 
trained with at the border.  Generally speaking, the militia and early National Guard were 
notorious for using out-of-date and obsolete weaponry (though the US Army was not 
much better, having not officially adopted a magazine-fed repeating rifle—the Krag-
Jorgensen—until the 1890s).107  However, while at the border, the National Guard 
enjoyed the finest military weaponry at the US military’s disposal.  Young soldiers 
gained their first opportunity to fire the Springfield M1903 rifle as well as the “new 
automatic Colt pistol” (the Colt M1911).108  The M1903 was a five-round, magazine-fed, 
bolt-action rifle capable of hitting a target between 300 and 700 yards away.  Indeed, 
skilled marksmen could hit a target at a much farther distance, and the rifle became one 
of the US Army’s standard-issue weapons during the First World War (the weapon 
actually remained in use in some capacity into the 1950s).  The Colt pistol was also state-
of-the-art in 1916, and was a magazine-fed, semi-automatic pistol that fired a .45 caliber 
round (variations of the M1911 remained the standard side-arm in the US Army until 
1986 and is still widely used).109  Ultimately then, the soldiers at the border trained with 
high-quality, modern weapons while at the border, and would many would use these 
same weapons in the trenches in France a year later.   
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Likewise, the guardsmen extensively trained with machine guns at ranges such as 
at Leon Springs while in service along the border—a luxury not often afforded during 
regular drill sessions.  Prior to border service, the War Department hedged on the 
decision to supply the National Guard with machine guns.  Many individual regiments 
needed to purchase the weapons privately, such as the First Illinois Cavalry, who used 
their high profile to raise funds and purchase five machine guns privately.110  The rest of 
the Illinois National Guard only held two machine guns for each regiment, and both of 
the First Illinois Infantry’s guns were awaiting repairs at the Rock Island Arsenal when 
the border duty commenced.  And because the government would not issue the 
guardsmen new guns until they regained possession of their original weapons, some of 
the Illinois guardsmen did not receive their guns until they were at the border for over a 
month.  However, as the guardsmen “tore the heart out of a bull’s eye” with their 
machine guns, officers appreciated these weapons’ destructive capabilities, and were 
surprised by “how few machine guns our army possesses.”111   
Unlike with their rifles and pistols, guardsmen utilized a variety of machine guns 
at the border.  The War Department officially announced that they would furnish the 
National Guard with machine guns on 2 July 1916, but suffered from an overall lack of 
modern guns.  The Army only had 1,077 machine guns in their possession in July 
because the War Department spent the previous three years deciding which gun to adopt.  
The Ordinance Department approved the use of Vickers-Maxim guns in 1913 and 1914, 
but the War Department generally ignored their recommendation.  Conversely, the 
Ordinance Department tested and issued the Lewis gun, but rejected it to the dismay of 
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both Congress and the War Department who pointed to the British’s successful use of the 
weapon in combat.  Eventually the Army approved the use of the Browning machine gun, 
but did not issue it until 1917.112  Because of this confusion, the Regular Army generally 
received the older Benet-Mercier gun, which was difficult to use and prone to jamming, 
and Guard units who possessed guns prior to border duty often utilized heavy Maxim 
guns.113  Ultimately, the War Department announced that they would supply the National 
Guard (and Regular Army) with more machine guns.  The department issued Lewis guns 
to the National Guard and Maxim guns to the Regulars until it could procure ample 
Brownings.  In September 1916, Secretary Baker ordered the establishment of a machine 
gun school at Harlingen, Texas, and ordered the machine gun companies of each Guard 
regiment to receive two weeks of instruction at Harlingen.  However, some units trained 
with and received Benet-Mercier guns, while others received Lewis guns, and the First 
Illinois Cavalry had Maxim guns.114  Regardless of the weapon type, guardsmen gained 
important familiarity with the types of weapons (rifles, pistols, and machine guns) that 
the US military would take to the battlefields in Europe. 
 Military proficiency drills at the border also took the form of mock or sham 
battles, often between units.  During these “battle practice” exercises, “companies 
competed against each other as to the accuracy and distribution of fire.”115  In many 
cases, officers planned these battle drills while the soldiers were in camp between 
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marches, but at times, the troops engaged in these sham fights during long marches as a 
means of gaining more experience.  Once again, these battles became competitions 
between various organizations.  Generally, Regular Army training officers set hidden 
targets up in specific areas, and as a company advanced, the officer in charge signaled 
someone down range to open the targets.  The companies then engaged the targets as they 
would a human enemy, and the company with the best target score and fire distribution 
won.116  Some of these sham battles could last for days.  On one occasion, the First Iowa 
Infantry Regiment marched fourteen miles to a “battlefield” where they engaged an 
entrenched company.  That evening they set up camp about 100 yards from the “enemy,” 
and the next day’s fighting forced the First Iowa to retreat to a nearby town for the night.  
In the town, the Iowans enjoyed a warm meal and took in a movie, but moved back to the 
“frontlines” the next morning.  Once again, the guardsmen used blank cartridges to storm 
the enemy’s trench and try to overtake the opposite position before marching fourteen 
miles back to their home station.117  
Sometimes, nature made these training sessions less than enjoyable.  For instance, 
Earl Beeson described one such sham battle which occurred after four days of continued 
rain, making the ground “very sloppy.”118  Another type of mock battle added a human 
element to both sides.  In these engagements, two companies or brigades would face each 
other, with one company in a defensive position and the other on the offensive.  During 
one of these mock engagements, Captain McCann and a young Illinois lieutenant jumped 
on a pair of horses and completely circled the “enemy, having a dozen narrow escapes 
and arriving back at camp with a thirst that made a bottle of Coca-Cola look like a spring 
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of water in a dry and thirsty land.”  Although McCann pronounced that “this was great 
fun,” a nearby major from the “other side” declared that had his men had real cartridges, 
McCann’s “final resting place would have been Hill 13, Leon Springs Military 
Reservation, and my [McCann’s] epitaph would read, ‘Here lies a fool chaplain who 
didn’t have sense enough to stay in the rear.’”119  Indeed, officers preferred to utilize 
blank cartridges to increase the realism of these drills, but often, supply limitations made 
the acquisition of blanks difficult if not impossible; therefore, many troops went into 
these mock battles without any ammunition.120  Some larger sham battles could last most 
of the day, such as one Beeson described which lasted from seven A.M. to after three-
thirty P.M., but others lasted even longer.121  One of the largest battle exercises took 
place during the longest march of 1916 in August, when 14,000 men under General 
Henry A. Greene marched 83 miles from New Braunfels to Austin and back over the 
course of three weeks.  When the troops arrived back at New Braunfels, 4,000 Wisconsin 
and Illinois soldiers took up a defensive position, and the remaining 10,000 men 
“attacked” trying to force the defenders from their entrenched position.  When the battle 
ended, the troops fired over 80,000 rounds of blank ammunition.122    
 Whether the guardsmen trained with their weapons or in formations, the drilling 
at the border was never relaxed.  While some observers and military officials questioned 
the validity of this extensive training, at the squad, company, and platoon level, Irving 
McCann outlined why he believed the training was necessary to turn the National Guard 
into a proficient fighting force. 
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It may seem that the connection between “squads right about” and the winning of victory 
is rather far-fetched, but the advantage of drill lie in acquiring habits of automatic 
obedience that will make possible accuracy, uniformity and celerity of moement under 
circumstances of great nervous excitement.  This explains why raw recruits cannot as a 
rule cope with seasoned veterans.  Moreover drills today are not conducted by word of 
mouth alone but by the notes of a whistle and by gestures.  Consequently repetition upon 
repetition is required to secure satisfactory results in code drilling.123 
The training at the border did more than simply increase Guard efficiency; it transformed 
large groups of previously undertrained soldiers into a cohesive military force capable of 
meeting modern military challenges.  By the time the guardsmen returned from the 
border (even those who only served on active duty a short while) they were part of 
perhaps the best trained military element at the United States’ disposal.  However, there 
was more to border duty than extensive training exercises. 
 
Leisure at the border 
 When the troops were not marching, shooting, or pretending to shoot, they 
partook in a variety of leisure activities.  Soldiers wrote letters home, played a variety of 
games either in camp or at newly erected Y.M.C.A.’s, participated in athletic 
competitions, drank in local saloons (when the officers did not ban the purchase of 
alcohol), watched movies and plays performed by local acting troops or soldier 
organizations, and formed bonds of military comradeship.  Rudolph Dubbert and his 
friend, Ike, regularly traveled to Brownsville, Texas to buy local goods or stayed on post 
to watch movies when they were off duty.124  On one occasion Dubbert and a few other 
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Iowans received a three-day pass and decided to travel to Corpus Christi by train.  
Apparently, strong winds blew through the open windows of the cars, and Dubbert’s 
campaign hat flew out of the train and “right into a salt lake along the road.”  Luckily for 
Dubbert, he came across some Tennessee guardsmen when he arrived in town and bought 
a new hat.125  However, leisurely activities in the town sometimes took a financial toll on 
the guardsmen.  Dubbert complained to his parents that “money doesn’t last long here,” 
because local merchants raised the price of local favorites like Mexican candies.126  
Apparently Dubbert’s gripes reached his sister’s ears and she sent him $1.00 because she 
thought her brother “was broke.”127      
Additionally, maintaining romantic relationships with loved ones at home became 
an important aspect of maintaining morale on the border because separation from wives 
and sweethearts was a new phenomenon for many guardsmen.  And ultimately, female 
support from home influenced nearly every soldier at the border—married or not—as 
they left wives, sisters, girlfriends, and mothers in order to answer the nation’s call.  One 
Illinois observer wrote that “for every man who wears the khaki there’s a woman who’ll 
watch the war news.”128  In the end, virtually every trooper needed to deal with 
separation in one form or another, and interestingly enough, for those soldiers who were 
not married, border service offered a unique means of entering into a romantic 
relationship with a woman at home.  Shortly after border service began, troopers started 
receiving letters from unmarried women in their home states seeking soldier companions, 
and company chaplains sifted through these letters, threw away the lewd ones, and found 
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adequate suitors for the women.  Some of these chaplain matchmakers seemingly 
performed this job well, as a few troopers began relationships with their female pen-pals 
when they returned home.129 
 Games and sporting events offered troops other avenues to keep up morale while 
maintaining a competitive edge when they hoped to clear their minds from the pain of 
separation and find a leisurely way to burn off excess energy.  Once again, masculinity 
seemed to be a centerpiece in these border activities, as many of the games and events 
carried an inherent level of risk or violence.  For instance, “blanket tossing” became an 
extremely popular game among the guardsmen, and in order to participate, a soldier 
(often unwilling) sat in the center of an Army-issued blanket.  Then, several other more 
than willing players tossed the seated trooper into the air as often as possible, while trying 
to toss the man higher every go around.  Of course, blanket tossing provided a great deal 
of entertainment for the tossers, but the game often “lost its charm” for the tossee after a 
second toss.130  Similarly, tugs-of-war allowed soldiers to take out some aggression in an 
entertaining way, while demonstrating a squad’s, a platoon’s, or even a company’s 
superior physical prowess over another’s.  Irving McCann recounted numerous games of 
tug-of-war in his memoirs, and took great pride when his company’s soldiers won, which 
again demonstrated a desire to uphold or prove one’s manhood through competition, and 
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even those who did not participate in the game itself could take pride in the win through 
association based on unit affiliation.131 
 Similarly, inter-unit athletic competitions served as both entertainment and 
sources of pride for guardsmen.  While any soldier could participate in these athletic 
events, which included baseball and football tournaments, as well as boxing matches, 
most of the more competitive events included men with a fairly high level of athletic 
experience.  As noted, guardsmen came from a variety of backgrounds, much more so 
than their Regular Army counterparts, and as also previously discussed, many troopers 
held some level of college education.  Not surprisingly then, many student athletes served 
at the border in some capacity.  The machine gun platoon of the First Illinois Infantry 
Regiment contained numerous college baseball players as well as noted prize fighters, 
“Kid Boswell” and Danny Goodman, “the Hebrew Battler,” who fought over 300 
opponents in the ring.  Goodman boasted that “we deserted the prize ring to shoot a few 
left hooks for the country.”  But this platoon’s athletic credentials did not end with a few 
fighters, as Carl Timmerman, a former Chicago White Sox pitcher, who remained under 
contract in the Three-I (Illinois-Indiana-Iowa) Baseball League, also served with the 
Illinois machine gunners, and he “told manager [Daniel] O’Leary that I was going to the 
front” because “baseball is one kind of war, and real war is another.”132    
 The abundance of top athletes at the border did not end with the Illinois troopers, 
Captain Paul Clemens of the Third Wisconsin Infantry Regiment played football for the 
University of Wisconsin and coached for several years, while Sergeant David August was 
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captain of Northwestern’s team in 1909 and 1910.133  With this many solid athletes in the 
ranks, official competitions arose up and down the border.  One major athletic challenge 
began on 11 November 1916 and included sixteen football teams from various Guard and 
Regular Army units who competed in an elimination tournament that culminated on 
Christmas Day.  Wisconsin’s team put up a good showing throughout the tournament, but 
almost came up short when they faced the Fourth Illinois Infantry Regiment who had “a 
team of heavyweights.”  The Wisconsin team came out on top and made it to the 
championship game where they lost to the Third Illinois Infantry Regiment’s team who 
defeated the Virginia Field Artillery Regiment in the semi-final game.134  Many other 
units from across the border participated in similar tournaments and boasted about their 
successes, as evidenced by Park Findley’s account of the Iowa border service where he 
stated “The Iowa troops entered in many contests; baseball, football, polo, prize drills, 
shooting, every form of clean sport represented, and Iowa always brought home the 
bacon.”135  Apparently the Iowans failed to bring home the bacon in the Christmas 
tournament, but nonetheless, these competitions offered soldiers a means of release and 
provided bragging rights to soldiers connected to the victorious teams.   
 
Hardship and tension 
 While the troops found various ways to keep themselves entertained when they 
were not training, life on the border could also be very stressful.  Boredom, the natural 
elements, and tragedy added stress to the situation.   From the borders duty’s onset, the 
heat and sun took their tolls on the troopers, as guardsmen’s faces were “burned red,” and 
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the Springfield Register noted that the sun provided scorchers for the men as they arrived 
at the border.136  However, the troops faced weather obstacles not related to the heat and 
sun as well, as the 1916 Gulf hurricane season hit the border in August.  One such 
hurricane that struck on 20 August interrupted General Greene’s long march to Austin 
and back from New Braunfels mentioned earlier.  Claude C. Manley of the Milwaukee 
Journal initially praised the troops, stating “Troop ‘A’ rides all through the storms,” but 
Moses Thisted seemed less than pleased with the weather when he wrote, “My brother 
Aaron and I who shared a pup tent, spent the night holding the tent in place.”  Manley 
went on to say that “Within a short time but few tents were still standing, and General 
Richardson sought shelter in his automobile for the rest of the night.”  All the while, other 
officers stood in the night vainly trying to firth their shelters, and “scores of officers and 
men carried their cots to the wooden bathhouses and latrines.”137  Continued rainy 
conditions also turned the sand and dirt in the camps into a thick much that Captain 
McCann described as “the stickiest black mud imaginable, upon which this regiment had 
to spread their blankets and sleep as best they could.”138  Elsewhere, the First Iowa 
Infantry Regiment at Brownsville, Texas felt the effects of the hurricane as the men lost 
numerous tents throughout the night.139 
 In addition to constant weather changes, guardsmen dealt with another 
uncontrollable element of military service: bugs and insects.  Soldiers consistently 
complained about the presence of chiggers, scorpions, ticks, tarantulas, and even rattle 
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snakes in their camps.  Private Dubbert had been in Texas less than a month when he 
suffered from a “light attack of malaria,” and though Dubbert recovered, had not been 
able to “keep anything in my stomach” for a few days.140  Fred Ballard lamented in his 
diary how the Iowa camp in Brownsville was filled with all kinds of insects ranging from 
red ants to locusts, and other pests such as horned toads and lizards, and Moses Thisted 
simply said, “chiggers have a feast here.”141  Captain McCann remembered hearing 
sounds of scratching within the pup tents after “Taps,” and joked that, “I once had half of 
the jiggers in Mexico on me at one time.”142  Additionally, brushing against a tree or 
resting in by a bush could “gather you a crop of ticks,” and scorpion stings and tarantula 
bites remained a constant threat; however, the stings and bites did little more than caused 
an annoying itch.143  Overall then, these camp pests rarely inflicted any real damage upon 
the soldiers, but did offer an annoying foreshadowing of conditions many eventually 
faced on European battlefields less than a year later, and in some ways served as a means 
of conditioning the guardsmen for the realities of life in a combat zone. 
 Furthermore, boredom, accidents, and petty jealousies also negatively affected the 
troops along the border.  The lack of action and enemy engagement led to a level of 
monotony within the camps.  Fred Ballard wrote on a few occasions in his diary that he 
“did nothing but walk around town today.”144  And in a similar vein, Senator Lawrence 
Sherman responded to a constituent’s letter by saying, “My friends, Walter A. 
Ronenfield, R.R. McCormick, and Col. Milton J. Foreman of the First Illinois Cavalry 
are stationed at or near your place.  If you could call around sometime it might break the 
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monotony of their camp life for them to know one of their friends is in that part of the 
country.”145  Apparently, the Senator’s friends informed him of the lack of action and 
their persistent state of boredom so much so that Sherman found the situation important 
enough to reference this dullness in a letter to a third party.  And unfortunately accidents 
and unforeseen tragedy also combined with prolonged tediousness.  One young soldier of 
the Second Illinois Infantry Regiment died in a camp hospital after a mule kick fractured 
his skull, and another popular trooper of the First Illinois Infantry Regiment died 
suddenly of a ruptured appendix.146  Many such deaths from illness or accidents occurred 
along the border and could not be prevented, but other tragedies were self-inflicted. 
 One preventable death occurred when a trooper from the First Wisconsin Infantry 
Regiment shot himself in a farmhouse off a trail during a two-day march to Landa’s Park, 
Texas, and no one in the regiment could point to a reason for the suicide.147  Another 
unfortunate incident took place on the night of 15 August 1916 when a corporal of the 
Second Iowa Infantry Regiment died after he heard a fight between a Regular Army 
soldier and a woman in a tent.  Lieutenant Fred Ballard wrote that the corporal “was 
killed through a fit of jealousy,” and “It seemed as tho’ the fellow and a girl were 
quarrelling” when the corporal entered the lovers’ tent.  The soldier allegedly “shot the 
corp. twice through the body killing him, then shot the girl through the body, but she did 
not die.  Then he tried to commit suicide but rec’d only a small wound.”148  After the 
shooting, the soldier turned himself into the authorities and faced murder charges.  
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Ultimately, these types of death remained rare, and the death and illness rates in the 
National Guard remained lower than the same rates in the Regular Army.149   
 Through all this, border service reflected broader trends in American society, as 
race and class relations did not disappear when the guardsmen entered federal service.  
On the evening of 24 July 1916, the regular provost guard shot three members of the all-
black Eighth Illinois Infantry Regiment after “an affray near Army Headquarters.”  Some 
commentators and witnesses believed more men of the Eighth received wounds, but 
escaped capture after the incident, and one local motorist, a Mr. Henne, described the 
event as follows: 
I drove my car around the corner just as one of the Negroes was stepping form the curb.  I 
didn’t touch him, in fact nearly wrecked my car swinging out of its way.  There were ten 
or twelve men in the party and they started to curse me.  One of them threw a brick into 
my car.  I had stopped the machine and they were evidently going to pull me out.  I ran 
into the saloon at New Braunfels Road and Wilson Street and asked the bartender for a 
revolver.  The Negroes ran in after me and the bartender hid.  The provost guard ran in to 
investigate the commotion and when the Negroes showed fight, opened fire. 
 
According to the wounded soldiers though, they entered a local saloon on payday to 
exchange twenty dollars’ worth of gold into paper money, and made no mention of the 
motorist.  The sergeant in charge and two soldiers entered the saloon while the rest of 
their squad waited outside.  The troopers claimed they never attempted to purchase a 
drink, but patrons began yelling at them to “get out of here!” from every corner of the 
barroom, after which the black and white soldiers exchanged some choice words when 
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finally someone threw a brick on the street.  About this time, the provost guard arrived 
and shot three of the black Illinois troops, one sergeant and two privates.150   
 This event increased racial tensions between various Guard regiments, and 
demonstrated a level of racial hostility between the local populace and black troops, as 
well as racial tension within the National Guard itself.  After this incident, officers 
expected the trouble to grow exponentially worse over the next few weeks, and took steps 
to reduce the possibility of a riot or violent outburst.  Wisconsin leadership begged their 
soldiers not to get involved and to avoid areas near the Eighth Illinois’s camp.151  Enlisted 
men who had no involvement in the incidents between white and black troops used the 
racial strife as a means of justifying other illicit behaviors.  One Wisconsin corporal, John 
Owens, shot Private Charles Wege, after the two (who were tent-mates) returned drunk 
from a local saloon.  Owens claimed he borrowed the pistol from a bugler and obtained 
ammunition for the weapon “by a ruse,” because he feared “trouble with negro 
soldiers.”152  Over the course of the next month, the situation remained tense, but 
relatively peaceful.153  Just as in the civilian world, racial issues remained tense at the 
border, and though the black and white troops served in segregated units, racial mistrust 
and historical stresses plagued the National Guard.    
 Race also played out on the border in other unexpected ways.  Due to the hasty 
border mobilization, many Illinois soldiers traveled to Texas with men who were 
mustered into federal service, but later failed to pass their physical examinations.  And 
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because no instructions existed regarding discharge of such troops, the Regular Army 
officer in charge ordered the Illinois guardsmen to take these “derelicts” to Texas with 
then and then send them home after their official discharges went through the chain of 
command.  Because many of these young men were unable to physically endure even the 
shortest marches, all of the unfit troopers remained at Camp Wilson near San Antonio 
even after their regiments left for their duty stations at New Braunfels.  This meant that 
the Eighth Illinois Infantry Regiment became tasked with overseeing these soldiers until 
they could return home.  When Captain McCann visited this “sore bunch” to bid them 
farewell and “try to put them in a good humor with everything and everybody before they 
return to Chicago” the derelict soldiers “openly declared” that officers of other regiments 
treated them better than their own officers.  And, these soldiers noted that the “Eight or 
Colored Infantry had treated them best of all.”154  Perhaps the Eighth’s own experiences 
led them to treat these military outcasts with less derision than their white counterparts.  
In any event, these types of incidents demonstrated how racial tensions in society carried 
over into guard service—even when federalized. 
 In addition to race, the social class dichotomy that existed in the National Guard 
throughout the Gilded Age and Progressive Era remained ubiquitous at the border, and 
even gained the attention of major newspapers.  The Illinois State Journal declared in a 
headline, “Millionaires and Poor do Same Work,” and the article went on to note how “It 
is impossible to designate a millionaire from one who labors for a livelihood in the field 
artillery now at Camp Lincoln.  The two classes perform the same duty.”  Additionally, 
the “rich and poor are together and partake of the same rations from the same cook 
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tents.”155  This article hinted at the notion that Guard service at the border somehow 
erased class barriers, but at best border service only temporarily blurred the lines.  On 31 
August 1916—only about two months after the initiation of border service—President 
Wilson recalled twelve regiments of guardsmen from nine states with key railroad 
terminals back home.  These troopers from New York City, Chicago, St. Louis, San 
Francisco, Seattle, and New Orleans returned home immediately in the event of a 
possible railroad strike, and once again demonstrated the ongoing labor strife in the 
nation as well as the prevailing willingness to use the class-divided National Guard for 
strike duty.156   
 Although strike duty still loomed over the Guard in 1916, other elements of the 
class divide were on display at the border.  Many units maintained the same social 
distinctions that existed within the organization prior to the president’s call to arms.  
Moses Thisted outlined the varying professions of a number of Wisconsin guardsmen in a 
machine gun company.  Within that unit, George Sattler worked as an auto mechanic and 
Frank Angst regularly worked as a machinist in a Milwaukee factory.  These laborers 
served alongside Moses and Aaron Thisted who both worked as school teachers and 
Elmer Groth who attended Marquette University’s law school.157  Every officer in the 
Second Battalion, First Illinois Field Artillery Regiment were college graduates, and 
furthermore, many prominent citizens who were well versed in public affairs found 
themselves at the border.  Fifteen employees of the Chicago Daily Tribune served in the 
Illinois National Guard (including R.R. McCormick), of which four served as 
commissioned officers and two as non-commissioned officers.  The other ten travelled to 
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the border as privates, which demonstrates a stark contrast to the composition of the 
Regular Army.158  These units continued to represent a cross-section of American society, 
and because these soldiers came from many walks of life, and were generally educated, 
their service records and personal writings provide compelling insights into American 
ideals of civic virtue and social responsibility which was not inherent in the peacetime 
Regular Army.   
 The class structure of the Guard created unexpected tensions with some civilian 
organizations.  Because previous militia mobilizations centered around volunteerism, 
college students and workers could avoid active duty if they so desired, but under the 
provisions of the Dick Act and National Defense Act of 1916, mobilization became 
mandatory.  For some, such as the members of D Company, First Iowa Infantry 
Regiment, of which “quite a number were students of Coe College,” service meant 
suspension of college enrollment.159  Because of this reality, a few students wrote to their 
respective colleges and asked for the opportunity to begin the fall term late, once the 
returned from the border.  At least one college president, Samuel Plantz of Lawrence 
College in Appleton, Wisconsin, “got himself into hot water,” when he told a prospective 
student that he “could enroll, not over 2 weeks late by paying a penalty for the privilege.”  
Plantz went on to voice his opposition to the border service by saying, “I would not make 
this suggestion (of coming home from the Border earlier) if I did not think you were on 
the Border FOR NO GOOD PURPOSE AND WERE NOT NEEDED.”160  President 
Plantz contended that his response was misquoted and that he only wanted his students to 
return as soon as possible, but his reaction drew harsh criticism from Army commanders.  
                                                          
158 “’Tribune’ Men Called to Colors,” The Chicago Daily Tribune, June 21, 1916. 
159 Findley, Iowa Troops in Mexican Border Service; Mis Docs, Mexican Border; INGA. 
160 Thisted, 81. 
187 
 
 
General Greene, as well as other officers and enlisted men, resented the “tone and 
contents” of Plantz’s letter, and General Greene declared that “these men cannot get away 
from here if they wanted too [sic].  Anyhow, I don’t believe in class distinction in the 
Guard.  Any man who takes such a view is unpatriotic.”161  While Greene’s sentiment 
regarding the lack of class distinction in the Guard contained elements of idealism, the 
reality remained that members of all class and racial segments of society constituted the 
National Guard and comprised its major elements; therefore, social issues related to 
discord and strife influenced the Guard’s composition and created discontent less 
prominent in regular military organizations.  
*** 
The Guard continued to drill and train throughout their time at the border, but by 
the final months of 1916, the War Department realized that there was not going to be any 
war with Mexico.  The return home came in phases, and some troops remained in federal 
service longer than others.  Units such as the First Illinois returned as early as August in 
order to face potential labor strikes, while other Illinois units remained at the border until 
the early months of 1917.  Once again, the Army abandoned the divisional breakdown 
and as early as October 1916 many guardsmen began returning home in increments.  
Those that arrived on the border earlier usually left for home first, while those that 
arrived later stayed longer, and either way, most troops were ready to go home.162  When 
men from the First Wisconsin marched from their camp to San Antonio to board the 
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trains for home, they actually marched faster than the scheduled pace and arrived in San 
Antonio days early.163  
 Some soldiers who stayed at the border longer apparently grew weary of the 
monotonous days and the long separation from home.  In early December 1916, some 
men from the 32nd Michigan Infantry Regiment stationed near El Paso, Texas mutinied 
because they “wanted to go home.”  The Michigan troops attempted to “invade” the 
neighboring camp of the 31st Michigan as a means of growing their rebellious numbers, 
but were dissuaded by the efforts of a few officers, including Colonel Louis C. Covell, 
who went into the crowd and gave a speech about military discipline and patriotism.  
Someone in the crowd shouted “nonsense,” and the colonel tore off his rank and declared, 
“Now I’m on the level of a private, and if any man who said that will step forward, I’ll 
meet him man to man.”  No one rose to the challenge, and the colonel ordered the men 
back to their quarters, thus ending the short-lived revolt.164  In the end though, most of 
the troops returned home without incident when their time came, but the return only 
brought one old issue back to the forefront. 
 As the troops returned to their home states, the oath issue sprung back to life, as 
the troops who served at the border needed to take another federal service oath after only 
a short time at home.  As previously noted, President Wilson mobilized the Guard for 
border service after passage of the National Defense Act of 1916, but before the law 
technically took effect.  Therefore, the Guard mobilized under the conditions of the 1903 
Dick Act and its amendments, which required an oath to serve to uphold the laws, repeal 
invasions, and suppress insurrections.  However, under the Hay-Chamberlain Law (the 
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National Defense Act), the National Guard fell under the official structure of the US 
Army, and would thus serve under the same rules and regulations when mobilized.  For 
the guardsmen, this status carried some benefits, as they would receive the same pay as 
the Regular Army and foreign duty pay when appropriate, but this new structure also 
required another service oath.165  And, as with the earlier oath, some troopers refused to 
raise their right hand.  Men from the Second Battalion, Second Illinois returned to 
Chicago after their time at the border and declined the oath because they had enlisted and 
served at the border before the new law became official.166  Ultimately, the War 
Department decided to allow states to grant discharges to any soldier who refused the 
federal oath, which diminished the Guard’s overall numbers on the eve of the First World 
War. 
 Ultimately, states reassessed their Guard organizations in the months following 
the border duty and granted a series of discharges to soldiers who either refused the oath 
or had dependent families.  Additionally, many soldiers refused to reenlist when they 
completed their service terms in early 1917, and many officers simply resigned their 
commissions.  In the ensuing months following the border duty, the National Guard 
reentered a short-lived transitory phase.167  Numbers had fallen, and states struggled to 
meet the new requirements outlined in the NDA.  Ultimately though, those soldiers who 
remained in the Guard, such as Colonel Joseph Sanborn, Private Rudolph Dubbert, 
Private Moses Thisted, and Captain Irving McCann returned from Texas in August 1916 
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and reported for European duty in March or April 1917.168  Similarly, the Eighth Illinois 
Infantry Brigade (Illinois’s only African American brigade) returned for service in 1917, 
despite some congressional efforts to prevent blacks from enlisting in the Army or 
Navy.169  While the situation in Mexico created a stir in the United States in 1915 and 
1916, the challenges of 1917 and 1918 brought the nation and the military into a war so 
devastating, many claimed the conflict would end all further warfare, and the National 
Guard was a central component to the American war effort.  
 In any event, the intensive training at the border certainly did more to prepare the 
National Guard for the ensuing wartime service than any other training efforts in the 
decades between the Spanish-American War and America’s entry into the First World 
War.  Wisconsin Adjutant General, Orlando Halway wrote in 1934 that “Regardless of 
what the real motive was in mobilizing the entire National Guard of the United States 
(158,664 Guardsmen were mustered in to Federal service in addition to the 40,722 
Regulars), the training was of inestimable value for World War I service the next 
year.”170  Ultimately, when the guardsmen arrived at the border they were unfit for long 
marches, undertrained in new weapons, undersupplied, and they lacked efficiency with 
new technologies such as trucks and motor vehicles.  Within a few months, these troops 
became proficient with their rifles and small arms, understood firing lanes, could 
regularly march long distances in a variety of natural elements, and participated in 
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numerous sham battles with varying force sizes, and Park Findley declared that the troops 
returned as “better men morally, physically, and more patriotic than the men who stayed 
at home.”171  So, for instance, when the federal government reactivated every Illinois 
National Guard unit for service in Europe in 1917, those men who remained in service 
were as prepared as the best Regular Army fighting units, and this training directly 
related to the Guard’s wartime service record. 
 Ultimately, the Guard’s border service played a key role in its evolution during 
the first two decades of the twentieth century.  While the Guard’s training prepared the 
soldiers for combat and life in the trenches, the border duty’s timing also came at an 
important time.  Essentially, the border duty was the final military endeavor of the 
National Guard under the Dick Act.  Those guardsmen who traveled to the border in 1916 
did so under provisions in the Militia Act of 1903 and its amendments.  During the 
mobilization process, many guardsmen refused to take a federal oath of service required 
under the NDA.  When border duty concluded, those guardsmen who remained were 
fully integrated into the American military system under the NDA and were members of 
the most highly trained state-centered military force in generations.  The First World War 
exposed a series of new challenges for the National Guard, but the border duty served as 
the Guard’s military transition from the old system into its new NDA role. 
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CHAPTER 5 – THE GUARD IN THE TRENCHES 
 
 Moses Thisted arrived in France less than a year after returning from the border 
where he had the chance to put his border training to good use with a pioneer infantry 
regiment.  Thisted and the rest of the pioneers served essentially as modern-day sappers, 
combining engineering skills and infantry tactics to aid the front line combat troops.  
Ultimately then, Thisted’s time building encampments, undergoing long marches, driving 
mules, and practicing marksmanship proved very valuable for his service as a member of 
a mostly-National Guard Pioneer regiment.1  Other guardsmen who served at the border 
found themselves hunkered down in trenches as shells poured in from across no-man’s 
land, and eight Guard divisions led America’s main offensive thrust of the war in mid-
1918.2  Others, such as Lieutenant Colonel Mathew Tinley of Iowa put previous wartime 
experience to use as he commanded a battalion of Iowa troopers in his second war 
(Tinley was a lieutenant in the 51st Iowa Infantry Regiment during the Spanish-American 
War, and served in the Philippines).3  Regardless of the capacity, service in the First 
World War altered the lives of those involved in various ways, whether they were 
Regular Army, National Guard, or conscripted troops, but the Guard’s service record was 
once again reflective of America’s overall experience in the war.  Guard veterans and 
volunteers from around the nation volunteered for Guard service and found themselves in 
infantry regiments, cavalry troops, engineering battalions, artillery batteries, and 
supporting units.  And in keeping with trends, guardsmen came from a variety of 
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backgrounds, classes, and nationalities, and represented a cross-section of American 
society.   
Unfortunately though, many scholars have overlooked this heterogeneous aspect 
of the Guard’s history.  Most general scholarship on the war glosses over the Guard’s 
contributions, leaving out a valuable piece of the story, or discusses the Guard in combat 
from the Regular Army’s perspective.  Historians Edward Coffman, Robert Zieger, and 
John S. Eisenhower mention the National Guard’s preparedness in their works, but rarely 
distinguish the Guard from the Regular Army when discussing combat operations or 
mobilization efforts.4  In The War to end all Wars, Coffman discusses the National 
Guard’s preparedness after border duty, and outlines the Guard’s wartime recruitment 
efforts.  However, while Coffman distinguishes between the Guard, Regular Army, and 
National Army regarding mobilization, he blends the three elements together when 
examining combat operations.5  While Coffman does not disparage the Guard’s combat 
record, he overlooks the Guard’s unique identity as citizen-soldiers, and compares the 
Guard to the National Army due to their “temporary soldier” status.6  However, the 
division between the Guard and National Army was important because guardsmen 
volunteered and signed a multi-year service contract.  Robert Zieger briefly mentioned 
the Guard’s border service prior to entering the First World War, but points out that its 
performance was “particularly discouraging.”  He goes so far to say that the Guard was 
                                                          
4 Edward M. Coffman, The War to end all Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I (New 
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194 
 
 
“a less ready reserve than a grumbling and weakly coordinated patchwork of disparate 
state units.”7  This analysis does not take into account either the Guard’s extensive border 
training or the Guard’s growth in competency over the previous decade.  
Other historical analyses that focus primarily on the Guard during World War I 
paint a bleak picture of the Guard’s performance.  For example, Robert Ferrell focused on 
the 35th Infantry Division’s performance during the Great War in Collapse at Meuse-
Argonne: The Failure of the Missouri-Kansas Division.  Though the 35th Division 
maintained a proud heritage and contained many notable figures such as Harry S. 
Truman, the division collapsed during the Meuse-Argonne Offensive.  Ferrell admired 
the division as a whole, and stated that “the Thirty-Fifth did not deserve to lose, but it 
did,” and while Collapse at Meuse-Argonne offered various explanations for their combat 
failures, Ferrell’s reasoning ultimately centered on poor training.  Ferrell argued that the 
Guard was less prepared for war than their Regular Army counterparts because weekly 
drills were little more than social gatherings and border duty did not instill a valuable 
military skillset.8   
Works such as Ferrell’s tell an important story, but what about the Guard units 
that succeeded?  Ferrell’s explanation regarding training certainly does not translate well 
to other Guard divisions who received the same training at the 35th, but did not “fail” in 
combat.  Furthermore, the Guard’s border training had acclimated the soldiers to military 
life and centered around weapons training and battle simulations.  Ultimately, the First 
World War became the National Guard’s first test under the National Defense Act of 
1916’s provisions, and as a whole, the National Guard met and surpassed expectations.  
                                                          
7 Zieger, America’s Great War, 38. 
8 Robert H. Ferrell, Collapse at Meuse-Argonne: The Failure of the Missouri-Kansas Division (Columbia: 
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The Guard’s wartime experiences directly reflected those of the Regular Army and 
drafted troops in two key ways: military competency and mobilization effectiveness.  
Throughout the war, the Guard served as a key component of the American 
Expeditionary Force (AEF), and by war’s end, the National Guard made up the majority 
of the AEF.  Most Guard divisions performed their mission as well as their Regular Army 
counterparts, and two Guard divisions (the 26th and 42nd) accrued more days in combat 
than every other American division except the Regular Army’s 1st Infantry Division.  
Additionally, the National Guard’s mobilized as efficiently as both the Regular Army and 
the drafted soldiers in the National Army. 
When the United States entered the First World War the National Guard had only 
recently returned from Mexican border service.  However, the National Guard remained 
understrength at the conclusion of the border duty, and when the United States declared 
war on Germany, state governments needed to increase their Guard numbers to meet their 
federal quota, as the government required each state to supply specific amounts of troops 
based on state populations, but based on a new divisional outline.  Therefore, the federal 
government disbanded many “non-essential” Guard units, and others required additional 
reorganization and training.  Due to these factors, many units, such as the 35th, entered 
wartime service with roughly the same level of preparation as volunteers and drafted 
troops, so their military shortcomings should not be blamed on their Guard origins.  In 
other cases, states sent “orphaned” units into the newly created 42nd Infantry Division, 
which contained Guard troops from 26 states, thus earning the nickname, the Rainbow 
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Division.9  Over the course of the war, the Rainbow Division became highly 
distinguished and served in every American campaign, where they performed on par with 
Regular Army units.10  Therefore, simply grouping the entire National Guard into a 
singular group who did not succeed on the battlefield fails to reveal the complexities of 
American service in the Great War.  Just as with Regular Army units, the National Guard 
executed their mission successfully in many instances and failed in others. 
While the Guard’s wartime contribution varied based on unit, mission, and 
location, the Guard’s greater contribution derives from their nature as a civilian military 
force.  The same forces that drove the Guard’s earlier recruitment efforts—virtue, 
masculinity, and civic pride—carried over into the organization’s wartime mobilization.  
The National Guard appealed to young men who sought to enlist for overseas service 
(sometimes to avoid the shame related to the draft), but offered men an opportunity to 
serve with members from their own communities and to represent their home states.  In 
short, the Guard represented the same ideals that drove their efforts dating back to the 
Gilded Age.  Irving McCann noted in his published memoirs about Mexican border duty 
that “Since placing my manuscript in the hands of the publisher, the President has again 
called our regiment to the colors.”  McCann went on to express his support for the 
American declaration of war, and declared that “a new United States will come forth 
form this war with higher ideals, a purer patriotism, and a greater love for all the world.”  
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He went on to say “We most certainly should go, and we will go.”11  However, unlike 
previous military actions (most notably the Spanish-American War), the National Guard 
went to Europe as an effective and centralized military entity, the result of Progressive 
reform efforts dating back to the Dick Act in 1903. 
Overall, the Guard’s service in the Great War reflects broader trends in America’s 
actions overseas.  Like their Regular Army counterparts, previously trained guardsmen 
were among the first to arrive in France, while others remained state-side for additional 
training prior to their move to the front lines.  And, like many drafted troops, those newly 
enlisted men required extensive training and familiarization with military life.  However, 
due to the part-time nature of the Guard, state troops spent much of their time as business 
professionals, lawyers, teachers, and laborers.  These soldiers continued to serve at an 
intersection between the nation’s military and civilian spheres, and their correspondence 
and diary entries demonstrate strong connections to their private lives.  Therefore, unlike 
many Regular Army soldiers at the time or many conscripts, many guardsmen were well-
educated and well-versed in civic affairs.  Certainly, while many Guard diary entries and 
letters may sound like propaganda to modern ears, their perceptions reflect broad cultural 
ideals of the time, from both within and outside of the military structure.12  Because of 
this dual role then, examining the actions and writings of Guard troops during the First 
World War within the larger context of the Guard’s history allows historians to bridge the 
gap between the individual soldier experience and broader political and military concepts.  
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The National Guard serves as an arena through which one can study the social elements 
of a military unit while not losing sight of the war’s broader political and cultural 
implications.  Historians can gain a great deal of understanding of the human experience 
of warfare against the backdrop of the war’s larger context through the National Guard’s 
experiences.   
The greater contribution of soldiers such as Francis Webster, Moses Thisted, and 
other individuals can become blurred when studied closely.  Eric T. Dean states that 
when examining small units, “the greater purpose and flow of the war is rarely evident; to 
the common soldier in all eras, war has seemed a chaotic and terrifying business.”13  
While Dean does not intend to glorify war, he notes large concepts often get lost when 
scholars focus on individual soldiers or companies, making all wars seem futile.  The 
National Guard’s wartime story illuminates both the small unit and the First World War’s 
larger context.  Ultimately, the National Guard reflected every major element of the 
nation’s wartime contributions, as some guardsmen spent many months in the trenches, 
while others trained extensively in American camps before travelling overseas to join the 
fray, and others served in vital support roles.  In each of these instances, the Guard 
represented a cross section of American society, as native-born Americans and 
immigrants served in the same companies where working-class and middle-class soldiers 
served side by side.  Furthermore, the National Guard comprised two-thirds of soldiers 
who served in all-black regiments and brigades during the war.14  Ultimately, while the 
Guard represented American society as a whole, their wartime experience was the 
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culmination of a nearly 40 year transitional period, and the war offered the Guard a way 
to prove themselves in actual combat, and justify their inclusion within the American 
military system under the National Defense Act of 1916 (NDA). 
*** 
Recruitment and mobilization 
 When the United States declared war in April 1917, the nation lacked plans for 
mobilizing a massive army.  Regarding the National Guard, the War Department had 
some options at their disposal.  One option was to bolster the Regular Army’s numbers 
through conscription and volunteerism and simply not include the Guard in the 
mobilization (an option some planners supported).  Raising the Regular Army to wartime 
strength and creating a federally-raised volunteer force was a second option, which again 
would have removed the National Guard from the equation.  The third option (and most 
viable under the National Defense Act of 1916’s provisions) involved raising both the 
Regular Army’s and National Guard’s numbers to wartime strength and bolstering these 
numbers through conscription.  The War Department ultimately chose the third option, 
partly because, as one officer put it, “despite many weaknesses shown during their 
service on the border, there was overwhelming evidence that the National Guard of this 
period was a very different force from the militia,” and that the Guard “was made up of 
civilians with a natural military instinct who voluntarily gave their time and frequently 
their money in order to secure military training in times of peace.”15  However, when the 
nation declared war, the National Guard was not ready for a second deployment.  Border 
duty had delayed the National Defense Act’s implementation because units stationed 
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along the border did not have the opportunity to conform to the new guidelines.  States 
began the reorganization process when their units returned home, but the process 
remained slow.  Though some units returned to their homes stations as early as October 
1916, most did not return until January or February 1917, and thousands of guardsmen 
remained on active duty in early April 1917.16   
Additionally, a series of issues slowed the Guard’s reintegration into federal 
service.  The first related to the federal oath requirement.  When President Wilson 
activated the National Guard for federal service, he resurrected the issue of federal oaths.  
As described in the last chapter, the NDA’s federal oath requirement bogged down the 
Guard’s border mobilization, and many soldiers responded to the new oath with 
animosity and hostility.17  Eventually the federal government allowed states to grant 
discharges to any soldier who refused to take the oath of service, which prompted many 
soldiers to leave the Guard in late 1916 and early 1917.  Adding to the confusion was the 
fact that when the Mexican situation drew down and guardsmen returned from the border, 
the government mustered them out of federal service, but actually denied them the role of 
“active service.”  The War Department ruled that any guardsmen who took the federal 
oath of service for border duty did so under an antiquated law, and ruled that any soldier 
mustered into federal service needed to take a new federal oath.  This new ruling took 
effect when President Wilson began activating Guard elements in March 1917, and many 
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guardsmen simply did not understand the new law.18  Iowa’s adjutant general reported 
that when the Guard mustered for federal service “many of these men had not taken their 
Federal oath.”  Most soldiers took the new oath when they arrived at their duty stations, 
“but an equal number refused and were ordered to their homes,” and “have since been 
discharged.”  Ironically, many of the soldiers who refused the oath were eventually 
drafted through the Selective Service Act.19 
The Guard’s second mobilization problem arose when President Wilson recalled 
roughly 40,000 guardsmen to federal service in March 1917, furthering the confusion 
regarding divisional structure and the order of battle.  Wilson intended these soldiers to 
guard stock yards, docks, railroad depots, railroad tunnels and bridges, and main rail lines 
in preparation for an official declaration of war, but this preparatory mobilization divided 
state units with little regard to the NDA’s divisional structure.20  During this initial 
deployment, some Illinois Guard travelled across the state due to anti-draft 
demonstrations and a series of strikes and riots in Bloomington and East St. Louis, and 
the government activated the First Iowa Infantry Regiment for the “purposes of 
‘preventing interference with postal, commercial and military channels and 
instrumentalities.’”21  A third major issue regarding the Guard’s mobilization occurred 
when Congress applied the Dependent Relative Order on 12 April 1917, which stated that 
any guardsman who had “families entirely dependent upon them for support, must be 
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dropped from the guard, whether they desire it or not.”22  Of course, such an order placed 
a great strain on the National Guard’s already low manpower numbers, but the federal 
government hoped to avoid a scenario where entire families would become the 
government’s public charge if a guardsman died in combat.  So, when the president 
called the Guard into service for the First World War, the Guard was in a state of 
“reorganization and readjustment.”23   
Only weeks after this initial call, Congress declared war on Germany and in 
addition to the Regular Army and National Guard, the government estimated they would 
need at least 800,000 more men to meet the demands of the Western Front.24  
Accordingly, Woodrow Wilson and Congress decided to utilize conscription, based on 
British and French experiences.  The Selective Service Act took effect on 18 May 1917, 
and created over 4,600 local draft boards composed of influential local citizens.25  By 
doing this, the United States had implemented its first modern draft; however, training a 
large, conscripted force was a long and arduous process.26  In late May, the War 
Department announced that the Army would raise its numbers to 300,000 men by the end 
of June, and on 15 July 1917 the government federalized the entire National Guard, and 
then officially “drafted” them into service in on 5 August 1917, removing the Guard from 
state control.27  Within months of the declaration of war, the National Guard became part 
of the American Expeditionary Force.  However, due to discharges and resignations 
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regarding oaths and dependent laws, when the president activated the National Guard 
states needed to expedite the creation of new companies, and bring their existing ones up 
to full strength.  In Iowa’s case, for example, only 2,200 troops out of the 4,300 
guardsmen who returned from the border were available for federal service when the 
nation declared war.28   
The ongoing struggle between organized labor and the National Guard added to 
the recruitment and mobilization problem, and although border service provided some 
respite from strike duty, heads of labor continued to view the Guard as an enemy.  This 
image of the National Guard grew to such proportions that when the United States went 
to war, the Guard’s ability to recruit the necessary number of men seemed in doubt.  For 
example, the federal government required the Iowa National Guard to raise the numbers 
of each company from anywhere between 50 and 60 men to 100 in order to reach 
wartime strength, and the government further set Iowa’s overall wartime Guard quota to 
roughly 10,000.  But given the Guard’s negative image as strikebreakers, relatively few 
working-class men rushed to National Guard recruiting stations.  As a sign of national 
unity and patriotic duty, the Executive Board of the Iowa State Federation of Labor sent a 
circular letter to 40,000 union members, urging them to answer the call to arms.  This 
plea noted that the Iowa National Guard was “the only organization which will carry the 
name of our state into the conflict,” and added  that “There is no good reason why union 
men should not answer their country’s call and join the National Guard, and every reason 
why they should.  Let all ill feeling, sentiment or opposition be swept aside in this hour of 
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our country’s crisis.  Trade unionists do and will stand shoulder to shoulder with other 
defenders of this republic’s liberty, regardless of class or calling.”29  The Iowa state 
government also helped encourage recruitment by getting major employers to pledge 
publicly that workers who enlisted in the National Guard during the war would regain 
their positions when they returned home.30       
Overall, the National Guard’s truce with organized labor during the war closely 
mirrored larger trends in American society, as the federal government sought similar 
agreements with labor unions for the nation’s greater good.  As early as 1914 and 1915, 
some military officers and railroad executives supported plans for drafting railroad 
workers into the Army if the nation declared war in order to impose military discipline on 
an important labor element.  Similarly, in 1917, some labor executives even supported 
drafting elements of the shipyard labor force into the military to ensure discipline and 
make work stoppages punishable by court-martial.31  Ultimately, these proposals never 
came to fruition, and the Wilson administration favored establishing contracts with 
various labor unions in order to support the war effort.  The United States government 
managed to appease organized labor by making the unions an integral part of the nation’s 
wartime mission, thus minimizing labor opposition and work stoppages.32  Again then, 
the Guard’s efforts in attracting unionists into the ranks and reducing tension during the 
war reflected the federal government’s larger mission regarding labor agreements.   
Furthermore, the Guard’s recruitment efforts mirrored on other national trends.  In 
order to sell the American people on entering the war less than six months after winning 
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an election on the premise of keeping the nation out of the war, President Wilson utilized 
Progressive language.  Wilson publically declared that the United States must enter the 
war to “make the world safe for democracy,” and other Progressives followed suit.  John 
Dewey, the famous educator and Progressive writer, argued that this was a particularly 
“malleable” time in human history, and true peace and pacifism could only be achieved if 
the United States and its allies defeated Germany militarily, and that this war could drive 
home all their progressive ideas across the globe.33  Along similar lines, the Wilson 
Administration created the Committee on Public Information to explain to Americans and 
the world “the cause that compelled America to take arms in defense of its liberties and 
free institutions.”34  Captain McCann reflected these sentiments, and appealed to other 
Progressive ideals—particularly Christian-based struggles for justice and equality.   
McCann declared that Jesus’s death “gave impetus to his teachings,” and “So will 
it be in this baptism of blood.”35  Furthermore, McCann stated: 
The earlier motives that may have brought on this colossal struggle, commercial and 
political jealousy and greed, have been entirely swallowed up in a larger issue, the liberty 
and freedom of mankind.  It is now a war of democracy against tyranny, of right against 
wrong, and American must do everything in her power (which means men as well as 
money) to crush forever the ideas that are now held to and fought for by the Central 
Allies.  When a world struggle is being waged for freedom and humanity, the Stars and 
Stripes should and must be flung to the battle’s front.”36 
McCann’s statements built off of larger inclinations in American society, and under this 
guise, states undertook massive recruitment campaigns to reach wartime strength that had 
a fairly high level of success.  The Guard continued to appeal to a sense of duty and the 
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volunteer spirit, which allowed many men to enlist in the Guard and avoid the stigma 
attached to conscription.  Wisconsin managed to reach its wartime strength of 15,200 
men by 1 August 1917, and recruiting efforts effectively increased Illinois’s Guard 
numbers from 16,700 in June 1917 to over 18,500 by the beginning of August.37 
Additionally, the National Guard continued to serve as a cross-section of 
American society at the onset of American entry into the First World War.  Just as the 
Guard and old militia contained members from a variety of social classes and races 
during the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, the Guard maintained this structure at the 
border and as they embarked for Europe.  Various immigrant groups hoped the Guard 
would ease the transition to full citizenship and serve as a means of assimilation into 
American culture without necessarily serving on active duty.38 These immigrants then, 
upheld a tradition of using Guard service as an option to fulfill one’s civic duty without 
living the life of a regular soldier, and further allowed the Guard to reflect broad trends in 
American society at the turn of the twentieth-century.  Indeed, one Finnish immigrant, 
Johannes Anderson, served along the border and again in Europe and earned a great level 
of distinction, which will be discussed later in this chapter.  The Guard reflected social 
distinctions, and remained a heterogeneous organization that drew membership from both 
rural and urban men, as well as from a wide array of ethnicities, races and economic 
circumstances.39  The Guard could not avoid existing racial prejudices, though, and 
throughout World War I, Guard units remained racially segregated; yet, eight of the 
twelve black brigades who served in Europe during World War I were National Guard 
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units.40  One such unit was the all-black Eighth Illinois Infantry Regiment, who became 
the 370th US Infantry Regiment and joined the provisional 93rd Infantry Division in 
France.41   
Even while in Europe, though, the 93rd Division faced racial segregation.  
Comprised of three National Guard regiments: the 370th of Illinois, the 369th of New 
York, and the 372nd which comprised guardsmen from the District of Columbia, 
Connecticut, and Maryland (as well as one conscripted regiment), this all-black division 
traveled to France in piecemeal fashion and never actually fought together as a single 
division.  The New York guardsmen arrived in Brest in late December 1917, after 
watching white Guard units leave for France as part of either the 27th or 42nd Divisions, 
becoming the first American black regiment to travel to France.  The Illinois troops 
arrived later, in April 1918.  Unlike the other Divisions of the AEF, General Pershing 
violated his own stance on amalgamation when he ceded control of the 93rd to the French 
army, who in turn supplied the soldiers with helmets and arms.  In early 1918, the New 
York troopers assisted French General Henri Gourand in his “elastic defense strategy,” 
and later in the year the 370th and 372nd regiments fought under Marshall Ferdinand Foch 
during the Meuse-Argonne Offensive.  Additionally, the Illinois troops assisted the 
French during the Oise-Aisne Offensive just prior to the armistice, where they earned the 
French Fourragère.  However, after the war, the US Army generally ignored the 93rd’s 
contributions to the war effort because it recorded that “the 93rd Division spent zero days 
in training in line, zero days in sector, and zero days in battle,” despite the fact that the 
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division suffered over 520 soldiers killed and over 2,600 wounded throughout 1918.42  
Indeed, the 93rd Division’s combat record served as a testament to the National Guard’s 
abilities, but reflected racial sentiments that plagued the nation during the early twentieth 
century.   
While black guardsmen faced discrimination and segregation during their 
deployment, other mobilization issues emerged after the US declared war.  As noted in 
the previous chapter, the National Guard and War Department abandoned the Army’s 
original divisional breakdown plan during border service, but this was not an option when 
the nation mobilized for service in 1917.  In order to streamline the process and meet 
wartime demands, the War Department settled on a new divisional outline, known as 
square divisions, which reduced the number of infantry regiments, added artillery 
regiments, dropped cavalry regiments, and added newly created organization such as 
machine gun companies, trench mortar battalions, supply trains, and military police 
companies.43 Under this structure, Guard divisions would be broken down by region.  
However, the new breakdown meant that many Guard units needed to blend with other 
ones, were left out of the structure completely, or were converted to new specialties, 
much to the chagrin of Guard officers, soldiers, and state authorities.44   
Additionally, the Army dropped any state insignia or references from Guard units 
in August 1917 as a means of minimizing prejudice and creating a sense of unity.45  This 
meant that Guard units removed the “N.G.” insignia from their collars and replaced it 
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with the universal “U.S.” pin, and state units removed any state-oriented regimental 
designations.  For example, the Third Iowa Infantry Regiment became the 168th US 
Infantry Regiment, the First Illinois Field Artillery Regiment became the 149th US Field 
Artillery Regiment, and the First Iowa Infantry Regiment became the 133rd US Infantry 
Regiment, and the previously noted Eighth Illinois Infantry Regiment became the 370th 
US Regiment.46  Ultimately, by removing state unit designations, the United States 
military permanently broke with the older state volunteer system that dominated 
nineteenth-century wartime mobilizations. 
Furthermore, the War Department applied numerical indicators to each division, 
and reserved numbers one through twenty five for the Regular Army.  The National 
Guard comprised Divisions twenty six through seventy five (though in practice these only 
went through forty two), and all divisions above seventy six went to the National Army 
(drafted soldiers).  The previously discussed 93rd Provisional Division was a notable 
exception.  Newton Baker’s War Department applied the Guard’s division numbers by 
region moving from east to west; therefore, the New England Guard coalesced into the 
26th Infantry Division, with the New York Guard comprising the 27th Infantry Division.  
The Illinois National Guard made up the majority of the 33rd Infantry Division, while 
guardsmen from Iowa, Minnesota, and the Dakotas served in the 34th Infantry Division.47  
Guardsmen from the Pacific Northwest became the last numeric region and they became 
the 41st Infantry Division.48  These Guard divisions required varying levels of preparation 
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and reorganization, so many units such as the first battalion of Iowa’s Field Artillery 
went to Fort Logan Roots near Little Rock, Arkansas and later to Camp Cody in Deming, 
New Mexico for training where they joined their counterparts in the 34th Division.49  The 
33rd Infantry Division travelled to Camp Logan near Houston, Texas, along with most of 
the 32nd Division, comprised of Wisconsin and Michigan guardsmen.50  Many of these 
troops did not receive overseas orders for many months, and while this experience was 
similar to that of conscripted troops, it was also shared by new volunteers of the Regular 
Army, again making the Guard representative of the overall American wartime 
experience.   
While the Army had an organizational structure in place by the middle of 1917, 
only New York’s and Pennsylvania’s National Guards were at divisional strength, which 
opened a new debate.  The War Department had already decided that the first unit to 
travel overseas would be the Regular Army’s 1st Infantry Division, but debated which 
Guard units would travel overseas first.  Some supported simply sending the complete 
divisions first, but others believed that this would lead to charges of favoritism.  Secretary 
of War Newton Baker, met with Army staff officers, particularly Major Douglas 
MacArthur.  According to Baker, MacArthur suggested “the possibility of our being able 
to form a division out of the surplus units from many states, the major part of whose 
National Guard organizations were in multi-state divisions.”  The Chief of the Militia 
Division, William Abram Mann, agreed with MacArthur, and they decided to include 
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Guard elements from twenty six states in this new composite division, prompting 
MacArthur to declare that this new division would “stretch over the whole country like a 
rainbow.”51   
Additionally, Brigadier General Frank Rumbold, who served for many years with 
the Missouri National Guard and the Militia Bureau prepared a plan for the 42nd Division 
where each unit contained men with border service experience.  Rumbold believed 
European soldiers would consider these guardsmen veterans because of their campaign 
badges.52  This composite division became the 42nd Infantry Division, and the War 
Department rushed to compile the division for overseas service, hoping that it would be 
among the first to arrive in France in order to represent a nationally structured Guard unit.  
In order to effectively mobilize their soldiers for quick overseas service in this new 
division, some states merged their existing units into singular regiments who then became 
part of the 42nd Infantry Division.  For example, Iowa transferred 1,650 men from the 
First and Second Infantry Regiments into the Third Infantry Regiment (168th Infantry 
Regiment), which the Army had designated as one of the 42nd Division’s four infantry 
regiments, along with the 69th New York, the 4th Ohio, the 4th Alabama Infantry 
Regiments.53  While only four states sent infantry regiments to the Rainbow Division, 
twenty two other states sent various combat and auxiliary units, such as the First and 
Second Illinois Field Artillery Regiments, renamed the 149th and 150th US Field Artillery 
Regiments.  Unfortunately, racial prejudice reared its ugly head when the all-black 369th 
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Infantry Regiment out of New York (mentioned earlier as part of the 93rd Provisional 
Division) petitioned to join the 42nd Division.  Someone in the War Department informed 
369th’s colonel, William Hayward, that “black was not one of the colors of the 
rainbow.”54  
The War Department placed Major General William A. Mann, a forty two-year 
Regular Army veteran, in command of the Rainbow Division in September 1917 and 
assigned then Colonel Douglas MacArthur as his chief of staff.55  While many staff 
officers and even line officers, such as Hugh Thompson (who served as a platoon 
commander in the 168th Regiment), came from the Regular Army, regimental command 
generally stayed within the Guard’s ranks.56  For example, Colonel E. R. Bennett, who 
commanded the 168th Regiment was a long-time Iowa National Guard officer who served 
with the 51st Iowa in the Philippines and was an officer with the Third Iowa while at the 
border.  Similarly, Bennett’s second-in-command, Colonel Mathew Tinley had enlisted in 
the militia as a private in 1894 and had risen to the rank of lieutenant by 1898.  Tinley 
likewise served in the Philippines with the 51st Iowa and went to the border as a 
lieutenant colonel.57  Colonel Benson Hugh, who commanded the 166th Regiment (Ohio 
Guard), also began his military career as a private with the militia and rose through the 
National Guard’s ranks.  Hugh eventually became Ohio’s adjutant general, but resigned 
so he could go to the border as a lieutenant colonel.58   
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Despite these officers’ collective experience, combining Guard elements from 
twenty six states into one division with one mobilization site proved difficult, but in any 
event, troops began arriving at Camp Mills on Long Island, New York in October 1917.  
Over the course of two months the division converged on their mobilization camp, and 
according to one brigadier general, “every sectional, racial, religious and vocational 
prejudice sank far into the background before the deep bond of comradeship which being 
a member of the Rainbow Division came to mean and which nothing could disrupt.”59  
However, a certain level of internal rivalry emerged among officers in the Rainbow 
Division, particularly between National Guard officers and Reserve Officers assigned to 
Guard regiments.  Lieutenant John H. Taber remarked in his diary that “the National 
Guard simply doesn’t speak our language,” and one major in the 168th Regiment 
“practically told the non-coms of the First Battalion to not pay any attention to the 
Reserve Officers.”  Taber went on to note that this same Guard officer drove another 
Reserve lieutenant to attempt suicide while training at Camp Mills.60  While Lt. Taber did 
not have a specific cause for this ongoing hostility (which carried over to service in 
France), but speculated that jealousy among junior Guard officers led many to resent the 
Reserve officers from taking positions that might have gone to senior Guard non-
commissioned officers.  Despite this rivalry within the junior officer ranks, the time at 
Camp Mills proved invaluable in encouraging unit cohesiveness, and the division finally 
received orders to go “over there” in December 1917.61      
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The Rainbow Division in combat 
Beginning in late 1917, the AEF needed to embark on a grueling journey overseas 
that was far from comfortable for most troops.  One Iowa private in the Regular Army 
wrote that there was “hardly room to walk between” the bunks, and Private Harry 
Lehnhardt noted numerous days of sea sickness, and cramped living quarters on his 
transport vessel.62  Military planners exacerbated the discomfort as they crammed troops 
into small bunk areas containing rows of bunks stacked three high, and although 
Lehnhardt did not travel overseas until July 1918, his experiences reflect the general 
conditions onboard transport vessels.63  During the journey, the government issued 
instructional booklets outlining where the soldiers could gather, when they could eat, 
when they could go above deck, and what to do in the event of an emergency or attack.64  
While many troops experienced less than desirable conditions, some soldiers had a much 
more pleasant experience on their way overseas.  After a mechanical failure forced the 
U.S.S. Grant to turn back to port, the majority of the 168th Infantry waited for a second 
transport vessel.  The short delay seemed to work in the Iowans’ favor, as they travelled 
to Europe on three converted British passenger liners, the R.M.S. Celtic, Aurania, and 
Baltic.  This journey became “very pleasant,” and their accommodations were “much 
better than we expected this time.”65  And, unlike the soldiers on other cramped ships, 
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many of the 168th stayed in small staterooms with only three other men because the three 
ships troop load was limited to one or two battalions, and thus, much lighter than typical 
transport ships, prompting one officer to boast that “the accommodations are so superior 
to the Grant that there is no comparison.”66   
Upon their arrival in Europe, many Rainbow Division regiments enjoyed a short 
layover in England, where they trained and paraded through Winchester and South 
Hampton.67  Francis Webster [figure 4] of the 168th Regiment took this opportunity to 
describe to his parents and fiancé, the sights and sounds of the “cloudy, foggy, and rainy” 
English landscape.68  Despite the foul weather, most men appreciated their brief time in 
England, and the troops even received a motivational letter from King George V, who 
offered them his support and thanks.69  After only a few weeks though, the soldiers 
travelled across the English Channel and began their move toward the front lines.  Life in 
France was a drastic shift from England, Cecil Clark described their first French rest 
camp as a “Hell hole.”70  Two days after Clark penned his letter, most of the Rainbow 
Division began their move toward Rimaucourt, Haute-Marne, where they remained for 
the next two months and underwent further drilling and inspections.71  Private Everett 
Wright noted in his diary throughout January “we drilled and hiked in snow and mud,” 
and on one occasion his company “prepared for a three day hike (which we made in two 
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days).”72  Throughout February, the 42nd Division remained in rear posistions and found 
ways to entertain themselves between training sessions.  On 17 February 1918, L 
Company (168th US Infantry) defeated M Company in a baseball game, and the next day 
the two companies spent the entire day at a rifle range.73     
What seemed like a dull interlude to the troops was a stressful time for American 
command.  General John “Blackjack” Pershing remained locked in a heated debate with 
French and British commanders regarding America’s role on the front lines.  The French 
and British amalgamation plan required the Americans to serve as replacement troops and 
fall under allied command.  General Pershing refused to accept this idea, as he fully 
intended to maintain an independent command and serve alongside the French and 
British, not under them.  Pershing believed amalgamation would weaken the American 
wartime position and alienate the American populace (as well as the troops themselves), 
who wished to fight for their own interests.  Further, if the Americans did not have an 
independent command, General Pershing’s strategic goal of an all-out assault against the 
German main force by American soldiers would never come to fruition because the 
Americans would be spread out among European commands.74  The American 
commander’s persistence paid off, and the American troops went to the front as 
independent units, under American commanders.  In order to meet the front’s demands 
and appease European commanders, Pershing allowed divisions such as the 42nd to serve 
in French sections of the line (but under their own commanders) until the rest of the 
American Expeditionary Force arrived in Europe.  The previously discussed 93rd Division 
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was the main exception, and they remained under French command for the duration of 
the war.75  
For the first half of 1918, the 42nd Division was one of only three substantial 
American forces in the field, and while allied commanders debated strategy and 
command structures, the guardsmen were about to receive a trial by fire.  At the end of 
February, a majority of the Rainbow Division began their move toward the front, and 
marched from station to station and town to town before settling in along their portion of 
the line.76  Over the next few weeks, American troops engaged the enemy at various 
points along of varying levels of intensity.  During the first week of March, the 168th 
Regiment moved to the forward trenches near Badonviller, France, which Everett Wright 
described as being “nearly all in ruins.”77  The next few days consisted of forward 
observation and trench maintenance, or what Francis Webster described as, “soldiering,” 
but this soon changed.78  On 5 March 1918, the Iowans awoke to the sound of a heavy 
bombardment and gas calls.79  The soldiers hastily donned their gas masks, scurried out 
of their dugouts, and took up their positions along the trench.   
In some sectors, the barrage amounted to little more than harassment, but in other 
sections, German forces advanced against American companies, and the 168th held their 
ground.  According to an Iowa captain, “The enemy attacked at 4:30 AM by barrage, 
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followed by a heavy bombardment until 6:00 AM.  The enemy’s attack failed, only three 
men entering the front line trenches without capturing any of our men.  The rest were 
driven off by our rifle and machine gun fire.”80  However, this attack did result in, “quite 
a few killed,” as the regiment suffered 22 dead and another 19 wounded.81  Cecil Clark 
noted in his diary that the Germans raided two sister companies on the same day, and he 
further noted that Company M along with two French companies went “over the top” on 
11 March.  The next week was filled with German artillery barrages, and on 17 March, 
Clark’s company made their first raid against the enemy’s lines.82 
Sergeant Charles Kosek of D Company was also in the trenches during the first 
weeks of March 1918, and his diary entries noted the strains and emotions of wartime, 
including a perceived level of hypocrisy on the part of commanders.  According to 
Kosek, division command awarded war crosses to a company of the 168th even though 
they were a mile in the rear of the trenches.  Conversely, “We ran out and repulsed the 
Hun attack as soon as the barrage lifted; we got nothing.  B Co. waited till they were sure 
it was all over and when they came out the Huns were in their trench and they had to run 
them out, result they got three medals.”83  Members of B Company probably remembered 
this event quite differently.  And although Private Alfred Bowen was still training in New 
Mexico at the time of the 42nd Division’s combat actions, his opinion that, “You really 
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cannot believe anything you hear in the army, as you hear all kinds of conflicting 
rumors,” definitely held true in numerous instances.84   
Despite the “conflicting rumors” of which regiment deserved what awards, World 
War I served as an eye-opening experience for Guard troops, because guardsmen never 
saw actual combat at the border.  As the nation prepared to go to war, Irving McCann 
stressed the importance of the United States’ future role in international affairs, and 
reflected Progressive propaganda as well as futuristic appeals to patriotism and virtue.  
McCann believed that his nation’s entry into the war would replace “a National 
patriotism, with its narrowness, bigotry and hatred” with a “World patriotism.”85  
However, the First World War altered the way many soldiers across the globe viewed 
warfare, and erased what many admired in retrospect as the old spirit and glory of war.  
Indeed, the war put Filippo Marinetti’s Futuristic call to glorify war to the test.  The 
realities of trench warfare and modern weaponry created devastation, destruction, and 
pain foreign to most young troopers, but border duty lessened the learning curve, as 
guardsmen already held the basic skills necessary for combat.  And, guardsmen were in a 
better position in the trenches due to a familiarity with army life learned in the American 
Southwest.  With time, American soldiers grew accustomed to life in the trenches, which 
consisted of constant shelling, machine gun fire, mortar attacks, air and tank warfare, and 
the painful reality of gas warfare replaced pre-war ideas of heroism.  As Paul Fussell 
noted, “Every war is ironic because every war is worse than expected.”86  The Guard 
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troops, particularly those in the Rainbow Division, soon faced this reality in daily combat 
actions. 
Over the next few months, the fighting continued for the National Guard troops, 
and wartime routines began to take shape.  Throughout the rest of March and April, the 
Rainbow Division’s regiments moved from the front to the rear in regular intervals, and 
spent most of their time “soldiering.”87  On 21 March 1918, German forces advanced 
against the allied front in the first of five major offensives codenamed “Operation 
Michael.”  While British and French forces felt the brunt of this offensive, American 
troops were not immune from raids and bombardments.88   But once again, French and 
British commanders hoped to supersede General Pershing’s authority.  Sir Douglas Haig 
and Ferdinand Foch called on Pershing to reinforce allied forces with American troops.  
As before, Pershing refused to give up his command, and the American forces remained 
under his control.89  Throughout this period, United States continued to engage with 
German forces, but no major American offensive took place because the majority of the 
American Expeditionary Force was still en route to the front, and Pershing was not yet 
ready to make a push.     
  American troopers generally supported Pershing and his persistence.  Francis 
Webster told his parents in a letter that “Politically, we [American soldiers] all think that 
without doubt Pershing will be the next president.”90  However, French troops grew 
impatient with the seemingly slow development of American strategy due to logistical 
struggles.  A major problem related to the United States’ wartime mobilization was the 
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lack of shipping, and though President Wilson placed Charles M. Schwab (the 
accomplished steel magnate and business organizer) in charge of ship building, the 
process remained slow, and the French soldiers voiced their irritation.91  According to 
Webster, “The French soldiers with whom I’ve talked are very unreasonably impatient 
because we have not already got several millions of men in the field.  We try to make 
them realize the difficulties which our country is facing.  From what I read, the ship 
problem is the biggest, and so I hope they give Schwab a free hand.”  Furthermore, 
Webster wrote, “I think President Wilson has done a fine thing in putting Schwab at the 
head of the ship building.  That is, if he lets Schwab have any real power.  I think that the 
war cabinet bill would have helped the U.S. a lot if they could have commanded the 
services of a few men like Schwab to manage the work part of the war.  Just at present we 
need men, munitions, food and supplies here in France more than finely phrased 
‘policies.’”92  Indeed, Webster’s correspondence demonstrated the general Guard 
understanding of larger US policies and wartime actions, and even though the Rainbow 
Division had been in the trenches for over a month by the time of Webster’s letter, the 
bulk of the American Expeditionary Force remained in the United States.   
Throughout May 1918, the Rainbow Division remained in the trenches opposite 
the German army, and over the course of twenty two days, the division took an average 
of 450 rounds of enemy fire per day.  In retribution, the 42nd Division fired an average of 
800 rounds per day across no-man’s land into the German lines, and this constant enemy 
engagement drained many of the troops.  Sometimes this bombardment had unforeseen 
and devastating consequences.  Private Everett Wright described an instance where 
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American artillery fell short and “exploded in our own trench,” and the next day 
“Sergeant Hobbs of Red Oak [Iowa] and two others were killed by our own guns.”93  
Cecil Clark noted that he had his first bath in over seven weeks at the beginning of May, 
and spent the next two weeks in the trenches, where he struggled to find his company’s 
dugout in the night.94  Clark did receive a two day reprieve from trench-life though on 15 
May 1918 when military officials arrested him “at noon for not having my blouse on,” 
and Clark did not seem to complain when he wrote that “I slept in a guard house all 
night.”95  Near the end of May, the division launched nine nighttime patrols, bombarded 
enemy positions, and threw over 1,000 propaganda tracts into the German lines by means 
of rifle grenades.96  Of course, the enemy retaliated in kind.  On 26 May 1918, “Dutch” 
soldiers “threw over gas all night” at Cecil Clark’s position, and three days later the 
troops faced a night-long artillery barrage, complete with gas and a “liquid fire attack.”  
Through all this though, the Iowa guardsmen captured three prisoners and killed eleven 
Germans.97     
For Cecil Clark, Everett Wright, Francis Webster, Charles Kosek, the 168th, and 
the rest of the Rainbow Division, combat actions, attacks, and counter attacks continued 
throughout June and into July, with both sides exchanging artillery shells and small arms 
fire.  In the middle of July though, the German infantry launched a series of assaults 
against the Division’s positions, and once again, the 42nd Division held firm.98  According 
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to official reports, when German forces did penetrate the American lines, the division’s 
soldiers “counterattacked and restored position with great loss to the enemy,” and during 
a 15 July attack, which Cecil Clark described as “a big offensive,” the guardsmen 
captured twenty seven Germans along with machine guns, and the division “lost no 
prisoners and have none missing.”  Additionally, “the conduct of the division has been 
the subject of congratulations by both [the] French Corps and the French Army 
commander.”99  In the immediate days after the two-day assault, the Rainbow Division 
received numerous replacement troops, and German soldiers retaliated with a series of 
nighttime artillery bombardments, and when some of the 168th counter-attacked, they 
pushed the Germans four miles back, but retreated when they moved too far out of their 
own artillery support range.100 
On 27 July 1918, the Rainbow Division took over a section of the line previously 
held by the French Army.101  Shortly after this move to the French sector, the 42nd 
Division received orders to attack the German line, “under the cover of darkness” with 
French army divisions on their right and left for support.  Following “a violent artillery 
preparation,” the 168th Regiment and the 167th Regiment (Alabama Guard troops) led this 
attack “in the nature of a surprise and, consequently, troops in the attack will not fire 
during the assault but will confine themselves to the bayonet.”102  The Iowans and 
Alabamans faced the Fourth Prussian Guards, and once again, the guardsmen performed 
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admirably and by the next day, the Americans captured their objective.103  As July gave 
way to August, the division continued to advance, but moved very slowly.  Early in 
August, the division received new uniforms just in time for some official visits by a few 
state representatives and senators.104  Throughout these months, troopers continued to 
move from the front to the rear in regular intervals, but life behind the lines was not a 
safety guarantee.  Cecil Clark took his opportunity in the rear to “sterilize his uniform” by 
swimming in the Marne River, and a couple days later his friend, Bruce, also went for a 
swim.  Unfortunately, “Bruce drowned in the Marne.”105  
Throughout this period, regular combat actions took their tolls on the soldiers.  
Constant artillery barrages meant that even a relatively “fine day” could result in death in 
the trenches, and soldiers constantly worried about deadly potential of conventional 
artillery and harassing small arms fire.106  But, of all the weaponry associated with the 
Great War, troops feared poisonous gas more than any other.  Soldiers had some 
protection, including gas masks, which they tested in specially designed chambers to the 
rear of the trenches.107  Yet, sometimes these masks hindered a trooper’s abilities, and on 
at least one occasion enemy troops took advantage of gas’s effects without actually using 
any of the deadly weapon.  Two days after a continued attack, German forces sounded a 
false gas alarm near the American lines, provoking many troops to don their masks as the 
German infantry advanced across no-man’s land.  Private Glen Shepherd realized this 
mistake as he ran across the trench warning his fellow soldiers to remove their masks and 
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meet the oncoming attack, but he did not reach everyone in time.  Just prior to Shepherd’s 
arrival, a young private climbed out of his position with his rifle in an attempt to get a 
better target.  The private managed to kill two enemy soldiers, but his bulky mask 
hindered his movements, and he died before getting back into cover.108   
The bulkiness of the masks was only one obstacle.  Time proved itself the biggest 
factor in a mask’s effectiveness.  During one attack, Iowa Captain Lloyd Ross called out 
“gas, gas!” as a warning to those around him, but he was unable to put his own mask on 
quickly enough, and the result was excruciating, “I could feel the gas burning my throat 
and lungs and then I knew that I didn’t get my mask on in time and that I was gassed.  I 
stood my post for a few minutes and then I began to get dizzy and couldn’t stand up 
anymore.  Corporal Kelly took me to my bunk and tole [sic] me not to move around.  The 
next morning I was taken to the hospital where I found several of my pals who were 
gassed the same night.”109  Similarly, Francis Webster felt the effects of a gas attack.  
Two weeks after his twenty-second birthday, Webster’s machine gun company advanced 
across a wheat field in front of the American infantry against the German lines, and his 
gun crew set up in an artillery crater and repulsed two German attacks with heavy fire.  
The American advance followed, but the Germans held their ground.  The following day, 
German artillery unleashed a heavy bombardment of the American lines.  While they 
hunkered down, an artillery shell exploded near Webster’s team, killing his sergeant-in-
charge, and severing the leg of a private sitting directly beside him.  Shortly after, 
mustard gas debilitated another sergeant, and Corporal Webster became acting sergeant.  
                                                          
108 Lloyd D. Ross, “Fifty Germans and How They Fared,” 1; 1999.113, Papers of General Lloyd D. Ross (Ross 
Papers), WWI; INGA.  “Fifty Germans and How They Fared” was Ross’s detailed account of a raid on 29 
May 1918, where he ultimately captured fifty German prisoners and earned a combat citation.  Hereafter 
cited as Ross, “Fifty Germans,” page number; Ross Papers, WWI; INGA.   
109 Ross, “Fifty Germans,” 3; Ross Papers, WWI; INGA. 
226 
 
 
The next day, Webster’s commander placed him in charge of the guard, but unfortunately 
for Corporal Webster, another gas barrage followed, and he failed to reach his mask in 
time.  He left for the hospital on 27 July with nine others, while the rest of his regiment 
moved to a French sector of the line.110 
While the general narrative of the Great War includes trench warfare, gas, suicidal 
charges across no-man’s land, and artillery bombardment, hospital life often plays a role 
in the overall story.  Erich Remarque dedicated an entire chapter to hospital life in his 
famous novel, All Quiet on the Western Front.  Remarque’s fictionalized first person 
account discussed the Red Cross volunteers and nuns who were “pleasant, but often 
unskilled.  They frequently give us pain when re-making our beds, and then are so 
frightened they hurt us still more.”111  The account continued with tales of poor 
conditions and surgery gone wrong.112  The novel’s main character, Paul, discussed the 
gruesome wounds incurred by soldiers, and the broken bodies in hospital wards, and he 
finally declared, “A hospital alone shows what war is.”113  However, Francis Webster’s 
experience with hospital life seemed quite different.  Webster wrote to a friend that, “The 
Red Cross is certainly a splendid organization.”114  Of course, Webster could have been 
trying to ease his family’s and friends’ worries by putting a good face on hospital life in 
his letters, and letters with a negative message may not have made it past the army’s 
censors.  But Webster could certainly have spoken the truth in his journal, which 
contained a detailed account of his stays in recovery hospitals, and offered a generally 
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bright view of convalescent life.  The Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) 
provided free movies for wounded soldiers, and those well enough to move around took 
in occasional baseball games between hospital staffs.115   
Another Iowa trooper, Private L.O. Stewart, discussed hospital conditions in his 
1923 memoir, Rainbow Bright.  Much of Stewart’s account aligned with Webster’s, as 
troopers enjoyed ice cream, chocolate bars, leisure time for writing, and fine cigarettes, 
but the hospitals contained “hopeless cripples, men whose memories would never be the 
same again—the German had left his indelible mark.”116  Certainly, World War I 
hospitals were places of contradiction.  On the one hand, nurses worked intensely to 
make hospital stays comfortable for convalescent troops, but on the other, those soldiers 
suffered from painful and gruesome injuries.  One such trooper had a taste of those “fine 
cigarettes” found in Private Stewart’s book, but he could only smoke them by “means of 
lighting contrivances suspended above his head by ropes” because the man lost both of 
his arms.  He did wear an asbestos bib for his own safety.117  For soldiers such as 
Webster, who were not wounded severely, hospital stays could be comfortable and fairly 
pleasant.  For others, such as the soldiers described by Erich Remarque and L.O Stewart, 
hospitals served as windows into the horrors of modern warfare.   
As September dawned, the guardsmen in the 42nd Division continued to hold their 
positions, but were now part of a much larger American force poised for a massive 
assault.  Indeed, by the middle of the year, General Pershing had his army in place, as 
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well as his chance to put his strategy into action.  As the AEF prepared for a grand 
assault, many guardsmen were already accustomed to life in the trenches.  Ultimately, the 
Rainbow Division’s combat experience reflects the First World War’s broad narrative (at 
least in relation to the Western Front).  Therefore, much of the 42nd Division’s wartime 
account is similar to typical stories found in Remarque’s All Quiet on the Western Front, 
Earnst Junger’s Storm of Steel, and comprehensive war scholarship.118  Ultimately, this is 
an important concept, as the National Guard served as a central piece of the United 
States’ wartime plan, and experienced the same realities as other soldiers on the Western 
Front.  Yet, the Guard’s overall role during the war came in many forms, and soldiers 
shared varied experiences.  
 
Other National Guard combat divisions 
While the Guard troops of the 42nd Division saw extensive combat in Europe, 
much of the National Guard did not share this experience because most guardsmen 
involved in combat operations did not arrive in France until the middle of 1918; yet, 
seven of the eleven divisions poised for an American advance in August were Guard 
divisions.119  Other Guard divisions, such as the 34th Infantry Division did not go directly 
to the front, but did see some combat as reserve organizations.120  These Guard units 
began their mobilization process in the middle of 1917 and reorganized in order to fit into 
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the Army’s divisional structure.  Guardsmen arrived at muster camps, underwent medical 
examinations, and prepared to move to mobilization camps.121  While many Guard 
divisions did eventually advance against enemy troops, their buildup to the war consisted 
of a great deal of military drills and monotony, very similar to border duty a year earlier.   
The monotony of camp life is apparent in the official history of the 126th Field Artillery 
(formerly the First Iowa Field Artillery), who arrived at Fort Logan Root, Arkansas early 
in July 1917 and left for Camp Cody, New Mexico in October 1917, where months on 
end consisted of “usual camp duties.”122  In July 1918, the 126th traveled to Fort Sill, 
Oklahoma for three months, and did not arrive in France until October 18, 1918 where 
they once again “took up usual camp duties.”123   Similarly, Corporal Alfred Bowen of 
the Second Iowa Infantry Regiment (133rd US Infantry Regiment), simply wrote, “Hikes 
and drills” on numerous days in his diary between August 1917 and August 1918 (when 
his company left Camp Cody).124 
Many guardsmen who continued serving after their return to the border—who 
served in these mobilizing units—provided valuable guidance for new recruits.  For 
instance, Rudolph Dubbert who served at the border with the First Iowa Infantry 
Regiment (the 133rd US Infantry Regiment) received a promotion to sergeant and traveled 
to Camp Cody in Deming, New Mexico as part of the 34th Infantry Division.125  Dubbert, 
along with numerous other non-commissioned officers worked with officers to train and 
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give advice to the fresh troops.126 While camp life may have seemed dull to many 
soldiers, these divisions earned valuable experience at the state-side camps.  Much of this 
training centered on military affairs, but sometimes related to more mundane activities.  
One French officer informed soldiers in the 34th Division that “an alcohol stove is the 
best thing a man can have in the trenches,” and he “hoped that every man would go back 
to his command and encourage the men to get them [the stoves] for themselves.”127   
This type of advice and experience became invaluable for soldiers ready to 
deploy.  As the Army rearranged guardsmen to fit their divisional plans and deployment 
tables, they transferred many soldiers to units ready to move to the front lines.  While the 
AEF needed to provide as many troops as possible to the front lines, experience and 
knowledge became indispensable.  Divisional command exempted NCOs such as 
Dubbert from such transfers though.  In June 1918, while still in New Mexico, Dubbert 
remarked that “the boys that leave are pretty lucky and they all know it.  A lot of the 
NCO’s around camp got busted [demoted] just in order to go.”  Commanders apparently 
got wind of this approach and ordered that “no NCO that had just been reduced would 
go,” and “as a result, there are a lot of privates that were sergeants and corporals that are 
now privates and won’t go across anyway.”128  Furthermore, as the majority of the Guard 
prepared to go overseas, political tensions and internal struggles influenced deployment 
timetables.   
As already noted, the War Department worked hard to fit the National Guard into 
a new divisional structure.  As a result of unit mergers and troop transfers, many field 
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grade Guard officers lost their commands and others found themselves in command of 
units outside of their military specialty.  This practice created a sense of resentment 
within the Guard, as it broke down the regional and provincial perspective that was 
historically central to the Guard’s identity.  Soldiers and officers reacted with hostility, 
but their complaints often fell on deaf ears.   The Regular Army officers who oversaw the 
Guard’s transition rarely sympathized with the “amateur soldiers,” and mobilization 
continued.129  In many ways, this reorganization became yet another step in the Guard’s 
overall transformation from the old militia system.  By dividing the Guard regiments to 
fit the Army’s organizational breakdown, the federal government removed any state 
control from the Guard’s mobilization process.     
A series of telegrams and letters between Iowa Governor William Harding and 
U.S. Senator Albert B. Cummins (Iowa), reflected the federal government’s usurpation of 
the Guard’s deployment process.  Governor Harding and Senator Cummins expressed 
anger when the military decided to break up Iowa units stationed at Camp Cody, New 
Mexico.  In order to keep the camp at its strength of 5,500 men, some Iowa guardsmen 
went overseas with other units, while their officers remained in New Mexico to train new 
arrivals.130  This separation of units angered many guardsmen and state authorities 
because the Guard generally resented military policies which broke down local and unit 
connections, which the Guard used as a valuable recruitment tool.131  Sergeant Dubbert 
described to his mother a situation where numerous soldiers had prepared to go overseas, 
but then “the Governors of the various states that are to be broken up here registered a 
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fuss and it was around that the boys wouldn’t leave at all.”132  Eventually the Army went 
ahead with plans to send troops across the Atlantic, despite many governors’ disapproval.   
Organizational distractions also played a role in the Guard’s overall mobilization.  
In October 1917, the 33rd Infantry Division (mostly Illinois guardsmen) and the 32nd 
Infantry Division (Wisconsin and Michigan guardsmen) travelled to Camp Logan and 
Camp MacArthur, Texas respectively.  As the two divisions began preparing for combat 
operations, shakedowns and inspections proved that the Wisconsin and Michigan were at 
a higher state of readiness than the Illinois men (though this was mostly due to the fact 
that the Illinois troops recently received a large contingent of “unfit draftees” who 
transferred over from the National Army).133  Ultimately, the War Department decided to 
postpone the 33rd’s deployment and forced the Illinois units to provide their ordinance 
and various wartime supplies to the 32nd Division.  Not surprisingly, the Illinois officers 
objected to this transfer, but to no avail.  The first soldiers from the 32nd Division left 
Texas for New Jersey in early January 1918, and began arriving in England and France 
throughout January and February.  By May 1918, the 32nd Division had moved to the 
front lines and had begun combat operations.134  Conversely, the loss of ordinance and 
training needs delayed the 33rd’s deployment.  The Illinoisans did not begin arriving in 
France until April 1918, and did not begin combat operations until July.135   
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These examples demonstrate the ongoing tension between the Regular Army and 
the National Guard, one that dated back to the nineteenth century, as well as demands for 
quick and efficient mobilization protocols.  However, the Guard struggled to establish 
political control over the Regular Army, particularly due to earlier disagreements over the 
Guard’s role in the American military structure.  Eventually, the sheer volume of 
complaints prompted Secretary Baker to advise Army officers commanding Guard 
Divisions to make every possible effort to preserve Guard identity.  Army Chief of Staff 
Tasker Bliss directed the War College Division to prepare public statements regarding the 
reorganization as a means of swaying public opinion and assuaging some Guard 
dissatisfaction, but his efforts did not fully succeed in changing the minds of soldiers who 
recently witnessed their beloved regiments and companies either merged or disbanded 
altogether.136  Again, despite Guard complaints, the mobilization continued.  As outlined 
in the previous chapters, many prominent regular officers and politicians hoped the 
Guard would serve as little more than a reserve force for the Regular Army, and a 1919 
report noted that the National Guard “fulfilled, during the Worlds War, the expectations 
that it would accomplish what was claimed for it, i.e. that with the Regular Army it 
would furnish sufficient first line troops to successfully engage the enemy until any larger 
force necessary could be reached and trained.”137  However, the Guard’s official role 
under the NDA’s structure was to serve as an integral piece of the American military 
system, and many guardsmen resented their perceived role as second class soldiers 
behind the Regular Army. 
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Other social elements and stresses were also on display in the mobilization camps.  
Near the end of May 1918, Sergeant Dubbert snuck a detailed letter through the Army’s 
censors by having his wife (who was serving as a laundress in his camp) address and mail 
his letter.  Dubbert discussed a few mobilization details but also described how draftees 
from Colorado, Nebraska, Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico all arrived in camp at once, 
and “the boys out at the Contact Camp are having their hands full trying to handle them.”  
Further complicating the issue were “a bunch of I.W.W.s [International Workers of the 
World members] in the draft,” who authorities “junked” into a single company.  Dubbert 
noted that their company commander was a “hardboiled” captain, “but that won’t be 
enough.”138  Ultimately, Dubbert’s opinions reflected long-lasting social tensions 
between the National Guard and organized labor.  These tensions did not easily dissuade, 
and they remained prevalent during the First World War, and guardsmen remained 
entangled in the ongoing struggle.  Though the Guard and organized labor came to a truce 
during the war, personal animosity did not simply vanish. 
Regardless of mobilization tensions, many of these guardsmen eventually 
travelled overseas.  While some divisions like the 32nd travelled to France much earlier 
than others, all of these divisions experienced similar conditions to their counterparts in 
the 42nd Division, the Regular Army, and draftees in the National Army.139  As noted 
earlier, Private Harry Lehnhardt recounted numerous days of seasickness while he 
journeyed across the Atlantic, and when the soldiers arrived, they enjoyed a brief layover 
in England before travelling to their stations in France.  August Smidt of the 34th Infantry 
Division (who also suffered from days of seasickness), remarked in a letter to his 
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girlfriend, Agnes, that his stay was in a “very good place, also good mess, but I think we 
will be leaving here before very long, but this is sure a beautiful country.”140  Indeed, 
Smidt was correct in assuming their stay in England would be brief, and shortly after the 
move to France, he wrote a letter telling Agnes that he found it difficult to write home 
because he was “constantly on the move,” and confirmed that he found it difficult to sit 
down for long enough to pen a letter, though he did finish his letter by ensuring her that 
he lost a bit of weight and in fact, grew a mustache.141   
During this mobilization process some officers dismissed the Guard’s 
performance, but Pershing generally praised the Guard as well as the rest of his field 
army that manned the American lines prior to the AEF’s concentrated assault.  On 28 
August, General Pershing commended the Army’s actions, and by that point, four 
National Guard divisions saw some action against the Germans.  Pershing said, “It fills 
me with pride to record in General Orders tribute to the service and achievements of the 
First and Third Corps, comprising the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 26th, 28th, 32nd, and 42nd Divisions 
of the American Expeditionary Forces.”  Pershing went on to discuss how on 15 July 
1918, the “most formidable army in the world [the Germans], with four years’ experience 
attacked the allied line,” and “three days later, in conjunction with our allies, you [the 
American forces] counter-attacked.  The allied armies gained a brilliant victory that 
marks the turning point of the war.”142  By the time of the general’s declaration though, 
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most of the AEF had arrived in France, allowing General Pershing to finally implement 
his Open Warfare strategy.143   
Pershing’s overall concept called for numerous medium and large scale advances 
across open ground with heavy artillery support.  Rather than simply moving between 
trenches, the Americans hoped to abandon the trench and move swiftly into and through 
enemy territory.  Pershing utilized a simple concept when he devised his campaign 
objectives.  Rather than bleeding the enemy through attrition, the American plan called 
for a grand attack at an isolated position intended to overwhelm German forces and bring 
the war to a quick end, and the general believed that the American soldier’s natural 
abilities as a marksman and bayonet fighter would shock the German army and force both 
sides out of the trenches.144  This concept was directly related to Pershing’s post-Civil 
War education at West Point, which taught the successes of Generals Ulysses Grant and 
William Sherman, combined with a general disdain for defensive tactics.  Pershing held 
to the notion that a mass, concentrated attack of fresh American troops would breach the 
German positions and deliver a final knock-out blow.145 
Pershing’s strategy offered some opportunity, but certainly had some 
disadvantages.  Francis Webster declared, “The open warfare is much more exciting, but 
there are many advantages to being in the trenches.  It is hard to get food and water up to 
the front lines in open fighting, and the men have less protection.”146  Indeed, the lack of 
protection and limitations of artillery ranges were the factors that led European 
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commanders to abandon similar tactics much earlier in the war.147  However, while the 
trench provided protection and a stable source of supplies, Webster believed “if we 
stayed in the ditch the war might last for twenty years longer without decisive result.”148  
While the American soldiers believed in Pershing’s plan, the results were indecisive.  The 
doctrine of open warfare proved effective when hardened regular troops advanced against 
smaller armies across open plains, but it was less successful against well entrenched 
German veterans.149  Despite heavy American losses during the Meuse-Argonne 
Offensive, Pershing continued his strategy.  Francis Webster noted that he was always on 
the move, and he spent his nights in a pup tent with one other soldier, rather than in a 
trench.150  Once again, the Guard’s actions closely aligned with the overall experience of 
the rest of the American army, and this reality was reflected in guardsmen’s letters and 
journals.   
For the men behind the line, discipline seemed to be a slight problem though.  On 
29 August 1918, Major Arthur L. Hart issued a memorandum to the 33rd Infantry 
Division officers that outlined codes of conduct for soldiers “in order to minimize arrests, 
and to avoid controversies with military police.”  These codes included all warrant 
officers, non-commissioned officers, and men to be in their billets by 9:30 nightly, and 
that only officers could use lights more than one hour after sunset for official business, 
only if “a light is necessary and if completely shaded from outside observation.”  
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Additionally, only officers on official business could leave the division area.151  The 
headquarters company of the 131st Infantry Regiment (Illinois Guard) in the 33rd Division 
issued special instructions to the division’s soldiers stating, “The practice of men washing 
themselves at the horses watering troughs must be stopped at once as this practice leads 
to disease among the horses.”152  Despite some discipline issues, when Guard divisions 
arrived in France, they took up positions along the front and prepared for an all-out 
assault.   
On 30 May 1918, the 33rd Division began traveling from town to town and station 
to station until the end of August when they took up positions in the reserve trenches in 
Jacques, France.  And even though the division was not in the front lines in their first few 
months in France, there were constant hazards.  First Sergeant Johannes Sigfrid 
Anderson, a Finnish immigrant of the 132nd US Infantry Regiment (formerly the Second 
Illinois), wrote on 27 July 1918 (the same day the 42nd Division prepped for an advance 
against German lines) that there was “rain and mud up to our ankles,” and “he [the 
German army] is sending us Trench mortars a plenty to day and a few shells.”153  
Eventually, the 131st  moved to the front lines, and throughout the end of September 
through early October, the unit advanced as part of General Pershing’s main operation 
and ended up in Hannonville, France at the Armistice.154  Like the rest of the AEF’s 
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combat divisions, the 33rd and other National Guard divisions saw extensive action 
during the American offensive.  Johannes Anderson’s regiment participated in the Bois 
de Forges attack on 26 September, and charged the German lines along with the 
Seventeenth French Army Corps at Bois de Craume throughout October.155  During this 
assault, on 8 October, while First Sergeant Anderson’s company was held down by 
intense machine gun fire, Anderson left his position alone and moved to the rear of the 
German machine gun nest.  From his new position, Anderson captured the gun position 
and brought back twenty three prisoners.  Congress awarded First Sergeant Anderson the 
Medal of Honor for his actions.156   
In the waning months of the war, Iowa Captain Lloyd Ross, who had also served 
in the Philippine Theater as a corporal with the 51st Iowa and along the border, wrote an 
informative letter home.  Ross wrote, “Everything looks favorable over here we are 
driving the Huns back every day.  And taking all kinds of prisoners, guns, and 
ammunition.  Bulgaria has laid down her arms and it is rumored that Austria has done the 
same.”  Captain Ross went on to describe how ashamed of himself he was because he did 
not write home more often, but somewhat justified his actions by saying he was “fairly 
busy driving the Dutch back,” and that “in fact, I believe I am about the busiest man in 
the army.”157  While Ross was probably not the busiest man in the army, he had gained a 
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high level of recognition earlier in the war, when he led his company “over the top,” and 
captured a German position as well as fifty prisoners.158   
Ross’s belief that the end was near came to fruition, but wartime hazards still took 
their toll even as the war drew to a close.  One potentially disastrous incident involved 
the 42nd Division during the final days of the war.  When General Pershing decided the 
US Army would capture Sedan from the Germans, he ignored Ferdinand Foch’s 
boundary that firmly placed Sedan within the French Fourth Army’s zone.  Pershing 
directed the I Corps, spearheaded by the 42nd Division, to make the main thrust, “assisted 
on their right by the V Corps.”  But Pershing’s order was so vague that the V Corps’ 
commander marched the Regular Army’s 1st Division across the front of the 42nd so they 
might reach their objective first.  This caused a great deal of confusion, and the 1st 
Division actually captured Brigadier General Douglas MacArthur, after they confused 
him for a German.  Somehow, the two divisions avoided shooting each other to pieces.159   
On 11 November 1918, the warring sides signed the Armistice that ended the 
fighting.  Celebrations ensued for soldiers and civilians alike.  Cecil Clark, not 
surprisingly, made a special note of the Armistice in his diary, and described elation 
within the ranks.160  August Smidt’s girlfriend penned an open letter one day after the 
armistice where she declared, “War is Over, lover! I mean until you get home, but there 
won’t be any fighting or anything like that, it will be a different kind of war, it will be a 
‘loving war,’ Sweetheart.”  She went on to say that “Waterloo [Iowa] certainly done 
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some celebrating” when news broke of the war’s end.161  Unfortunately, thousands of 
other soldiers, such as Francis Webster, did not live to see the end of the war.  A piece of 
shrapnel struck Webster in the chest while his machine gun team set up their position on 
a small hill with a good line-of-sight in order to provide cover for the infantry during the 
Meuse-Argonne Offensive, and German artillery spotted the Americans, and began 
shelling their position.  Webster’s friend, Private U.M. Kelso, Jr., remembered “we had 
been there but a short time when the German artillery located us, and harassed the hill 
with their fire.  We immediately went out of action and jumped into any little hole for a 
little protection.”162  As any good non-commissioned officer would do, Corporal Webster 
refused to take cover until all his men were dug in, and that delay cost him his life. 
When the war ended, military authorities naturally reviewed each division’s 
combat performance.  While the National Guard generally performed well in combat, 
some divisions did not fare so well.  As mentioned earlier, the 35th Infantry Division 
completely fell apart during the American’s final push of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive.  
Shortly after the armistice, one of the 35th’s colonels, Carl Ristine, outlined a series of 
problems that influenced his divisions collapse.  Again, demonstrating a high level of 
tactical, strategical, and political understanding, Colonel Ristine blamed training 
regimens, poor officer schooling, attack orders, operational security, poor operations 
against machine guns, daytime operations, too frequent movement, ammunition 
rationing, and retreats for his division’s failures.163  Throughout the war, these issues 
certainly plagued the National Guard and limited their combat effectiveness, but these 
issues were not limited to the Guard.  While the colonel was speaking of his own 
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division, his analysis could also be applied to other failures of the AEF as a whole, and 
not specific to the National Guard, again making the Guard representative of the whole, 
not on the periphery.  
 
Home guards 
Regardless of the Guard’s successes or failures, the war left individual states 
without a military force.  And while a truce existed between organized labor and the US 
government for the sake of national unity, state governments remained uneasy.  As a 
means of maintaining order in the potential event of unrest, states created “home guards” 
or public safety departments which carried out the Guard’s traditional role at home.164  
One historian, Barry Stentiford, noted that these state militia forces “remained outside of 
the National Guard, yet at the same time their history has been intimately intertwined 
with that of the National Guard.”165  For example, Iowa created one regiment of infantry 
for state duty, which carried out the Guard’s pre-war role related to labor strikes, riot 
duty, and disaster recovery efforts.166  But the wartime shortage of supplies plagued even 
this temporary unit.  In July 1918, a company from Sioux City, Iowa aided in disaster 
relief after the collapse of the Oscar Ruff Building, even though the government had not 
yet supplied rifles to the men.  Locals worried that the lack of supplies might limit the 
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home guard’s ability to maintain order, especially during the fall, when a large “floating 
population” passed through Sioux City to harvest the fields.167   
Similarly, due to the lack of a potential home defense force, the Illinois Volunteer 
Training Corps, part of the new State Council of Defense, sent out a circular letter calling 
on at least 80 men to volunteer for companies, prior to officer selection.  The State 
Council of Defense further hoped these units would reach a strength of 100 men.168  
Eventually some of these Volunteer Training Corps units became part of the Illinois 
Reserve Militia, which fell under the control of the Adjutant General instead of the State 
Council of Defense.169  But, seemingly, raising volunteers was not the only issue related 
to the Guard’s overseas deployment.  In September 1917, Angus S. Hubbard wrote to 
Illinois’s acting governor Richard Oglesby regarding an ordinance request he made to 
John H. Winterbotham at the National Council of Defense.  He declared, “In speaking of 
the prevailing shortage of rifles, he [Winterbotham] stated that he had been told the 
Canadian government had on hand a large number of arms which were not now used 
abroad, and it was believed if applied for by the United States Government for us of 
training home guards they would be furnished.”170  Oglesby replied a day later and said 
that this was a matter for the US government to settle, not the Illinois Council of Defense, 
but would be “glad if Mr. Winterbotham could prevail upon the Government to get guns 
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from the Canadian Government for the Home Defense Guards.”171  Indeed, these home 
guard’s served a valuable purpose in the National Guard’s absence, but certainly suffered 
from wartime shortages, and the lack of federal support. 
Furthermore, these home guard units added to the general confusion about the 
National Guard’s role during wartime.  During the First World War many citizens 
witnessed these “guard” units in action as they provided security to valuable state 
installations, and responded during natural disasters and strikes.  Therefore, people 
associated this wartime service with the National Guard, and many families spoke of their 
deployed relatives as serving with the “Army,” not the “Guard.”  New York’s adjutant 
general summed up this concept when he described the “New York Guard’s” role.  
General Charles Berry stated, “This force [the New York Guard] took the place of the 
New York National Guard which was drafted into the service of the United States on 
August 5, 1917, and thereby discharged from the militia.”  The adjutant general went on 
to describe how “It was necessarily composed, however, largely of men who were not 
eligible for active service.”172  Ultimately, many former guardsmen who were either too 
old or medically unfit for service enlisted in these state defense forces making the 
association between the two organizations indistinguishable to many citizens.  Therefore, 
despite years of Congressional reorganization and Guard solidification, many Americans 
believed the National Guard was a home defense force rather than a part of the federal 
military structure.173  Indeed, this was not the case, and the National Guard served as a 
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complement to the Regular Army since the organization’s official creation at the turn of 
the twentieth-century.   
*** 
The service of the National Guard during World War I came in many forms.  
Some guardsmen spent nearly ten months in the front lines as part of the Rainbow 
Division, while others spent most of the war drilling on the home front before advancing 
against the Germans during the Meuse-Argonne Offensive.  Still others filled important 
support roles both at home and in rear positions behind the main lines.  Furthermore, 
some men served in home guard units while the National Guard remained in federal 
service.  Despite these variances, though, the Guard played an important role in the war 
effort as a whole, as each piece of the Guard aided in the Army’s mission execution.  
Many guardsmen such as Moses Thisted, Irving McCann, and Cecil Clark, put skills 
learned at the border to good use in the trenches, and veterans of the Spanish-American 
War, such as Mathew Tinley and Lloyd Ross, drew on over two decades of experience 
when they commanded guardsmen on the front lines.  Young men like Francis Webster 
and Everett Wright who enlisted after Wilson’s declaration of war, found themselves 
alongside Guard veterans on the front lines.  Other border veterans like Rudolph Dubbert 
and Finnish immigrant, Johannes Anderson, trained raw recruits such as Alfred Bowen at 
home stations before going “over there.”  Indeed, such service variety reflected the 
complex nature of the pre-, intra-, and post-war Guard, and mirrored the complexities of 
the larger American experience. 
The Guard’s deployment during the First World War served as the culmination of 
a series of organizational transformations that began with the Militia Act of 1903, and 
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over the next decade, the United States government repeatedly reassessed the Guard’s 
potential.  The National Defense Act of 1916 completely altered the existing American 
military structure World War I and tensions between the United States and Mexico.  
Throughout this period, American political leaders and National Guard advocates 
actively sought to reform the existing National Guard into a more effective fighting force, 
but the National Defense Act essentially severed many of the National Guard’s state ties 
and regional identities.  When the National Guard mobilized for war in 1917, a new 
divisional structure forced the Guard to reorganize to meet new federal guidelines.  Under 
this structure, some officers lost their commands, soldiers and officers needed to learn 
new specialties, and the War Department merged or divided existing units.  Many 
“orphaned” regiments, batteries, and companies found themselves in the Rainbow 
Division, which was among the first American divisions to arrive in France.  Other 
guardsmen from around the nation found themselves in regionally-oriented divisions at 
various levels of readiness.  These units (which often contained large amounts of raw 
recruits) trained at American camps until government officials deemed them ready to join 
the American Expeditionary Force, and when General Pershing launched his massive 
offensive in 1918, the National Guard comprised nearly two-thirds of his force. 
During the war, the National Guard generally met or exceeded expectations.  
Many Regular Army officers held long-standing prejudices regarding the Guard’s civilian 
soldiers, and doubted their abilities.  Numerous Guard divisions performed on par with 
the Regular Army, and the Guard generally earned praise from many high ranking 
officers such as Pershing and MacArthur.  However, the Guard’s role in the Great War 
became the new organization’s first military test under the new military structure.  The 
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National Guard that fought in the trenches fell completely under the War Department’s 
control, and state governments had very little say in how or where their soldiers served.  
Although the peace-time Guard returned to state authority, the National Defense Act 
ensured that any wartime mobilization would occur without state sanction.  Indeed, the 
Guard’s performance during the First World War demonstrated the organization’s ability 
not only to provide a valuable reserve force, but also to supplement the Regular Army on 
the front lines adequately. 
Importantly, the Guard’s wartime service came at a time when the Guard’s long-
term role remained in doubt.  The National Defense Act of 1916 had solidified the 
organization’s place in the American military system, but discharge issues and legal 
oversights again threatened the Guard’s survival after the war.  Additionally, while the 
majority of the Guard performed as well as their Regular Army counterparts, some Guard 
units like the 35th Infantry Division collapsed during combat operations, prompting a few 
civilian officials to once again call for Guard replacement proposals.  As the next chapter 
will demonstrate, the overall success of the National Guard during the war led many 
prominent military officers and politicians to double-down on their organizational 
support, and the United States Congress again took steps to refine the Guard’s role in the 
twentieth-century American military structure.  Perhaps more importantly, though, the 
Guard’s ongoing connection to civilian society ensured that the organization would 
continue to represent a cross-section of the American populace.  Furthermore, social 
values and attitudes would continue to shape the Guard’s development in the immediate 
years following the First World War.  And once again, the Midwestern Guard units 
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served as a window into the Guard’s larger contributions to the war effort, and indeed to 
the Guard’s larger role as an indicator of American society.
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CHAPTER 6 – THE GUARD AFTER THE WAR 
As the First World War drew to a close, the United States entered a year of 
upheaval.  The Spanish Flu decimated communities across the nation, race tensions were 
heightened (especially in Northern cities and urban areas), and Americans feared the 
possibility of a socialist uprising amidst organized labor’s renewed ongoing push for 
increased workplace regulations.1  In August 1919, various unions within the newly 
formed International Association of Machinists, Local 314 out of Waterloo, Iowa had 
been on strike for a week when Agnes Brennan wrote to her boyfriend, August Smidt 
(who was still in France), that “All the large shape and some of the small men are out on 
strike.  [I] think it is only a question of time till they all go out.”2  The Waterloo strikes 
were part of a larger trend in the United States throughout 1919 where workers (who 
entered an informal truce with the federal government during the war) took to the streets 
to secure higher wages, safer working conditions, an eight-hour workday, and collective 
bargaining rights.3  Unlike in the previous decades though, the majority of Iowa’s 
National Guard remained in France with the 34th Infantry Division, and the state held 
only one full infantry regiment (organized during the war as a federally-recognized home 
guard regiment) at their disposal in 1919.  While many states across the nation responded 
to increased tension by using the National Guard to restore order, the organization faced a 
new challenge when the Army’s judge advocate general, Enoch Crowder, ruled that 
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guardsmen became exempt from all military obligations—including state ones—when 
they returned from France. 
The First World War was over, but some battles were just beginning for the 
National Guard.  In 1919, General Pershing faced a congressional committee who 
questioned him about the United States’ actions in France during the war as well as the 
best approach to strengthen the American military going forward.  Some Members of 
Congress pressed Pershing to denounce the National Guard as the weak link in America’s 
force structure in the hopes that they could finally replace the Guard with the alternate 
forces they supported.  These Guard opponents hoped that failures such as the 35th 
Division’s collapse during the Meuse-Argonne Offensive would be enough to force 
Pershing and other top commanders to admit that the National Guard failed to support the 
Regular Army adequately.  However, these congressmen were greatly disappointed.  
Instead of denouncing the Guard, Pershing praised the Guard’s abilities not only to 
support the Regular Army but also as a stand-alone force.  Pershing even declared that 
the National Guard never received full support from the federal government during the 
war, and that some of the Guard’s failures in combat related to the lack of federal support 
at home.4  Other officers who worked closely with the Guard (such as Douglas 
MacArthur who served as a staff officer with the Rainbow Division) provided similar 
reports.5   
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Following these testimonies, Guard supporters in Congress managed to press for 
amendments to the National Defense Act of 1916 that would “remedy certain defects 
which four years of operation under the said national defense act had developed.”6  
Though the National Guard performed their duties throughout the First World War, a 
series of unforeseen circumstances related to mass discharges threatened the ongoing 
survival of the organization.  Enoch Crowder—a longtime Guard opponent—declared 
that all guardsmen who earned a discharge from the federal army were subsequently 
discharged from all other military obligations.  This ruling left the National Guard in 
shambles, and Congress again faced the question of how to retain state forces.  However, 
unlike in previous decades, some states opposed the reorganization of the National Guard 
in light of increased federal oversight.  Many state governments believed the federal 
government usurped power related to the National Guard with the National Defense Act 
of 1916, and hoped to increase their own authority over their state forces—particularly 
the home guard units which more closely resembled the old militia than the new National 
Guard.  And, just as prior to the war, Guard opponents renewed their efforts to replace 
the Guard with either some form of universal military training (UMT) or remove the 
organization altogether.   
However, a group of senators led by J.W. Wadsworth and George Chamberlain, 
and a group of representatives led by Julius Kahn and John McKenzie continued to 
support the Guard and proposed a series of laws to solidify the Guard’s place in the 
military system.  While these proposed laws ultimately failed, these Guard advocates 
worked with the Militia Bureau and the National Guard Association (NGA) to amend the 
existing National Defense Act in 1920 as a means of strengthening the Guard and 
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solidifying many military protocols.  Not surprisingly, just as in 1916, many of these 
reforms took place amidst larger military reorganization.  Congress simultaneously 
reexamined the Army’s force structure and the Navy’s fleet size.  In 1919 the Wilson 
Administration proposed expanding the US Navy to meet new international demands, 
because, as one scholar noted, “by 1919 we [the US] had become a part of the world 
system of military rivalry.”7  Ultimately, the naval expansion plan never came to fruition, 
but the National Defense Act’s 1920 amendments effectively outlined the Army’s force 
structure—which included the National Guard.  General Henry Reilly eventually 
described the National Defense Act of 1920 as “the first military policy the United States 
has ever had.”8   Indeed, though the Guard entered into a renewed struggle to rebuild its 
manpower, their actions at the border and in France convinced enough congressional 
leaders and military officials to support strengthening the Guard’s position in the 
American military.  Ultimately, the Guard’s nature as a Progressive Era political and 
military organization—focused on centralization and efficiency—combined with its 
military successes during the First World War led to its long-term survival and continued 
inclusion in the American military system.  
The National Defense Act of 1916 and the ensuing border service allowed the 
National Guard to carry out its mission in the Great War under a highly centralized 
structure.  Unlike in previous conflicts, state governments maintained very little control 
over how the federal government utilized their forces.  By 1917, the National Guard had 
become a centralized military force with established protocols for promotion and federal 
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8 Brigadier General Henry J. Reilly, Americans All: The Rainbow at War, Official History of the 42nd Rainbow 
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allocations.  American progressives reoriented the National Guard in the same ways that 
they oriented American businesses and professional organizations around concepts of 
scientific management and expert rule.  Jerry Cooper points out in The Rise of the 
National Guard, that by 1920, state soldiers could no longer use political connections or 
their state’s manpower contributions to win general officer commissions, and volunteers 
recruited by the states would no longer form the wartime army.  Cooper also notes that 
the National Guard would no longer provide the skeleton of an expansible army, as it had 
in 1898.9  Ultimately, Cooper’s assessment of the National Guard’s development as a 
truly nationalized force outlines the Guard’s general trend following the Civil War, and 
his brief discussion of the National Defense Act of 1920 notes that the new legislation 
strengthened the National Guard.10  However, Cooper’s overall description of the 
National Guard’s growth avoids placing the National Guard within the Progressive Era’s 
societal framework.  By overlooking the Progressive Era’s centrality in the Guard’s 
evolution from a state-centric force to a federally-sanctioned one, Cooper and other 
Guard historians have kept the National Guard in its own military realm.   
By placing the Guard’s development within a larger political and social context, 
the organization’s importance as a lens through which to view American society during 
the Gilded Age and Progressive Era becomes apparent.  As noted earlier, the Guard’s 
growth illustrated the emerging class consciousness among the new middle-class, and 
political leaders used the Guard’s performance during the First World War as justification 
for solidifying the organization within the US Army’s force structure.  The War 
Department reorganized the National Guard to fit a new divisional structure based on 
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University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 172. 
10 Cooper, Rise, 173-4. 
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overall needs rather than regional identity or affiliation, and these provisions reshaped the 
National Guard into a hybrid of the old militia and a federally-structured reserve force.  
Some states responded to this new reality with hostility and animosity, and campaigned 
for increased local control.  By 1920, just as the Republican presidential nominee called 
for a “return to normalcy,” Congress assessed whether the National Guard would also 
return to an earlier version of itself.  Ultimately, the opposite occurred, and the federal 
government kept the National Guard on its general trajectory toward heightened 
centralized authority.  However, before guardsmen would face these possibilities, they 
needed to return home.  As the First World War came to a close, many National Guard 
units remained in France through the first few months of 1919 alongside their Regular 
Army counterparts. 
*** 
The Guard returns home 
 When the war ended in November 1918, American soldiers returned to civilian 
life rapidly.  By the end of January 1919, the Army issued discharges to over 818,500 
men of its wartime strength of over 3.7 million, and by the end of June 1919, more than 
2.7 million soldiers received their discharge papers (along with a $60 bonus, a coat, a 
uniform, and a pair of shoes).  Any soldier who served overseas could also retain a 
helmet and a gas mask as wartime mementos.11  However, demobilization took place in 
piecemeal fashion, and many combat veterans of the Regular Army, National Guard, and 
National Army remained overseas throughout the first eight months of 1919.  Many 
guardsmen remained with their divisions, much to the dismay of both officers and men.  
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Although the Army began sending soldiers home at an average of 300,000 per month in 
1919, the process was slow, and some Guard units such as the 33rd Infantry Division 
(Illinois National Guard) remained in France in some capacity until June 1919.  Much of 
their duties ultimately resembled those of regular camp life.12  As soldiers found 
themselves in occupation zones with little to do, discipline and morale began to break 
down.    One private, Harry Lehnhardt, fell into some trouble when the military police 
arrested him for selling cigarettes to French citizens and soldiers.  Lehnhardt received 
three months of hard labor and half pay for defrauding the US government, but did 
receive an honorable discharge in August 1919.13   
Soldiers such as Rudolph Dubbert responded to the monotony of their post-war 
role with hostility.  After hearing a series of rumors regarding a potential conflict with the 
new Soviet Union, and the possibility of some divisions responding to trouble, Dubbert 
wrote, “I’m rarin [sic] to get home, we’ll let someone else do the volunteering from now 
on.”14  While these rumors never came to pass, American soldiers found themselves 
without a mission.  The Army instituted a drilling policy to keep the soldiers busy, but the 
image of American veterans marching up and down muddy roads with little motivation, 
and firing at imaginary targets across deserted battlefields did little to improve morale.  
Eventually, the Army set up a series of athletic competitions and schools, but the troops 
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simply wanted to go home.15  August Smidt lamented to his girlfriend in Iowa that “You 
seem to be banking on my early return according to the papers, but I know nothing 
definite about this now.  So don’t be too sure, it may be a long time yet.”16   
In an effort to keep the soldiers busy and out of trouble, the Army instituted a 
drilling program for each unit, and guardsmen continued moving from station to station, 
trained with their weapons, and practiced drill and ceremony.  Rudolph Dubbert spent the 
first few days of January trying to collect his mail because the post office struggled to 
keep up with constant troop movements amidst the abundance of Christmas and New 
Year’s letters and packages.17  While the mail issue created some anxiety, the guardsmen 
also experienced a level of hostility to continued overseas service after the war’s end.  
Dubbert applied for a transfer back to the US, but his division command rejected his 
application.  Frustrated, Dubbert complained to his parents, “How they expect to keep us 
here and get any service out of us the way we are getting treated is more than I know.”  
Morale in Dubbert’s regiment continued declining and some tension developed between 
the soldiers and officers, especially after one well-liked sergeant earned a demotion for 
“busting a corporal in the jaw.”  Dubbert’s frustrations grew to such a level that he hoped 
he would meet some of his officers after he got out of the army and was not bound by 
military conventions, and he remarked that “we all are dissatisfied” with the current 
situation.18  
 Soldier animosity grew to such proportions that some began losing faith in their 
commander.  Iowa guardsmen Francis Webster had once declared that “we all think that 
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without doubt Pershing will be the next president,” that sentiment waned in light of 
continued service.19  In February 1919, Rudolph Dubbert reported to his parents that “if 
you want to know who the next president will be look up Leonard Wood’s history and 
you’ll find the man that outsells even [William Jennings] Bryan.  He’s the best bet.”  
Conversely, Dubbert claimed that “If anyone around there thinks Pershing is going to be 
the bird [sic], just remind them that there are over 1,500,000 AEF votes to be cast against 
him.”20  While Dubbert’s prediction regarding Leonard Wood did not come true, his 
sentiments demonstrated a heightened tension growing within the AEF’s ranks.  And 
while the Army hoped to limit boredom and monotony, the everyday routine continued, 
and Sergent Dubbert remarked “Things have been going about the same except there is 
less work to do so I have to invent ways to kill time.”21  Eventually though, the soldiers 
returned home.    
The 1st Infantry Division, who were the first to arrive in France, became the last 
American combat division to embark for the United States in late August 1919.  John J. 
Pershing followed shortly after and left France on 1 September 1919.22  Oftentimes, their 
voyages mirrored their journeys during the previous year, but with a very different 
destination.  Alfred Bowen recounted three days of sea sickness during his return to the 
United States while onboard the U.S.S. Santa Clara.23  Of course, Bowen’s elation soon 
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replaced Bowen’s health issues, as he receive hid discharge on 14 May 1919, and simply 
wrote “Finni Le Guerre!” in his memorandum booklet.24   
 While the AEF’s wartime role officially came to an end, the National Guard faced 
a series of new challenges, as troopers readjusted to civilian life and the organization 
entered a new struggle for its long-term survival.  Not surprisingly, guardsmen hoped to 
return to their pre-war professions and continue on their career trajectories when they 
returned to their civilian lives.  Guardsmen such as Moses Thisted, Lloyd Ross, Mathew 
Tinley, Frank O. Lowden, and Rudolph Dubbert shared a middle-class identity, and their 
post-war careers continued to reflect the middle-class’s professional orientation.  Thisted, 
Ross, and Tinley became prominent figures in both their social and military professions.  
Lowden left the National Guard, but eventually won election as Governor of Illinois.  
Dubbert never achieved the personal or political success of the others, but his life too, 
paralleled broader societal trends.  These men’s personal lives demonstrated how the 
National Guard closely mirrored civilian attitudes, and illustrated the emerging class 
consciousness among the new middle-class. 
Moses Thisted had taught high school while he served on the Mexican border and 
in France, and he continued his education after he returned home.  Thisted married in 
1924 and moved to Indiana where he worked as a university professor.25  By 1940, 
Thisted, his wife, and his daughter had relocated to Macomb, Illinois, where he served as 
a dean at Western Illinois State Teachers College (currently Western Illinois 
University).26  Thisted continued to embody the middle-class professionalization that 
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dominated the National Guard’s officer composition prior to and after the First World 
War.  Unlike many of his fellow soldiers though, Thisted remained in the military for 
many years, and retired from the Army National Guard in 1956 as a lieutenant colonel.27  
Eventually, Thisted relocated to California and continued to maintain a strong connection 
to his National Guard roots, as he served as the Historian for Mexican Border Veterans, 
Incorporated until his death in 1984.28 
 Similarly, Captain Lloyd Ross remained in the National Guard after he returned 
home from serving with the 168th Infantry Regiment in France, and he continued to serve 
as a link between the professional military and civilian realms.  After receiving the 
Distinguished Service Cross for displaying “notable gallantry in leading a command of 
untried men in company with French troops in a successful raid on enemy trenches,” 
Ross rose in the Guard’s ranks.29  When the Iowa National Guard reorganized to conform 
to the National Defense Act of 1920 (discussed later in the chapter), Ross earned a 
promotion to lieutenant-colonel, and became the second-in-command of the Iowa’s 
infantry regiment.  Additionally, Iowa’s adjutant general placed Ross in command of his 
state’s new officer training school at Camp Dodge.30  By 1920, Ross served as Iowa’s 
Assistant Secretary of State, and eventually reached the rank of brigadier general in the 
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Iowa National Guard.31  Prior to the war, Ross had worked as a mail carrier and had then 
been a partner in a meat packing business in Red Oak, Iowa; however, his father worked 
as a farmer.32  Therefore, Ross came from a fairly typical background, but by the time the 
United States entered the First World War, Ross established himself as a middle-class 
professional and remained in this status after the war.  And, like other prominent Guard 
officers, Ross entered the political sphere and bridged the gap between the military and 
civilian worlds.   
 Frank Orren Lowden was another former militia and guard officer who grew from 
obscurity to prominence in the years following the First World War.  Lowden spent his 
childhood in rural Iowa where he lived in general poverty and only attended school when 
he could put aside duties on his family’s farm.  However, by 1876, at only fifteen years of 
age, he managed to garner enough knowledge to teach at a small school in Hubbard, Iowa 
and he saved enough money to attend the University of Iowa, where he graduated in 
1881.  Lowden continued his education and eventually earned a law degree from 
Northwestern University and became a prominent member of Chicago’s social elite by 
the turn of the twentieth century.  And though Lowden did not serve during the First 
World War, he did briefly hold a commission as a lieutenant colonel with the First 
Illinois Infantry Regiment between 1898 and 1903, and Irving Goff McCann made 
special note of Lowden’s brief service with the Illinois National Guard (militia) in his 
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border service memoir.33  Eventually, Lowden won the 1916 Illinois gubernatorial 
election and remained in office until 1921.  And though never successfully, Lowden ran 
for the Republican presidential nomination twice, in 1920 and 1928.  While Lowden’s 
service in the militia and National Guard was brief (and he did not serve in the Guard 
after its official creation), he too represented the intersection the Guard played between 
civil government and military affairs, and he oversaw the implementation of state soldiers 
in his state’s highest office.  On one occasion, Lowden refused to use troops to suppress a 
1919 steel workers strike.34  Indeed, Lowden was another example of Progressive Era 
political leaders who had close ties to the state militia and National Guard, and who 
directly influenced both military and civic affairs at either the state or federal level, both 
prior to and after the First World War. 
 Similarly, Mathew A. Tinley embodied the Guard’s Progressive nature and 
became a highly influential member of society [figure 5].  Tinley was born in Council 
Bluffs, Iowa in 1876 to an Irish immigrant family on a small farm, and each of his four 
brothers and three sisters achieved success in their adult lives.  His eldest brother became 
a bank president, and two of his other brothers became successful lawyers, and Emmett 
Tinley became president of the Iowa Bar Association.  Tinley’s youngest sister became a 
local teacher, and another sister became a nurse and married a member of the New York 
Stock Exchange.  Mathew Tinley embarked on a career in medicine and became a 
prominent physician along with his eldest sister.  In 1894, Tinley joined the Third Iowa 
Infantry Regiment as a private, and by the onset of the Spanish-American War, had 
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reached the rank of second lieutenant.  Tinley travelled to the Philippines with the rest of 
his regiment, and by the time he returned, he was a first lieutenant.  Tinley continued to 
serve in the National Guard as he finished his education, went to work in his sister’s 
medical practice, and began a family of his own.  Tinley served along the Mexican border 
as a lieutenant colonel, where he oversaw the training of his troopers, and he served in 
France as commander of the 168th Infantry Regiment in the 42nd Infantry Division.35 
 After the war, Tinley returned to Iowa and continued both his medical practice 
and his military career.  In 1921, he earned a promotion to the rank of brigadier general, 
and in 1924, Tinley became commander of the 34th Infantry Division (which consisted of 
the Iowa, Minnesota, North Dakota, and South Dakota National Guard), and he held that 
position until he retired as a lieutenant general in 1940.36  During the Second World War, 
Tinley briefly came out of retirement to serve as the commander at Camp Dodge, Iowa.37  
In the meantime, Tinley became the first commander of the Iowa Department of the 
American Legion in 1920, and he served as vice-president of the NGA in 1932, and 
president in 1933.  Politically, Tinley was a staunch Democrat in a highly Republican 
state, but enjoyed bipartisan support in his military, social, and political endeavors.  In 
1920, Tinley’s political friends suggested that he run for governor of Iowa, but he 
refused, and in 1924, delegates to the Democratic National Convention suggested Tinley 
as vice-presidential candidate, but he again refused the honor.   
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By 1932 however, Tinley came to believe that the Herbert Hoover Administration 
had not done enough to support veterans and farmers, and he specifically sought the 
Democratic vice-presidential nomination (with no presidential aspirations), but his 
campaign ultimately failed.38  Ultimately, Tinley’s civilian, military, and political 
trajectories reflected Progressive Era trends.  As a physician, Tinley represented the 
growing middle-class professional ranks, and actively sought to use his skills to relieve 
individual suffering.  Tinley carried this philosophy over into both the military and 
political arenas, and when he could not help American citizens through his medical 
practice, he used his military and political influence to press for social reforms and ease 
economic hardship. 
 Other guardsmen embodied the middle-class identity that shaped the organization 
throughout the Gilded Age and Progressive Eras in other ways.  Rudolph Dubbert 
enlisted in the First Iowa Infantry Regiment in 1915 and served at the Mexican border.39  
Dubbert’s father had immigrated to the United States in 1877 and eventually married and 
settled in Cedar Falls, Iowa.  Both Dubbert’s father and mother worked as self-employed 
music teachers.40  During the First World War, Rudolph Dubbert served as a training 
non-commissioned officer and eventually as his adjutant’s orderly as part of the 131st US 
Infantry Regiment in the 34th Infantry Division.  At one point, Dubbert had an 
opportunity to attend officer training school to earn a commission, but he was too low on 
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the list.41  Along with the majority of his division, Dubbert spent a long period of time at 
Camp Cody, New Mexico where he oversaw training exercises and prepared to fight in 
France.  However, when Dubbert arrived in France, the war was all but over, and most of 
his time in Europe centered on guard duty and mundane tasks.  After the war, Rudolph 
Dubbert returned to Iowa and opened a sporting goods store with his wife (whom he 
married in the months between his return from the border and wartime mobilization).42  
Like many other Americans, life and economic hardships took their toll.  Dubbert 
divorced his first wife and remarried in 1928, though by 1930, Dubbert was once again 
divorced and had moved to Illinois to take up a job as a day laborer on a farm.43  By 
1940, Dubbert returned to Iowa, married for a third time, and began selling sporting 
goods again.44  He died in 1943 at the age of 45.45 
 These guardsmen’s stories were by no means uniform.  Guardsmen came from 
various racial and social backgrounds, and their peacetime (and wartime) lives reflected 
the American experience’s complexity.  Ultimately, the National Guard represented a 
cross-section of American citizens, and embodied overall trends associated with 
Progressive Era reform movements.  Indeed, the Guard continued to mirror social trends 
in the United States throughout the twentieth century.  While guardsmen hoped to get 
back to their lives after the war, though, the National Guard entered into another fight for 
its organizational survival.  Under the provisions in the National Defense Act of 1916, 
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when guardsmen swore their second oath entering federal service, they took on all the 
Regular Army’s benefits and requirements.  When the war ended, Enoch Crowder, the 
Army’s judge advocate general, declared that guardsmen who had taken a federal oath of 
service and were subsequently discharged from federal service were also discharged from 
any previous commitment or enlistment, both to the federal government and their home 
states.46  Crowder had served as the judge advocate general since 1911, and had 
previously argued that Congress committed an error by allowing the Guard to mobilize 
for overseas service.  Crowder was also a longtime Guard opponent, and in 1912 argued 
that the National Guard was little more than the militia under a new name and could not 
therefore serve as a legal substitute for a volunteer army.47  Instead, Crowder supported 
the Selective Service Act and encouraged the implementation of some form of UMT—
voluntary or conscripted, and his ruling effectively discharged all guardsmen who had 
entered federal service during the First World War from both active service and their 
National Guard obligations.  These men became free to reenter civilian life without any 
continued military requirement.  This sudden hollowing out of the National Guard 
dramatically reduced the organization’s strength and threatened its ability to reorganize.     
 
The Guard’s post-war struggles  
Some states particularly suffered when guardsmen exited the Guard after 
Crowder’s ruling.  When the judge advocate general made his ruling, the majority of the 
National Guard was still overseas and preparing to return home, prompting many states to 
                                                          
46 Iowa Adjutant General Report, 1920, 1. 
47 Crowder’s Opinion, reprinted in the Department of Military Affairs Annual Report, 1912, December 29, 
1911; Entry 5, Memoranda and Reports, Records of the War Department General and Record Staff, 
Record Group 165; National Archives at College Park, College Park, Maryland. 
266 
 
 
seek federal recognition for their existing home guards.  In order to maintain order, the 
New York and New Jersey legislatures authorized their governors to establish emergency 
forces until their state soldiers could meet the National Defense Act’s requirements.  In 
New York’s case, the state raised roughly 22,000 men to serve in their Home Defense 
Reserve Guard, but the majority of these were unfit for active service.  New York’s 
adjutant general noted that “At the close of the war its membership consisted almost 
entirely of those not subject to the Selective Service Law—boys under the age of 18 
years, men over the age of 45, men whose business or family relations were such that 
their presence was required in their home communities and men with physical defects 
which barred them from active service, but which were not sufficient to prevent them 
from performing duty in the New York Guard at their home stations.”  Furthermore, the 
adjutant general doubted that even 5,000 of the state’s existing National Guard could 
muster for either a statewide or national emergency.48   
Under existing provisions, the federal government could not offer any funding for 
units not prescribed in the National Defense Act; therefore, each state’s Guard units 
needed to meet manpower quotas and proficiency standards to earn federal recognition.  
As the Guard troops from around the nation returned home throughout 1919, the majority 
of the soldiers sought discharges and left the National Guard.  Against the backdrop of 
growing social discord, states needed to replace their guardsmen.  Massachusetts 
maintained their home guard during 1919 as a means of maintaining an emergency force, 
and in December 1919 began disbanding their state guards in exchange for a reorganized, 
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federally-recognized National Guard.49  New York took a similar approach, and 
discontinued enlistments in the New York Guard on 29 December 1919.  The New York 
Adjutant General’s Office, with approval from the War Department, ordered that any 
future enlistment in the National Guard would be in federally-recognized units.  
Furthermore, any member of the home guard who transferred to the National Guard 
would receive credit for time served.50  
Some states such as New York and Massachusetts actively encouraged their 
Guard units to meet federal demands, and by the end of 1919 had reestablished federally-
sanctioned companies and regiments.51  Other states though, like Pennsylvania, believed 
they did not need to replenish their federally-recognized Guard units.52  Instead, these 
states hoped they could raise state-based Guard units to serve in a role similar to the 
nineteenth-century militia.  Due to general discharges and conflicting opinions regarding 
Guard provisions and federal oversight, the Guard’s overall numbers diminished.  The 
Guard’s situation deteriorated so drastically that by the middle of 1920 fourteen states 
maintained no federally-recognized National Guard units.  Militia Bureau Chief, General 
Jesse Carter, publically announced that states across the country, including Illinois, 
Indiana, and Nebraska, suffered from general public antipathy toward the Guard, and that 
the entire National Guard’s strength was at only 56,000 officers and enlisted soldiers.53 
 Although the official National Guard’s numbers dramatically decreased after the 
war, pre-war racial and social tensions reemerged.  As outlined in earlier chapters, the 
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National Guard had been involved in racial and class issues for generations.  As the 
United States prepared to enter the Great War, back-to-back riots in East St. Louis, 
Illinois illustrated the prominent social and racial tensions throughout the nation.  In May 
and July 1917, a massive worker and race riot erupted in East St. Louis.  A Congressional 
report noted that initial reports blamed organized labor for the riot, “but the 
overwhelming weight of testimony, to which is added the convictions of the committee, 
ascribes the mob spirit and its murderous manifestations to the bitter race feeling that had 
grown up between the whites and blacks.”54  Eventually the Illinois National Guard 
moved in to restore order, but quickly became embroiled in the racial tension.  While 
Illinois’ assistant adjutant general, S.O. Tripp, took command in East St. Louis and at one 
point reportedly saved a black man from a lynch mob, Congress noted that they were 
unable to “find any evidence to confirm this valiant deed of the redoubtable colonel,” and 
“it is the unanimous opinion of every witness who saw Col. Tripp on that fateful day that 
he was a hindrance instead of a help to the troops; that he was ignorant of his duties, 
blind to his responsibilities, and deaf to every intelligent appeal that was made to him.”55  
Furthermore, the colonel never donned his uniform, and wore his civilian clothes during 
the strife. 
 When the riot in East St. Louis grew out of control, the mayor petitioned the 
governor for more troops, but Colonel Tripp assured the mayor that he had the situation 
under control.  While Congress placed much of the blame for the ensuing disaster at the 
colonel’s feet, the official report noted that “the conduct of the soldiers who were sent to 
East St. Louis to protect life and property puts a blot on that part of the Illinois militia 
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that served under Col. Tripp.”56  Unlike in other instances where the National Guard 
served with distinction, in this case, the soldiers acted with “the same spirit of 
indifference or cowardice that marked the conduct of the police force.”57  According to 
the official Congressional report, “a number of soldiers openly stated that ‘they didn’t 
like niggers,’” and on one occasion three guardsmen and two police officers killed two 
black citizens who stood outside a saloon “although neither had committed any 
offense.”58  This same group of soldiers and police officers shot off the arm of a young 
black servant girl, and on another occasion guardsmen shot down two black men who 
were running from a fire.  Other soldiers reportedly fired into a house where seven black 
men had taken shelter, and one Illinois guardsmen had boasted “that he had fired his gun 
17 times during the riot and every time at a ‘black target.’”  Congress noted that during 
the riot, the federal government had not yet activated the National Guard and the Illinois 
governor and authorities had the responsibility of charging and convicting the soldiers in 
question, but by the middle of 1918 had not made any such progress.59   
Although the riot in East St. Louis occurred just as the nation entered the First 
World War, it served as a prelude to many issues that would reemerge throughout the 
country as the war ended.  The First World War became a Progressive crusade for many 
Americans amidst the Woodrow Wilson’s call to “make the world safe for democracy,” 
and various sub-sections of society hoped the war would usher in a new era of freedom.  
Organized labor leaders and civil rights activists believed the working class and minority 
citizens would finally enjoy the liberties they had sought for decades.  However, many of 
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these hopes faded in the war’s immediate aftermath.  The Wilson Administration and 
American commanders denied Black soldiers who answered the nation’s call the right to 
march in US victory parades in France, and denied some (such as the 93rd Provisional 
Division) recognition of their military exploits.  Unionists found that their conditions 
improved little during the war, despite their promise to accept wage controls and support 
the war effort.60  Amidst these social struggles, hundreds of thousands of Americans were 
recovering from the Spanish Flu pandemic that swept across the nation (and the world).  
The flu epidemic grew to such proportions that state governments converted military 
camps (such as Camp Dodge, Iowa), into flu wards [figure 6].61   
In January 1919, shipyard workers in Seattle went on strike seeking wage 
increases, and unions around the nation followed suit.  Additionally, a series of mail 
bombs delivered to wealthy citizens and prominent officials set off a wave of fear across 
the nation related to a potential socialist uprising.62  Amidst this backdrop, in April, 1919, 
Iowa placed their small National Guard contingent on alert in anticipation of potential 
trouble at the International Workers of the World convention held in Des Moines.63  Over 
the course of the next three months, strikes around the state and the nation demonstrated 
the need for a reorganized National Guard force.  Throughout the year, over four million 
workers (one-fifth of the total industrial workforce) went on strike, and the general trend 
culminated in the Great Steel Strike of 1919, which lasted from September 1919 through 
January 1920.  Because the National Guard remained in a general state of reorganization, 
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many states suffered from low numbers and inefficient equipment.64  However, some 
Guard units clashed with strikers during the steel strike, most notably in Ohio, where 
some clashes became violent and deadly.65         
Meanwhile, racial tensions reached a boiling point.  The Great Migration had 
altered racial dynamics in many Northern cities, as thousands of black citizens settled in 
cities alongside other ethnic neighborhoods.  Violence broke out as the result of ongoing 
prejudice and workplace competition.  The most notorious riot occurred in Chicago 
between 27 July and 3 August 1919.  The riot began after Irish citizens drowned a black 
teenager in Lake Michigan after the teen swam over to the “Irish side” of the lake.  The 
New York Times reported that two black citizens died during the riot’s first day, and the 
violence resulted in at least fifty injuries.  According to the news report, “So great was 
the confusion throughout the district that the acting Chief of Police, [John] Alcock, was 
unable late tonight to estimate the total number of injured.”66  Over the next week, 
constant clashes resulted in the eventual deaths of 23 blacks and 15 whites (with an 
additional 500 injured).  Police were unable to quell the riot, so Chicago’s mayor 
eventually asked for militia support.  However, Illinois maintained no federally-
recognized Guard units during the riot.  Many Illinois guardsmen had only recently 
returned from overseas and left the guard, and those who eventually responded to the riot 
were members of state-sanctioned home guard units.67     
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As the Chicago Race Riot of 1919 drew to a close, state soldiers found themselves 
embroiled in both racial and labor tensions.  On 3 August 1919, a captain in the 4th 
Illinois Reserve Infantry Regiment became the focus of an assassination attempt after an 
assailant stabbed him multiple times with a knife after a hidden sniper fired several shots 
at the officer, but failed to hit his target.  This assassination attempt coincided with a 
series of fires set by white laborers in an apparent attempt to keep black workers from 
returning to work as the riot drew down.  Illinois’s governor (and former guardsmen), 
Frank O. Lowden, believed the fires and attacks on militia officers were the result of 
labor troubles rather than racial ones.68  Lowden issued a public statement on 2 August 
1919 (the final full day of the race riot), that “The most serious menace to the future 
peace of the country is the constant increase in the cost of living,” and until the federal 
government took steps to check the increase, “there will be no permanent industrial 
peace.”69  Interestingly, just two days after the riot ended, the Chicago Daily Tribune 
mirrored the governor’s claims, and warned that a general railroad strike may be on the 
horizon after Bert Mark Jewell (president of the railway union) informed President 
Wilson that a proposed rail workers’ wage increase would not be satisfactory due to 
increased costs of living.70  These issues demonstrated that the First World War had not 
erased the ongoing social problems associated with the Gilded Age and Progressive Era.   
 Just as in previous decades, the Guard’s presence during strikes and riots usually 
eased tensions.  In the summer and fall of 1919, Wisconsin’s State Guard responded to a 
series of riots and strikes.  Wisconsin’s legislature established the State Guard during the 
First World War, and the Wisconsin adjutant general declared that his office placed the 
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home guard “under the same system of discipline and training which governed the 
National Guard.”71  While official reports noted that “the occasions which necessitated 
the call of Guard detachments to active service [during the war] were remarkably few and 
minor in extent and importance,” the state guard did increase their activities in the year 
following the war.  On 19 August 1919, a riot broke out in Cudahy, Wisconsin, and four 
provisional state guard units responded.  According to the adjutant general, their “prompt 
arrival” and “their firm and disciplined conduct prevented and discouraged outbreak or 
threat of further violence.”  A similar incident occurred on 10 September 1919 in Two 
Rivers, Wisconsin, but the situation cooled before another four companies arrived on the 
scene.72  Similarly, in October 1919, twelve companies of Indiana’s Reserve Militia (their 
wartime home-defense force) rushed to Gary, Indiana during a worker strike.  Over 500 
angry workers took to the streets and attempted to rush two steel plant’s gates.  The 
crowd fired on local policemen and injured at least 50 citizens in the course of a few 
hours.  Within a day, the existence of the militia and an increased police presence ended 
the strike, but the rioters renewed their efforts after nightfall.73  While the local troops 
and police managed to put down the strike, these types of incidents demonstrated the 
continued need for the Guard’s presence. 
As tensions intensified in 1919, the pre-war negative image of the National Guard 
as anti-labor strikebreakers placed Guard recruitment in serious jeopardy, and limited the 
Guard’s ability to reorganize.  Even the Guard’s extensive service during World War I 
did not automatically erase all the earlier tension with the working-class.  And, as many 
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had prior to the war, guardsmen who hoped to remain in military service grew frustrated.  
The Militia Bureau wrote in 1919 that the Guard’s mission should not be “for the purpose 
of aiding capital in its issues with labor but with a view to enforcing the law of the land 
and of preserving local communities from a reputation for lawlessness.”  The Bureau 
worried that members’ “dislike of strike duty” and the “hostility of labor unions toward 
the National Guard” had contributed to low morale among Guard members and kept 
numbers low.74   
 
New calls for replacement 
Due to ongoing turmoil and the Guard’s falling numbers, calls for replacing the 
National Guard reemerged.  Some argued that the selective service law established a legal 
way of creating a universal military force in the United States and could easily replace 
the Guard.  Secretary of War Newton Baker continued to support the National Guard.  
While the law specified that guardsmen could leave their units without reprisal when they 
received discharges from active duty, Baker noted that there was nothing to prevent these 
men from rejoining their old Guard units.  Baker also indicated that he would like to see 
as many former guardsmen as possible reenlist in their old units to replenish the Guard’s 
ranks.  When questioned about a speech he delivered earlier, Baker clarified his 
statements and said that he did not support replacing the Guard with a UMT force and 
that “the National Guard had done excellent service on the border and abroad, and that 
the volunteer principle would undoubtedly always be necessary to maintain a peace-time 
regular military establishment.”  Baker believed that the Selective Service Act was 
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necessary to serve the public interest during wartime, but did not suggest that it would 
serve as a means of replacing the National Guard.75 
Some critics of the National Guard system went so far as to argue that the First 
World War actually demonstrated that the Guard was unnecessary.  According to former 
Senate Military Affairs Chairman, Louis Cuvillier, “the time has passed when each State 
can depend exclusively on its own State militia for the preservation of law and order, 
without the assistance of the Federal Government.  That was thoroughly demonstrated in 
the present war.”  Cuvillier when on to describe how UMT was not in fact universal 
conscription, but was a way to “teach physically and mentally, in time of peace, citizens 
the art of war and self-defense.”76  The former senator called for the revival of a UMT 
force in the face of the NGA’s calls to replace the Chamberlain-Kahn Act of 1918 that 
revised how the government dispersed funding to the states based on public health issues 
at the expense of existing Guard allocations.77  Somewhat ironically, the unofficial Guard 
units created during wartime became ammunition in the fight against reestablishing the 
official Guard during peacetime.  Essentially, Guard opponents pointed out that these 
non-federally sanctioned units performed adequately during the war in preserving local 
peace, and demonstrated the lack of necessity related to the official National Guard.  
Similarly, many state governments believed that by maintaining home guards they could 
exempt themselves from federal oversight.   
In early 1919, Dr. Charles Eliot, Harvard University’s President Emeritus, 
published an editorial in the New York Times, where he advocated for building a “future 
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army” based on universal service.  Eliot noted that while American soldiers were 
returning from France, that the war was not yet over, and that “the United States will 
soon have no army to speak of.”  The United States faced a precarious situation regarding 
the size and scope of the military after the First World War, and in light of debates over 
the League of Nations, Eliot noted that America should take a leading role in establishing 
a modern, democratic military force.  According to the editorial, this future American 
army “should clearly be a national force like the recently enlisted National Army [drafted 
troops].”  Eliot continued to lay out his ideal force, and argued that the National Guard 
“was originally not only a state force, but largely a class force; that is, it was recruited 
from clerks, young professional men, and small shopkeepers and farmers.”  According to 
Eliot, “The large class of manual laborers, skilled and unskilled, was only feebly 
represented in it; and it was therefore an object of distrust and dislike in that class.”78   
While Eliot under stressed the working-class contribution to the pre-war National Guard, 
he correctly pointed to ongoing class tensions within the organization, and used that as 
justification to replace the existing system with a “democratic” form of universal service. 
Eliot’s editorial outlined how his ideal form of universal military training would 
look.  He argued that there were two provisions in the Swiss military constitution that 
“every other nation, and especially the British and American commonwealths,” should 
follow.  First, Eliot argued that the federal government should establish physical training 
protocols that all schools should follow.  Secondly, he hoped the federal government 
would cultivate “as a national sport of shooting at a mark through voluntary organization 
aided by the government.”79   Under this proposal, instilling military skills and structure 
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in the entire American male population would directly lead to an increase in voluntary 
enlistments in the military, and that this new force would be large enough to meet the 
challenges of the post-World War I international environment.  This proposal, and 
numerous others, came before the US Congress within weeks of the armistice, and called 
for again re-designing the American military structure. 
While UMT advocates blamed the Guard’s structure for its problems, others 
blamed the Guard’s poor post-war status on other factors.  Colonel Fitzhugh Lee 
Minnigerode believed that “The failure is a consequence of the backwash that follows in 
the wake of every war.  Men of military age have played a part in a tremendous show—
the World War—and they are pretty well fed up on the game.”  In an editorial piece, 
Minnigerode outlined a brief National Guard history, where he was very critical of the 
early Guard system, but argued that the National Defense Act of 1916 and “the 
subsequent amendments to it have all been important factors in the prospective 
development of the State forces as a reliable second line,” and he declared that “the 
National Guard proved its mettle on the battlefields of France.”  Minnigerode further 
noted that the Guard’s performance eroded earlier levels of distrust and distance between 
the Regular Army and the Guard and that replacing the Guard with another military 
organization would be counterproductive.  According to the editorial, if competent 
officers—not politicians—took up the reins of rebuilding the Guard and recruited from a 
pool of young men “those new coming of military age,” then the organization would 
continue to serve as a valuable piece of the American military system.80 
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Reorganization proposals 
Once the Guard’s struggles became apparent, Congress and the NGA outlined 
tentative plans to reorganize the National Guard along its prewar structure.  The federal 
government revised some existing protocols to allow 389 officers and 1,000 non-
commissioned officers to train new enlistees and administer the Guard’s 
reestablishment.81  Not surprisingly, General John Heavey, the acting Chief of the Militia 
Bureau, “urged that the National Guard be maintained in the same form as it was before 
the United States entered the war and that the increases in its strength authorized by the 
act of June 3, 1916, be carried out.”82   Additionally, the NGA hoped to solidify the 
Guard’s position in the post-war system by allowing for easier enlistments and by 
building off earlier efforts to increase federal oversight into the state organizations.  
Although the government took steps to reorganize and strengthen the National Guard, the 
process trudged along slowly.  In a special edition of the New York Times, the paper 
reported that the National Guard’s strength in July 1920 was 50,700 officers and enlisted 
men.  This number was still roughly 128,000 men short of their 1920 quota.  The Times 
reported that the “guard is increasing at a rate of about 8,000 men monthly, and at this 
rate it will be fourteen months before it is recruited to full peace strength.”83  At the time 
of the report, New York’s and Texas’s Guards had the largest numbers, with Wisconsin 
and Minnesota close behind.84  Some states, though, like North Carolina, only had about 
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100 men in their ranks in the middle of 1920.  North Carolina increased that number to 
roughly 30 officers and 630 enlisted men by the end of the year.85   
More than a year prior to the New York Times’s report, in January 1919, the 
Committee on Military Affairs held a series of hearings to “re-organize and increase the 
efficiency of the Regular Army,” and through expansion, the National Guard.86   The 
majority of the hearings centered on the debate regarding the means through which the 
government could establish a 500,000 person standing army.  The chairman of the 
committee questioned how the government could establish such a force without creating 
universally trained force.  Secretary Baker noted that “I have several [UMT] plans on my 
desk which have been suggested as the results of studies by the General Staff.”  When 
asked if he would approve any of these proposals, Baker responded, “not at present,” and 
went on to discuss how he would not even consider any new plans until the conclusion of 
the ensuing peace conference.87   As the committee and secretary continued to square off, 
Baker encouraged Congress to expand the existing reserve and National Guard structures 
to establish a large peacetime force.88   Secretary Baker further clarified that “having a 
National Guard and having a Regular Army has never been regarded as antagonistic,” 
and that he was “in favor of the Government doing its part in the support and upbuilding 
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of the National Guard.”  Baker specifically noted though that he did not favor the 
government taking the Guard as “a substitute for the Regular Army.”89  
Following Secretary Baker’s testimony, the committee proceeded to question 
General Peyton March, the Army Chief of Staff.  When questioned about appropriation 
bills, General March noted that all Guard funding was on hold until the army and federal 
government could reach some agreement regarding the Guard’s restructuring.  March 
noted that in all but eight states, the “National Guard has gone out of existence,” and that 
the Guard will need to “build up again from the ground up.”90  Over the next year, many 
states worked to reorganize their official Guard units, by as noted earlier, by the middle 
of 1920, fourteen states had not yet met federal standards.  Elements of the National 
Defense Act of 1916 related to federal funding and Guard recognition further 
complicated the issue because state governments only needed to make provisions for their 
National Guard units to comply with federal law.  In order for a state government to 
receive federal appropriations, their Guard units needed to pass federal inspections and 
“conform to the act.”  Essentially, states could establish militia units outside of the 
National Defense Act (as many had done during the war), and structure them as they saw 
fit.  Some state governments preferred to establish their own units and simply forego the 
federal appropriation in order to expand their state authority.  March assured the House 
committee that if states organized Guard units as outlined in the National Defense Act 
they could request arms and equipment from the War Department.  These units would 
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then “be regarded as appropriate under that bill for distribution to that National Guard 
organization.”91    
Ultimately, the War Department had the means and will to strengthen the 
National Guard, but the states needed to reestablish Guard units that met federal 
standards first.  On 17 July 1919, Secretary Baker approved plans to reorganize the 
National Guard into a sixteen-division structure which mirrored the Guard’s arrangement 
during federalization.  These guidelines allowed the Guard to reach a potential strength of 
over 440,000 soldiers, but the number would be capped at just over 106,000 through 
1920 due to funding limitations in the 1920 federal budget.92  These provisions outlined a 
potential plan to reestablish the National Guard to its prewar numbers and actually allow 
for the Guard’s expansion.  Unfortunately though, these protocols developed 
simultaneously with the Judge Advocate General’s ruling regarding Guard discharges.  
Additionally, the Guard’s thinning out led to increased calls for the Guard’s replacement 
despite Congress’s and Baker’s efforts. 
In April 1920, the Committee on Military Affairs proposed an amendment to the 
National Defense Act designed to re-strengthen the National Guard.  Senator Wadsworth 
noted that this amendment would alter the existing provision which “provides that 
enlistments in the National Guard shall be for a period of six years, three in active service 
and three in the National Guard Reserve, and that reenlistments shall be for the same 
period.”  The committee believed that amending this provision to permit one-year 
reenlistments and one-year enlistments for soldiers who served in the Regular Army for 
at least six months.  Wadsworth noted that “it is believed that in this way that many men 
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who have had valuable experience in the recent war can be enlisted in the guard and their 
experience be made use of in training the guard.”93  The senator hoped that allowing 
guardsmen who exited the guard after the judge advocate’s ruling would potentially 
reenlist if the government set service terms at one year instead of three.  However, other 
factors—particularly post-war malaise—also played a factor in limiting the National 
Guard’s overall numbers.  
In the War Department’s 1920 annual report, the Chief of the Militia Bureau 
noted that “the strength of the National Guard, June 30, 1920 should have been 106,300.”  
Unfortunately for the organization though, numbers at the end of the 1919 fiscal year had 
the National Guard at only about 38,000 officers and men.  According to the Militia 
Bureau, “The reorganization of this force has been very seriously retarded from 
numerous causes,” which related to uncertainty about future legislation, discontent with 
“tales of unfair treatment,” general war malaise, state desires to avoid federal oversight, 
and “the usual antagonism of labor unions.”94   In the report, the Militia Bureau quickly 
put down claims of unjust treatment, particularly among officers, and even declared that, 
“There is conclusive proof that National Guard officers were not, as a class, 
discriminated against by Regular Officers.”95   Generally these complaints subsided by 
1920, but when combined with other long-lasting issues, hindered the Guard’s 
reorganization efforts.  Furthermore, the Militia Bureau believed that National Guard 
reorganization needed to build off of organizational lessons learned during the First 
World War.  The Bureau admitted that the war demonstrated that “the strength of our 
                                                          
93 Committee on Military Affairs, National Guard Enlistments, S. Rep. No. 66-501 (1920). 
94 Report of the Chief of the Militia Bureau, War Department Annual Reports, 1920, Volume I, H.R. Rep. 
No 66-863, at 1301 (1920). 
95 Report of the Chief of the Militia Bureau, 1920, at 1301-02. 
283 
 
 
combatant units under the old organization was inadequate,” and that future fighting 
would center around the platoon, not the battalion or regiment, and that “the draft law to 
provide untrained men for an army was practicable and efficient.”96   
 
The National Defense Act of 1920 
In 1919 and 1920, Congress proposed a series of bills that had bearing on the 
existing Guard’s structure.  In the US Senate, Republicans, James Walcott Wadsworth 
(who succeeded Elihu Root as New York’s senator), and Joseph Frelinghuysen (New 
Jersey) proposed bills to reorganize or replace the National Guard.  The “Frelinghuysen 
Bill” called for the War Department to establish a National Guard Council, and 
Wadsworth’s proposal completely reorganized the United States Army.  In the US House 
of Representatives, Julius Kahn (California) proposed a comprehensive law which 
stressed the importance of military education in American schools.  The National Guard 
Association openly announced their opposition to the “Kahn Law” due to a section in the 
proposal that “conscripts our citizens for service in the Regular Army in time of peace.”  
The NGA was “absolutely opposed to such conscription.”  Interestingly, the NGA eased 
back their opposition to universal military training, but proposed that “the universal 
principle” should be “developed in conjunction with the National Guard of the 
country.”97  During the National Guard Association Convention in May 1918, the 
delegates declared that their current struggle was related to the fact that the National 
Defense Act contained no provision for the reorganization of the National Guard after a 
period of federal service, and that “when the National Defense Act [of 1916] was 
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enacted, it contemplated an existing organization, which organization, under the 
interpretation of the act by the Judge Advocate General’s Department of the army, was 
wiped out of existence by being drafted into federal service.”98    
Although Judge Advocate General Crowder effectively dismantled the National 
Guard, the NGA prepared once again to fight for the National Guard’s existence, and 
they once again found congressional and military allies willing to take up the cause.  The 
Army’s wartime chief of staff, Peyton March, presented a mobilization plan to Congress 
based on Emory Upton’s late-nineteenth century military vision.  Conversely, John M. 
Palmer, who had previously penned An Army of the People, which called for a 
universally trained, conscripted force, now championed the idea of a “democratic army” 
comprised of citizen-soldiers in the National Guard and Reserves.  While the War 
Department diluted some of Palmer’s ideas in its proposal to Congress, both Palmer and 
the “Uptonians” pursued the same goal: creating a peacetime army capable of quick 
mobilization for a large-scale war.99  Regarding the proposals, the US Senate struck down 
the UMT elements of the proposals, and Congress ultimately blended the three plans 
(Wadsworth, Kahn, and Frelinghuysen) together into one comprehensive piece of 
legislation: the Amendments to the National Defense Act, also known as the National 
Defense Act of 1920, or the Kahn Act.100  Enjoying majorities in both the House and 
Senate, the Republicans passed the amendments, and the Kahn Act took effect in June 
1920.   
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Both the Militia Bureau and John J. Pershing (who became Army Chief of Staff 
after the war) supported the new law, and believed amendments to the National Defense 
Act would ease existing tensions and resurrect the faltering National Guard.  The Militia 
Bureau noted that states reported difficulty in reorganizing their Guard regiments “due to 
jealousy aroused because State forces organized during the war in many cases wish to 
continue as National Guard troops and to retain possession of state armories.” 
Furthermore, “the National Guard returning from overseas feel that they were unjustly 
excluded from joining their old commands, as their numbers had been assumed by State 
organizations during their absence.”101  Provisions in the National Defense Act’s 
proposed 1920 amendments seemingly addressed these issues and that “the causes which 
retarded the reorganization of the National Guard immediately after the armistice are 
gradually disappearing.”102  Ultimately then, the National Defense Act of 1920 received 
praise from elements of both the civilian and military spheres, and ushered in a general 
era of legal stability which lasted through the Second World War. 
This new legislative push also occurred during another period of general military 
reform.  Congressional and military leaders and military reassessed the nation’s response 
during the First World War and hoped to avoid some of the confusion regarding the 
Army’s mobilization.  Army planners such as John M. Palmer, John J. Pershing, and 
Douglass MacArthur stressed the need for a modern army capable of a massive 
mobilization for a potential conflict overseas (preferably in a single theater, where the 
size and scope of the US forces could overwhelm the enemy).103  The National Defense 
Act of 1920 required the Army to conduct studies and planning for future mobilizations.  
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This move toward contingency planning coincided with similar moves in the US Navy 
which occurred decades prior, particularly regarding a possible war in the Pacific.104  The 
National Defense Act of 1920 altered the military’s contract procurement process, and 
increased cooperation between military and industrial sectors.105  Congress took steps to 
solidify the Reserve Officer Training Corps as well as the Army’s ready reserve in 1920, 
but many of the 1920 amendments dealt with the National Guard’s position in the army 
structure. 
The National Defense Act of 1920 specifically included provisions designed to 
restructure and reestablish the National Guard as a permanent piece of the American 
military system.  Under the 1920 amendments, “When in service of the United States the 
National Guard is part of the Army of the United States (not merely attached thereto),” 
and the peace-time army establishment “includes the Regular Army, National Guard, the 
Organized Reserves, and such other organizations as are necessary for the national 
defense.”106  Additionally, in order to establish solidarity and singularity, the “names, 
numbers, flags, and records of the divisions and subordinate units that served in the 
World War shall be preserved as far as practicable.”107  Therefore, the US government 
officially removed Guard titles along state lines, such as the prewar “Third Iowa Infantry 
Regiment.”  The 1920 Amendments also allowed National Guard officers to serve on the 
War Department General Staff and any Guard officers who wished to do so could be 
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appointed as a reserve officer in his present rank or any lower grade.108  Additionally, 
“enlisted men in the National Guard shall receive one day’s pay of his grade for each full 
participation and drills duty ordered,” and “the National Guard is subject to draft into 
United states service in time of war.  While in United States service all such soldiers 
become part of the Army.”109  However, as a means of avoiding the Guard’s massive 
discharge witnessed after the First World War, upon “termination of the emergency such 
men shall be discharged from the Army and revert to the status of militia, and if State 
laws so provide resume an active status in the National Guard until expiration of their 
enlistment.”110   
The National Defense Act of 1920 also influenced force structure and officer pay.  
The legislation required that each National Guard company maintain a minimum of 50 
men and a maintenance strength of 65 men to earn federal recognition.  Along similar 
lines, the 1920 amendments solidified a general army force structure based on a corps 
breakdown rather than a divisional one.  Under this new structure, each corps contained a 
series of divisions generally based along regional dimensions, and the National Guard 
became bound to the Army’s general structure.  Congress ensured that the president could 
assign the National Guard to various divisions, brigades, and “other tactical units” for 
training purposes, and any Guard or Regular Army officer could command such units.  
However, the federal government could not displace a Guard officer whose entire unit 
was held within a single state.111  Pursuant to the new guidelines, captains and company 
commanders would receive pay increases, provided they maintained efficient 
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organizations.  Officers could additionally purchase uniforms and equipment through the 
US Army Quartermaster’s Department, under the same regulations that directed Regular 
Army officers.  Any commissioned Guard officer who held a commission during the war 
could receive a federal commission without the need for additional examinations (except 
a physical), and, as a means of encouraging former guardsmen to reenter the 
organization, any soldier who served in France during the First World War could reenlist 
in the National Guard for one-year periods, and established that any new enlistment 
would be for a three-year term.112  Congress passed the National Defense Act of 1920 in 
June, and the amendments took effect over the course of the next year.   
Congress’s actions in 1920 took necessary steps to strengthen the existing Guard 
system; however, some prominent officials remained skeptical.  A 1921 Congressional 
report concerning the amendments to the National Defense Act stated that the bill would 
“benefit the National Guard and bring about even closer relationships between it and the 
Regular Army,” but might not do enough to solidify the Guard system in the long run.113  
According to the report as well as the War Department, the original set of amendments in 
1920 “are not in complete harmony or are inadequate to permit of the most efficient and 
economical maintenance and development of the land forces available for national 
defense,” with most problems connected to the National Guard because “the basic law is 
more specific in the case of this component [the Guard] than in the Regular Army and 
Organized Reserves.”114  Secretary of War John Weeks, outlined seven proposed 
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amendments that would more easily allow National Guard officers to receive 
compensation for time served on active duty, simplify the procedure for Guard officers to 
attend army leadership courses, solidify enlisted pay for guardsmen who served on active 
duty, and standardized federal fund dispersal to the individual states.115   
Over the course of the next two years, Congress examined the War Department’s 
proposals and eventually issued a few new amendments to the National Defense Act of 
1920 as a means of fixing oversights.  The most notable of these amendments took effect 
in June 1921 (one year after implementation of the National Defense Act of 1920), and 
dealt with Regular Army enlistment periods and Army appropriations.  Effectively, the 
Army Appropriation Act of 1921 repealed some provisions in the National Defense Act 
related to enlistment allowances and bonuses.116  Regardless of a few minor amendments 
in 1921, the National Defense Act of 1920 ultimately became, as Henry Reilly described, 
“the first and only military policy ever possessed by the United States of America.”  
While Reilly’s statement was certainly an overstatement, he argued that the actions of the 
Rainbow Division and “other National Guard Divisions on the battlefields of France 
showed this decision to be justified.”117  By 1921 then, the National Guard had become 
enmeshed in the US Army’s official legal structure.  The National Defense Act of 1920 
became the basis of the Army’s organization over the course of the next two and a half 
decades, and sustained the American military during the Second World War.  While 
Congress made a few alterations to the National Defense Act during the 1920s, the law 
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remained largely intact until 1947 when Congress replaced it with the National Security 
Act.  Ultimately, then, 1920 marked the end of the National Guard’s evolution from a 
loosely defined state force to a federally-sanctioned piece of the US Army.  Indeed, 
Progressive political and military leaders guided this transformation, and the Guard’s 
actions at the border and on the battlefield justified Congressional support.  
*** 
 When the First World War came to an end, the National Guard found itself in a 
precarious situation.  While the Guard generally met expectations during the war, their 
absence forced states to create localized home guards to maintain peace, protect public 
property, and aid in national disasters.  In 1919, as guardsmen began returning home with 
the rest of the American Expeditionary Force, the Army Judge Advocate General ruled 
that when guardsmen received a discharge from federal service they became exempt from 
every other military obligation.  Therefore, any soldier who served with the AEF 
effectively exited the Guard when they returned home from Europe.  This left many 
states with no effective military force, and states scrambled to reorganize their National 
Guard units.  However, in order to effectively reestablish their state forces, any newly 
organized unit needed to meet the federal standards outlined in the National Defense Act 
of 1916.  This task proved difficult, as many men who served in home guards were 
generally unfit for active service—either due to age or physical limitations.  In this 
context, the NGA and Congressional leaders initiated protocols to strengthen the National 
Guard and encourage recruitment efforts. 
 Though many influential leaders pressed to reestablish the National Guard to their 
prewar status, others reinitiated calls to replace the Guard with some other form of 
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universal military training.  These opponents believed that the First World War 
demonstrated that the federally-oriented National Guard was unnecessary during 
peacetime because home guards performed their duty admirably in the Guard’s wartime 
absence.  Some states even supported this line of thinking because they wished to return 
their state soldiers to an older power dynamic with less federal oversight.  In 1919 and 
1920 then, Congress conducted a series of hearings regarding the National Guard’s 
future, and many influential figures, including John J. Pershing, Douglas MacArthur, and 
Secretary Baker testified on the Guard’s behalf.  They argued that the National Guard 
performed their duty on the battlefields of France and that reestablishing the Guard would 
benefit the nation as a whole because conscription only sufficed during national 
emergencies. 
 While Congress debated the Guard’s future, old tensions resurfaced.  The federal 
government and organize labor established an unofficial truce during the war under the 
guise of Progressive mutualism.  In the wake of the war though, labor unionists pressed 
for increased wages, shorter work hours, and safer conditions—the same concepts 
President Wilson argued would naturally develop after the nation’s wartime victory.  
Simultaneously, racial hostilities boiled over in cities throughout the nation as black and 
white workers clashed over neighborhood boundaries and access to work.  Strikes, race 
riots, and a general sense of fear related to a general socialist uprising throughout 1919 
demonstrated the need to maintain the National Guard as a potential peacekeeping force.  
Some states utilized their home guards during these strikes and riots as a means of 
restoring order, but other states quickly embarked on plans to reorganize their federally-
sanctioned National Guards.  States began the process of recruiting new soldiers to fill 
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the ranks, and encouraged former guardsmen to reenlist—assuming they still met federal 
standards.   
 Unfortunately for the National Guard, general post-war military malaise and 
antipathy toward strike duty hindered recruitment efforts.  In 1920, Congress responded 
to the Guard’s struggles (as well as the nation’s post-war military needs) and passed a 
series of amendments to the National Defense Act.  These new policies—designated as 
the National Defense Act of 1920—altered Guard enlistment periods to encourage 
reentry, and ensured that the Guard would not disintegrate when massive deployments 
ended, while also creating a peacetime reorganization of the Guard as a whole.  The army 
replaced the World War I divisional system with a corps structure, with the National 
Guard providing eighteen regionally-structured infantry divisions and two cavalry 
divisions for the new Army Corps.   Their quota stipulated that each state provide a 
certain number of troops based on population and force structure.  For example, the 
government expected Iowa to provide 10,200 men to meet their goal, and the National 
Guards of Iowa, Minnesota, North, and South Dakota would compose the 34th Infantry 
Division.118   Illinois’s National Guard needed to furnish 18,000 men who would make up 
the majority of the 33rd Infantry Division.119   
This reorganization gave the National Guard a clear, permanent place within the 
Army system.  The 1920 legislation defined a new clear role for the National Guard; 
providing that Guard units met federal standards, they would remain under state control a 
majority of the time.  Ultimately though, the federal government permanently established 
a basis of control, where the federal government could disband units who failed to meet 
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defined standards.  The National Defense Act of 1920 also established protocols on how 
and when the federal government could activate the National Guard, and this new 
arrangement resolved doubts and ended debate over the Guard’s immediate future.  The 
National Defense Act allowed the National Guard to maintain the traditions of the state 
militia system, while benefitting from a modern military system.
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CHAPTER 7 - CONCLUSION 
 
Colonel George C. Richards became Chief of the Militia Bureau in early 1921.  
President Woodrow Wilson (or someone within his administration following his 
debilitating stroke) appointed Richards over a handful of other worthy candidates, 
including Kansas’s adjutant general Charles Martin, Brigadier General Perry Harrison of 
Minnesota, and New York’s General John F. O’Ryan (who removed himself from 
consideration).  Each National Guard officer had exemplary military records, and O’Ryan 
was the only guardsman who commanded an entire division during the First World War 
(the 26th Division).  General Harrison managed to recruit Minnesota’s National Guard 
almost to full strength by the end of 1920, despite the fact that the overall Guard’s 
numbers still sat at less than 70,000.  Furthermore, many governors (particularly in the 
West) supported Charles Martin for the post, and one governor, Henry J. Allen of Kansas, 
even charged that the president “ignored the law which provides that the Chief of the 
Militia Bureau was to be chosen upon recommendation of the Governors of the States.”1   
However, Governor Allen ignored an important element of the National Defense 
Act of 1920, where Section 81 specifically stated that the president could appoint any 
former or current National Guard officer who had at least ten years of service as an 
officer with at least five years as a line officer.  Under the law, the president could choose 
the candidate upon recommendation of the governors, but was not beholden to their 
desires.2  The Wilson Administration, Congress, and the War Department agreed that 
Colonel Richards’s forty-three years of service as commander of Pennsylvania’s 16th 
Regiment during the Spanish-American War and along the border, as well as his service 
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record as commander of the 56th Brigade of the 28th Infantry Division were enough to 
earn his new position.  General John J. Pershing even cited Richards for distinguished 
service during the Great War.  Additionally, outgoing Chief of the Militia Bureau, the 
Regular Army’s General Jesse M. Carter applauded Richard’s career and recommend him 
as his replacement.3  Ultimately, this appointment demonstrated a series of shifts in the 
National Guard’s collective history, and served as a capstone in the Guard’s 
development.  For the first time in the nation’s history, federal law required the Militia 
Bureau Chief (eventually the National Guard Bureau) to come from the National Guard’s 
ranks, and the federal government—not state governors—held the ultimate say in who 
would hold that position.  This appointment then, symbolized the National Guard’s 
development between 1898 and 1920 where the federal government effectively altered 
the Guard’s identity from a state-centric military force to part of the United States’ 
permanent military structure. 
 
The Guard’s creation and legal structure 
The National Guard’s development had its roots in the old militia’s decline.  
While the militia had its origins in the colonial era, by the Civil War’s onset, the militia 
was a shadow of what it once was, and most state militia organizations were privately 
funded and were not part of the “organized militia,” but were instead volunteer 
regiments.  The Civil War revitalized the militia spirit across the nation (which included 
Reconstruction militias), but by the late 1870s the lack of a military mission allowed the 
organized militia to devolve into a social institution based on pageantry and 
intemperance.  In an effort to revive the militia’s public perception, many states adopted 
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the term “national guard” by 1877 and stressed the importance of maintaining high levels 
of military proficiency.  During the Gilded Age, as social tensions arose between 
organized labor and big business, governors increasingly utilized the militia to maintain 
or restore order during labor strikes and race riots.  During these sometimes violent 
clashes, the militia’s inefficiencies became apparent to the public and to governmental 
bodies. 
In 1879, amidst larger professionalization efforts in society and the military, 
militia officers formed the National Guard Association (NGA) as a lobbying and 
advocacy body.  Throughout the 1880s and 1890s, the NGA worked with Congress to 
increase federal funding for the state militia and pressed for increased military 
proficiency within the organization.  The federal government attached Regular Army 
officers and non-commissioned officers to militia units, and these Army contingents 
oversaw training programs and worked to turn the militia into a cohesive fighting force.4  
Rifle training and target practice became a staple of militia duty, and troopers trained 
with their weapons during regular drill weekends and annual summer encampments.  
Additionally, militiamen in strike-prone areas practiced military movements and close 
order drills as a means of increasing efficiency and effectiveness during labor strife.5  
Generally, these training efforts paid off, and by the Spanish-American War’s onset the 
militia was better trained than at perhaps any previous time in the organization’s history.  
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However, antiquated laws and a disastrous military mobilization proved that the existing 
structure would not suffice if the United States ever faced a strong, modern military 
force. 
During the Spanish-American war, the United States struggled to organize its 
military elements.  Because the nation had no official conscription protocol, the 
government relied on the volunteer ethic much as it had in earlier American wars.  And 
while numerous militiamen enthusiastically volunteered for service, the government 
required all state soldiers to leave their militia units and volunteer for Army service.  This 
process became confusing, as each state needed to meet quota requirements based on 
population, but received little federal guidance or support.6  In the end, this slow and 
inefficient mobilization greatly hindered the US military’s overall effectiveness, and the 
federal government took steps to ensure that future mobilizations would move more 
smoothly. 
In the early twentieth century, Congress took steps to reform and reshape the 
militia.  Calls to reform the militia were certainly not new, and indeed, many political and 
civil leaders made various proposals throughout the Gilded Age, often to no avail.  
However, reform-minded Progressives began reassessing the nation’s military structure 
in the aftermath of the war with Spain and ensuing Filipino Insurrection.  Led by 
Congressman Charles Dick (who also served in the Ohio National Guard), these 
reformers gained the NGA’s support and took steps to reshape the militia into a more 
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centralized force.  The Militia Act of 1903, or the Dick Act, officially created the 
National Guard and replaced the militia with this more nationalized force.  While the 
Dick Act was only the first step in an ongoing process, the federal government 
established federal guidelines for each National Guard unit and established a process for 
federalization during national emergencies that did not require individual state sanction.7 
Amendments to the Dick Act in 1908 and 1910 further solidified federal authority over 
the National Guard and increased federal oversight regarding training and funding. 
As the First World War erupted in Europe, the US government again assessed 
whether or not the nation was prepared to enter into an armed conflict against a European 
force.  Increased tensions with the Mexican government between 1910 and 1915 only 
increased calls for military preparedness despite America’s neutrality.  In 1915, Secretary 
of War Lindley Garrison proposed that Congress make serious alterations to the existing 
military structure and effectively transform the National Guard into a universally 
conscripted and trained military force similar to the Swiss model.  Some Congressmen 
and Senators made similar restructuring proposals, and Congress blended the proposals 
into the National Defense Act of 1916 (NDA), or the Hay-Chamberlain Law, rejecting 
Garrison’s proposal for a universal military force.  The NDA officially established the 
National Guard as a key element of the US Army’s force structure, and allowed the 
president to mobilize the Guard for any national emergency either at home or abroad.  
The NDA further outlined a new divisional structure which included the National Guard, 
and established that the Guard would receive full federal recognition and monetary 
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compensation when on active service.8  In many ways, the National Defense Act of 1916 
served as the final major step in transferring ultimate Guard authority away from the 
states to the federal government.  By the time the United States entered the First World 
War, the National Guard was a centralized supplement to the Regular Army, not a 
collection of individual state military units. 
Only weeks after Congress passed the National Defense Act, the National Guard 
found itself on active duty as a defensive force along the Mexican border.  Woodrow 
Wilson activated the National Guard in light of a series of raids Francisco “Pancho” Villa 
made into US territory and after John J. Pershing failed to capture Villa with his punitive 
expedition into Mexico.  Many guardsmen welcomed this opportunity to carry their state 
and national colors into battle, but became disillusioned when war became increasingly 
unlikely.  Some guardsmen questioned the legality of a second oath of service to the 
federal government under the NDA and refused to take the oath, claiming that they 
enlisted under the Dick Act’s structure.  Many of these soldiers backed down when the 
War Department threatened a court-martial, but the issue rearose when the soldiers 
returned home from the border.  Overall, though, border duty became a prolonged 
training exercise that had many positive long-term benefits for the Guard related to 
military effectiveness.  While the federal government disregarded the NDA’s new 
divisional structure at the border in exchange for speedy transportation to border sites, 
this military exercise became the first test the new National Guard faced.  Though the 
border duty exposed many shortcomings of the Guard system, when the National Guard 
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returned from active duty they were well-trained and prepared for wartime service.9  And 
importantly, because the War Department eventually granted discharges to any 
guardsmen who refused the federal oath, the post-border Guard became the foundation 
for the Guard’s continued service under the NDA of 1916. 
The National Guard’s second military test under the new structure came within 
weeks of the border duty’s conclusion, when the United States declared war on Germany 
in 1917.  When the US went to war, the National Guard became an important element in 
the nation’s force structure, despite low numbers following a series of discharges 
regarding border service.  The federal government reorganized the National Guard to fit 
yet another new divisional structure, with a regional element, and officially removed the 
Guard from state control (complete with new numeric unit designators).  Most of these 
new divisions required extensive recruitment efforts and training, and proceeded to state-
side training sites, along with their Regular Army and drafted counterparts.  Other Guard 
units, such as the 26th Infantry Division (New York Guard) began their move overseas 
near the end of 1917 along with the 1st Infantry Division (Regular Army).  Additionally, 
the War Department combined elements from 26 states into the newly designated 42nd 
Infantry Division (Rainbow Division), which held some of the first American soldiers to 
reach the front lines.  By war’s end, the National Guard comprised nearly two-thirds of 
the American Expeditionary Force, and the 42nd Division and 26th Division witnessed 
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more days of consecutive combat than any other division except the 1st.10  While some 
Guard units failed militarily—most notably the 35th Infantry Division—most performed 
their duty on par with the Regular Army, and many high ranking Army officers, such as 
John Pershing and Douglas MacArthur, praised the Guard’s efforts.11 
 Despite the Guard’s wartime successes, the National Guard faced an ongoing 
struggle upon its return.  During the Gilded Age and Progressive Eras, militia and Guard 
opponents made repeated replacement proposals, often related to some form of universal 
military training.  These Guard opponents stressed the militia’s and Guard’s inabilities to 
supplement the Regular Army adequately in combat due to competing state interests and 
levels of readiness.  Additionally, those who supported universal training often pointed to 
internal Guard strife and tensions with organized labor as evidence of the Guard’s 
inability to recruit the required numbers and maintain a high level of military proficiency.  
Some influential figures, such as Emory Upton in the nineteenth century and Enoch 
Crowder in the twentieth pressed for the militia’s and Guard’s replacement.12  However, 
the NGA remained a powerful force and maintained relationships with many 
Congressional officials who retained and ultimately strengthened the National Guard.  
However, even the Guard’s wartime performance did not ensure the organization would 
survive after the first two decades of the twentieth century. 
 As the National Guard began returning from France in 1919, Enoch Crowder, the 
Army’s judge advocate general, ruled that any guardsmen who served on active duty and 
                                                          
10 Brigadier General Henry J. Reilly, Americans All: The Rainbow at War, Official History of the 42nd 
Rainbow Division in the World War 2nd ed. (Columbus: The F.J. Heer Printing Co., 1936). 
11 U.S. Congress, National Defense: Hearings Before the United States House Committee on Military 
Affairs, Sixty-Ninth Congress, Second Session, on Mar. 3, 1927, Part 1 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1927).   
12 Biennial Report of the Adjutant General of Iowa, for the Biennial Period Ended November 30, 1916 (Des 
Moines: State Printing Office, 1917). 
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received a subsequent discharge would be exempt from any and all other military 
obligations—including state service.  This ruling effectively dismantled the existing 
National Guard, leaving states with only small forces.  This hollowing out of the entire 
National Guard dismayed many state governors, as well as the NGA and other Guard 
advocates.  Congress responded by establishing a series of amendments to the National 
Defense Act in 1920.  These new legislative elements allowed the National Guard to 
reenlist those with prior service for a shorter period, and also provided new recruitment 
incentives to both the states and soldiers.  Additionally, the NDA of 1920 solidified the 
Army’s new divisional structure and ensured that following a war or other national 
emergency, the National Guard would not dissolve.  By 1921, then, the National Guard 
was cemented as a major piece of the US Army’s force structure, and the Guard had 
become a truly national force, with a state service obligation during peacetime. 
 
The Guard and society 
 As the National Guard evolved into a centralized force, the old militia and new 
National Guard reflected American societal and cultural developments.  Since the 
nation’s founding, citizen-soldiers comprised the organized militia, and the state forces 
relied on an element of the martial spirit for their survival.  During the Gilded Age, the 
militia drew from a cross section of American society, and while many of the militia’s 
practices (such as officer elections) remained outdated, Americans from all walks of life 
served in state units.  This meant that the militia contained soldiers from various ethnic 
backgrounds, racial identities, and social classes.  While the militia (and National Guard) 
remained segregated throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
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working-class militiamen served alongside upper-class soldiers and officers.  And 
importantly, throughout the latter part of the nineteenth century, an emerging middle-
class took on an active role in driving both social and militia reforms. 
 The middle-class’s emergence in the United States sparked a series of reform 
movements geared toward professionalization and increased efficiency, and coincided 
with general trends in the development of modern statehood.  During the Gilded Age and 
into the Progressive Era, this developing middle-class consisted of two main groups in 
the United States.  Lawyers, doctors, teachers, and other professionals comprised the first 
group who regularly formed professional organizations such as the American Bar 
Association and the American Medical Association to support their cause and establish 
their professional identity.13  Not surprisingly, middle-class officers in the militia formed 
the National Guard Association during the same timeframe, and the NGA stressed the 
same form of professional development, but within a military context.  The middle-
class’s second group consisted of an emerging group of middle managers in an 
incorporated business world.  This management class stressed efficient and centralized 
business models, which paralleled similar movements within the militia.14  The 
combination of these middle-class oriented reform movements became the Progressive 
Era’s platform, and served a vital role in shaping the basis of what became the National 
Guard in 1903.    
 Though the National Guard’s development stemmed from Progressive Era trends, 
the Guard maintained the same internal social structure as the late-nineteenth century 
militia.  Therefore, Guard soldiers from various social classes served alongside one 
                                                          
13 Robert Wiebe, The Search for Order, 1877-1920 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967). 
14 Wiebe, Search for Order, 111-23. 
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another in individual companies and regiments, and men from various ethnic 
backgrounds (particularly immigrants) used the National Guard as a means of cultural 
assimilation.  African American soldiers also looked to the Guard to demonstrate their 
civic virtue, and while these black soldiers served in segregated units, the National Guard 
reflected larger social and racial dynamics in the United States.  Due to this demographic 
makeup, ongoing social and racial tensions often played out within the National Guard, 
and the National Guard regularly became involved in social and racial uprisings.  State 
governors continued to utilize the National Guard during labor strikes and riots to restore 
order or prevent further violence. 
 In most cases, the National Guard carried out its mission during strike or riot duty 
with little incident, and often managed to quell the violence.  However, in isolated 
instances, the National Guard (like the militia before) failed to end the uprising 
peacefully, and sometimes actually exacerbated an already volatile situation.  For 
example, when the Illinois National Guard responded to a race riot in East St. Louis in 
1917, many guardsmen showed a racial hostility and often targeted and sometimes shot 
or killed terrified civilians with little regard for orders or a sense of civility.15  Cases such 
as this were the exception, though, and not the rule.  Unfortunately for the Guard, public 
perception played a role in organizational reform proposals, and this type of negative 
publicity dated back to the militia’s struggles during the Railroad Strike of 1877.  
Additionally, despite these rare occurrences of breakdowns during strike or riot duty, 
organized labor organizations came to view the militia and then the National Guard as an 
enemy.  Forty years of such tensions took their toll on the National Guard, and many 
working-class soldiers struggled to balance their Guard duty with their working class 
                                                          
15 Special Comm. on the East St. Louis Riots, H.R. Doc. No. 65-1231, at 1-2 (1918). 
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identity.  Internal strife related to strike duty hindered the National Guard’s ability to 
carry out its mission, and many guardsmen responded to strike or riot duty with a sense 
of hostility.  
 Although the National Guard struggled with hostility related to strike and riot 
duty, the Guard continued to appeal to men from various backgrounds who hoped to 
demonstrate their patriotism and masculinity.  Because the Guard appealed to a 
traditional sense of civic virtue related to civilian military service, many middle-class 
citizens enlisted in the Guard to fulfill their civic duty without needing to live the life of a 
soldier in the Regular Army.  Furthermore, the National Guard appealed to a futuristic 
drive among young men who hoped to use military service as a means of attaining glory 
and purpose.16  In a similar vein, working-class men who lost a sense of masculine 
identity as machines replaced manual labor in the workplace, could maintain such an 
identity through Guard service.  The National Guard provided an arena where men could 
demonstrate their masculinity through marksmanship drills and inter-squad 
competition.17  For these reasons then, the National Guard continued to recruit from a 
wide demographic, and managed to stabilize their manpower numbers despite labor union 
hostility.    
 The National Guard transformed from an ineffective state-based militia force into 
a competent centralized military force during the Progressive Era.  This transition was not 
always smooth, and the Guard faced many challenges from universal military training 
advocates to organized labor.  Ultimately though, the National Guard met these 
                                                          
16 Filippo Tommaso Marinetti, “The Foundation and Manifesto of Futurism,” Poesia, April, 1909. Originally 
published as “Manifeste du futurism,” Le Figaro (Paris), February 20, 1909. 
17 Eleanor Hannah, Manhood, Citizenship, and the National Guard: Illinois, 1870-1917 (Columbus: The 
Ohio State University Press, 2007). 
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challenges and demonstrated their military effectiveness during the First World War.  
The National Guard met—and often exceeded—expectations in the trenches in France, 
and National Guard advocates solidified the Guard’s role in the American military 
structure in 1920.  In the ensuing decades, the National Guard continued to reflect 
broader trends in the United States’ social development, and the National Guard 
remained an avenue through which American men and women of all races and 
backgrounds could fulfill a sense of civic virtue and patriotism.  During the Second 
World War, the National Guard again found itself federalized under the NDA’s divisional 
structure, and again met military expectations.  While the Guard served a minimal 
wartime role during the Vietnam War, the Guard reemerged as a key piece of the US’s 
combat force in the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.18  
 Not surprisingly, the National Guard faces a series of new challenges in today’s 
military environment.  Some of these new struggles have their roots in the Guard’s 
Progressive Era origins.  Federally-mandated Army training requirements have increased 
exponentially in recent years, and the National Guard struggles to meet these 
requirements during their drill weekends and annual training sessions.  Due to time 
constraints, officers in both the Regular Army and National Guard regularly find 
themselves exaggerating training reports to meet federal mandates.19  While some of 
these issues are related to an expanded bureaucracy, they grew out of the federal 
                                                          
18 “The National Guard’s Legacy,” accessed June 2014 http://www.nationalguard.com/legacy; and Major 
General Timothy Lowenberg, “The Role of the National Guard in National Defense and Homeland 
Security,” accessed February 2016,  http://www.ngaus.org/sites/default/files/pdf/primer%20fin.pdf.  
19 Leonard Wong and Stephen J. Gerras, Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession (Carlisle 
Barracks: United States Army War College, 2015); and “Report: Army Officers Admit to (and Defend) their 
Lying,” The Army Times, February 19, 2015, accessed December 2015 
http://www.armytimes.com/story/military/careers/army/2015/02/19/-army-lying-distrust-
ethics/23678429/.  
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government’s increased control over the National Guard beginning with the Dick Act of 
1903.  Although the National Guard maintains its heritage in the old militia system, the 
national nature of the organization was a Progressive Era creation, and that idealism 
drove the Guard’s development after 1903.  Ultimately, the National Guard has remained 
central to the United States’ force structure throughout the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries, and can trace their current origins to the military reforms of the early twentieth 
century. 
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